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Introduction 
 
Laura Cull, John Mullarkey and Helen Julia Minors 
Surrey University and Kingston University 
 
This conference, held on 13th and 14th April 2012 at the London Studio Centre, 
brought together practitioners and scholars concerned with the question of how 
performance thinks from a wide range of overlapping perspectives and contexts 
including practice-as-research, professional practice and the emerging sub-field of 
‘Performance Philosophy’. The conference was co-hosted by the PSi Performance 
and Philosophy working group, founded and then chaired by Laura Cull, and the 
Practice Research Unit, of Kingston University, led by John Mullarkey and Helen 
Julia Minors. The union of these organisations ensured that the delegation covered 
theatre studies, drama, dance, music, film, documentary practice, fine art, design, 
performance arts, creative arts technologies and experimental arts. 
 
Both days and evening performance were sold out, with a long waiting list. Over a 
100 scholars and practitioners came together over two days to explore the following 
questions:  
 
• Can performance be understood as a kind of thinking in its own right?  
 
• What value might such an understanding have for performance and 
philosophical research, for academia and for practices operating outside the 
academy? 
  
The idea of practice-as-research has achieved a growing institutional acceptance in 
international Higher Education institutions over the last decade, with funding 
councils, government bodies and academic institutions increasingly recognising the 
capacity of arts practices, as well as text-based research, to produce new 
knowledge. Likewise, in his recent book, Philosophers and Thespians, Freddie 
Rokem argues that the question of how, or in what ways, performance and theatre 
“think”, constitutes one of ‘the most urgent issues on the agenda of today’s 
institutions of higher education’ (Rokem, 2010: 5). And yet, the tendency to treat 
performance as the mere application or exemplication of pre-existing ideas (for 
instance, from philosophy) remains a feature of scholarship in both Performance and 
Philosophy. In contrast, this conference questioned:  
 
• Can we extend or democratize, perhaps, our conception of what counts as 
‘thought’ without rendering the term meaningless?  
 
• To what extent can performance be understood as a way of thinking rather 
than as the illustration, application or demonstration of existing ideas – 
including philosophical ideas? 
  
Presenters addressed topics and questions included the following, and a large 
number are produced as essays in what follows: 
  
• Performance practice-as-research, performance as a contribution to 
knowledge  
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• Performance practice as a kind of thinking, including dance, theatre, 
performance art, Live Art, music, applied theatre, performance in everyday life 
etc. 
 
• Practitioner knowledge and its dissemination: knowing-how and knowing-that  
 
• Thinking as the process of making performance and/or performance as 
thinking through/with the audience 
 
• Can performance be understood as a kind of thinking? If so, what are the 
benefits and risks of doing so, for performance and/or for philosophy? 
 
• How does performance present ideas, create concepts or produce knowledge 
in itself? 
 
• Do current definitions of ‘practice-as-research’ effectively capture how 
performance thinks? 
 
• What do we mean by thought or thinking? How does including performance 
within the category of thinking affect other disciplines such as philosophy? 
 
• Is thinking something that only humans can do? Or can we speak of non-
human thinking? 
 
• What, if anything, is distinct about how performance thinks? What are the 
forms of thought that are native or indigenous to performance (in contrast, 
perhaps, to those that belong to other disciplines)? 
 
• How, specifically, do different kinds of performance think? Through the body? 
Through participatory experiences? Through duration and liveness? Through 
improvisation and devising? 
 
• Is there a difference between the ways in which thinking occurs in and as solo 
and collaborative forms of performance? 
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http://psi-ppwg.wikidot.com/london-2012 
 
 
The Society of Dance Research offered a highly complementary review of this event 
in its Newsletter No. 52 (July 2012). João Florêncio noted that the ‘panels [had] such 
exceptional quality and, most of all, cohesion.’ The ‘several’ keynote addresses were 
seen as ‘punctuations’ to the cohesive nature of the event. In particular: 
 
you will know how often one sits on a panel where the papers presented find it 
extremely hard to resonate with one another and where, during Q&A, most 
questions seem to be directed at individuals speakers rather than at the 
similarities (and, consequently, the differences) amongst them. In How 
Performance Thinks nothing of that kind happened... this was vehemently 
praised by the audience during the closing roundtable. (p. 4) 
 
The essays presented here, collated and edited by Helen Julia Minors, represent the 
content of the speaker’s presentations. The original conference pack is available 
from http://psi-ppwg.wikidot.com/london-2012 
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Directing & Dialectics: Re-thinking Regietheater 
 
Peter M Boenisch 
University of Surrey 
 
If one was to look for an example in the field of theatre arts of what Jacques Rancière 
in his fashionable politico-aesthetic terminology calls dissensus, one could hardly find 
a field of more deeply entrenched mésentente than what is often (and even more often 
with derogatory undertones) called ‘directors’ theatre’:1 the production of mostly 
canonical playtexts and classics of the dramatic repertoire, staged by contemporary 
directors, usually in the subsidised state and city theatres of Continental Europe and 
their resident ensemble companies. Even some 150 years after theatre directing 
emerged in the wake of the Meininger, Wagner, Antoine and Craig, it is still perceived, 
not only in the Anglophone world, as something outright outlandish if not outrageous. 
In the memorable words of a New York theatre critic (writing on Flemish director Jan 
Lauwers’ celebrated production Isabella’s Room), it marks the fatal ‘sins of Eurotrash 
theater’, which the critic helpfully goes on to classify as ‘wilful obscurity, over-the-top 
stagecraft, auteur-ish egocentrism’ (McCarter, 2004: 19). Such short of pathological 
rejection is then counterbalanced by others who idolise the very same directors as 
Wunderkinder and prophets of a theatre that is different, fresh, or simply exotic. Not 
the least since moving from Germany to the UK a decade ago, I have been particularly 
fascinated by this remarkable gap in the perception and experience of Continental 
theatre work in the Anglo-American world – even more so since it quite strikingly 
mirrors a similar rift between Anglo-American pragmatic ‘realist’ thinking and 
Continental philosophy. An interesting parallel opens up here between what François 
Cusset has investigated as the phenomenon of ‘French Theory’ (Cusset, 2008) and 
what is branded as especially German Regietheater (Carlson, 2009). My following 
‘thinking in progress’ therefore moves in that field that interlinks the vogue and the 
hatred of, say, Jacques Rancière and Thomas Ostermeier alike. 
 
Such an exploration might be quite timely. In the heydays of performance art and the 
decades of devising, the production of playtexts was widely perceived as the very big 
Other from which experimental, innovative practices sought to distance themselves, 
with the director as personified figure of authority and disciple that was rejected 
(Oddey, 1994). More recently, however, both theatre theory and performance practice 
have begun to freshly embrace and explore the work with texts and textual legacies, 
which renewed interest in theatre directing as a core theatral practice (Delgado and 
Rebellato, 2010; Lavender and Harvie, 2010). Yet, while we find many ‘How To’-
manuals flooding the bookshelves, we still lack a more thorough reflection of, to 
paraphrase the title of this conference, ‘how directing thinks’ – despite Patrice Pavis’ 
tireless attempts to articulate a theory of mise en scène (Pavis, 2007 and 2010). Of 
course, much directorial work has lent itself perfectly to considerations of postmodern 
deconstruction, gender critique, postcolonial re-readings of the Western canon, and 
other academic pursuits. I shall here attempt, however, a more structural approach to 
outlining an understanding directing. 
 
To start with, let me propose the hypothesis that terms such as directing, producing, 
mise en scène and Regie are not simply mere ‘translations’ in different languages for 
one and the same general theatrical principle of ‘directing’ as such. Instead, the 
varying terms precisely reflect quite specific approaches, pointing us to variant 
underlying ‘partitions of the sensible’, to phrase it in Rancièrian terminology. This link 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rancière introduces his aesthetico-political thinking most lucidly in Rancière 2009. 
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between the artistic organisation of a wealth of disparate semiotic materials and 
differing modes of thinking is crucial. As Alain Badiou affirms, ‘the assemblage of 
components directly produces ideas’ (Badiou, 2005: 72). Badiou describes the theatre 
director as ‘thinker of representation’ who, in the name of theatre as an event of 
thought, ‘carries out a very complex investigation into the relationships between text, 
acting, space and public.’ (Badiou, 2007: 40). Furthermore, he asserts that the 
emergence of the new art of theatral mise en scène marks the very moment which 
‘transformed the thinking of representation into an art in its own right.’ (ibid.). Yet, here 
we should bear in mind that Badiou’s very idea of a ‘complex investigation’ precisely 
reflects a certain, a most specific dispositif that creates the categorical gap to directing 
in the pragmatic, ‘realist’ (Anglophone) sense of ‘producing’ a play. Of course, 
someone has always in a sense ‘directed’ and ‘produced’ a theatre performance – the 
question is: why had the emergence of Regie and mise en scène become a necessity 
in the early nineteenth century? The emergence of a new way of ‘thinking 
representation’ is exactly the background that underpins Continental directing or 
Regie, and links it to the simultaneously emerging Continental philosophy from Kant 
and German idealism onwards. To begin understanding ‘how directing thinks’, I 
therefore propose to turn back to this moment in the early nineteenth century that saw 
the paradigm shift which Rancière described as the transition from the 
representational to the aesthetic regime of art.  
 
In particular, I turn here to Friedrich Schiller, who is – for different reasons – also one 
of Rancière’s key heralds of the aesthetic regime of art. Schiller’s legacy is 
ambiguous, to say the least. On the one hand, he remains for the German 
Bildungsbürger-establishment an icon of its self-definition, not the least in the field of 
theatre (Sharpe, 1995). Schiller’s 1784 lecture on ‘Theatre Considered as A Moral 
Institution’ serves to the present day as principal manifesto of the institutionalised 
German Stadt- and Staatstheater system, which is taught on every introductory 
module in theatre studies.2 This Schiller certainly embodies all the bourgeois 
conservative values for which he has undergone some harsh Eagletonian ideological 
grilling (Eagleton, 1990). Yet, Schiller also developed what Herbert Marcuse once 
described as ‘one of the most advanced positions of thought’ in its time (Marcuse, 
1987: 188). Most interestingly this thought emerged from thinking through theatre and 
aesthetic theory, precisely a ‘thinking of representation’. 
 
I want to explore here some crucial contours referring to a particularly fascinating 
moment in Schiller’s late work. Two years before his death, he staged an at first sight 
rather irritating attempt to reintroduce the Greek chorus into a contemporary tragedy, 
The Bride of Messina of 1803. The common interpretation explains this play as a 
nostalgic devotion to some lost ideal of Greek culture towards the end of Schiller’s 
career, as his withdrawal into an aesthetic realm after the disillusioning turn into violent 
terror of the French Revolution, whose spirit had underpinned so much of his early 
dramatic works of the 1780s. Such a perspective, however, obscures the mature 
radicalism of this experiment. While the actual play may have been a failure on stage, 
we can also look at the Bride of Messina as a complex piece of ‘practice as research’, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ‘Schaubühne’ is the literal German translation of the Greek theatron, ‘the place to watch’, ‘thea’ 
being the ‘gaze’ or ‘Schau’. Schiller originally delivered his notorious speech on June 26, 1784 to the 
Kurpfälzische Deutsche Gesellschaft at Mannheim, where he had just become an elected member. It 
first appeared in print the following year. At the time, it was still entitled ‘What can a fine permanent 
theatre truly achieve?’ Only when Schiller edited the manuscript for his Collected Works in 1802, he 
rewrote parts of it and gave it the new title, ‘Theatre Considered as a Moral Institution’. An English 
translation is readily available at http://www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/schil_theatremoral.html (access 
15 May 2012). 
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as we would say today. Schiller even provided us with an articulate essay in the 
preface that accompanied the published playtext.3 Here it becomes clear that 
Schiller’s motivation was far from recreating a lost theatrical past, but to point to the 
future through the past. He stresses that the function of the chorus only fully came into 
its own for the playwright of his own time. He describes this function, with a term that 
would later also occupy a key place in Walter Benjamin’s aesthetic, as being a ‘foreign 
body’, a ‘fremdartiger Körper’. On the one hand, this strangeness of the chorus 
enhances the power and effect of (in Schiller’s terms) ‘exalted’ theatrical 
representation. On the other hand, the chorus participates in the drama as embodied 
representation of thinking to which it awards sensory force, quite literally, giving 
‘gravity’ to an idea, a material form in performance that gives the idea its ‘exhaustive 
presence’ as Schiller terms it (Schiller, 1970: 111). The central function of the Chorus 
is thus a mediation that enhances both sensual pleasure and intelligent reflection: 
‘Just as the chorus brings life to the language, so it brings repose to the action’ 
(Schiller, 1970: 112; orig. emphasis). This idea of balancing out, of an equilibrium, is at 
the heart of Schiller’s key aesthetic notion of ‘play’. ‘Play’, for him, does not refer to 
ludic qualities of performance, not to harmless ‘childish’ play nor to ironic romantic 
playfulness that would relieve us momentarily from realities of work or from the 
political state of the (‘superior’) ‘adult’ worlds – this would be no more than an idea of 
theatre as play that reduces performance to the ‘court jester’ of our contemporary 
societies. Schiller’s concept of play, however, evokes the sense of the German term 
‘Spiel haben’: to have the tolerance, flexibility, or ‘play’ in a technical sense, in order 
not to get stuck. 
 
Theatre as play is hence above all an act of mediation that avoids what Schiller 
perceives as harmful excesses of either ‘cold intellect’ or equally of ‘unreflected’ 
sensuality. It is a mediating and regulating function which in many ways points beyond 
Kant, to whom Schiller declared all his allegiance, towards a dialectic thinking later 
systematised by Hegel with explicit nods to Schiller. Play is precisely something that 
intervenes in the binaries, such as those between text and performance, or between 
words and spectacle. It is what calibrates form and matter, subject and object, 
abstraction and fantasy, reflection and representation, the sensory and the sensual. It 
offers what Kojin Karatani has termed a ‘transcritital position’, from which we can 
challenge binary notions such as ‘authorship’ or ‘presence’ (Karatani, 2003). It is for 
this reason that play becomes a condition of Schiller’s most central value: freedom, or 
– in the French coinage of his time, liberty. This liberty of play affords, above all, 
aesthetic autonomy – a key aspect of the aesthetic regime at large, which has often 
been reduced to a romantic withdrawal from reality. In his Chorus essay, Schiller 
resolutely proclaims his statement of intent for introducing the chorus as ‘to declare 
openly and honestly war against naturalism in art, it should be for us a living wall, 
which tragedy builds around itself to seal itself off in purity from the real world, to 
preserve its ideal ground, its poetic liberty.’ (Schiller, 1970: 108) 
 
This autonomy is not a retreat, but a safeguard and security measure. It is, above all, 
a structural, a relational position. Only on this formal basis is art able to gesture 
towards ‘true liberty’ that goes beyond ‘a fleeting dream of liberty’, as Schiller terms it, 
with which even Schiller’s own plays may inspire us when watching Don Carlos or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I will provide my own translations throughout for all of Schiller’s essays referred to in this chapter, 
quoting for easy reference to standard editions of the German original. In English, the ‘Chorus’-preface 
is readily available online from the Schiller Institute http://www.schillerinstitute.org/fid_91-
96/931_chorus_trag.html (accessed 15 May 2012). Together with Schiller’s other central writings on 
theatre, it is included in Schiller 1970, to which I refer as source for my quotations. 
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Wilhelm Tell. Yet Schiller’s freedom is precisely not the representation of issues of 
freedom in a playtext: Just as the mere appearance of truth does not yet constitute 
truth, the mere representation of liberty on stage is not in itself an act of liberation. We 
can here usefully link with Rancière’s prominent meditations on the ‘emancipated 
spectator’: actual freedom can only ever be achieved on the basis of a formal, 
structural liberation – and this is precisely what ‘play’ achieves. We now see what 
Schiller is after when he asserts that any ‘true art’ will ‘not merely aim at a momentary 
play; its serious intention is not to excite us with, but to genuinely make us free’ (Ibid.: 
106; orig. emphasis). It ‘emancipates’ not by waxing radical, but by putting us in an 
actual position of liberty, a liberty which Schiller understands as ‘the liberty of mind in 
the lively play of all of its powers’. (Ibid.: 105) 
 
This is thus not freedom as directorial ‘anything goes’. Instead, play suspends the 
Master authority of ‘The Play’ as well as that of the Author, and of the director. This is 
where the assumption of a competition for superior authority and auteur-ship between 
playwright and director that still to a large extent dominates theatre-academic thinking, 
needs to be rejected. The minute slippage in terminology from German Regietheater, 
a ‘theatre of directing’ to “directors’ theatre” which emphases the individual artist, 
discloses an optic that seeks to explain if not to integrate the practice of Regie as 
‘thinking of representation’ in terms of the very representational dispositif with which it 
set out to break. It solidifies the position of an individual director-auteur who fits the 
concepts of modern Western individuality, subjective agency, and a history of (theatre) 
art written in terms of the works produced by creative makers who – between producer 
delivering his goods and inventive geniuses – command and authorise the direction.  
 
In this model, the playwright’s authorised text becomes the ‘Text with capital T’, the 
Master Signifier that commands and controls the direction of a theatre production 
should take, the way it should run. The director can in this perspective only be judged 
in terms of his (dis-) obedience to that legitimating authority – there is no room for the 
Badiouian ‘thinking’. Directing as Regie, however, introduces a minimal gap that would 
forever interrupt the hermeneutic exegesis of the text as one with the drama that 
characterised the representational regime: the mise en scène becomes a contingent 
complement that mediates and sublates the Text. It is a dialectical operation which 
produces the Text as Master Signifier but at the very same time introduces this very 
shift of perspective, this minimal gap or distancing which Slavoj Žižek has termed ‘the 
parallax view’ (Žižek, 2006), describing this dialectical approach as ‘the basic attitude 
of philosophy’ (Žižek, 1993: 2). The director is thus not only the philosopher as ‘thinker 
of representation’, but with Žižek’s Lacanian stance also the analyst who insists on the 
contingency of the Text. 
 
The Chorus is Schiller’s ‘practice as research’ experiment to create a theatral tool to 
achieve this aim: as Schiller explicitly states, as a foreign body, it irritates, halts, and 
interrupts the effortless progress of the play. It is in a term closer to Schiller’s own time 
what Hölderlin outlined as poetic caesura: an intervention, a rupture, an interval, a 
border that opens up in the seamless imaginary world of the play – and as such play is 
indeed ultimately a philosophical gesture. It affords the space for a different ‘partition 
of the sensible’, for precisely a thinking through of representation à la Badiou. 
Schiller’s chorus thus embodied play – it was an attempt to give a body on stage to the 
very function that would soon be ‘directed’ off stage by Regie: the indispensible 
mediation between the ideal and the sensual, between action and reflection as 
guarantor for the spectator’s emancipated liberty, which is not about ‘understanding’ 
and thereby commanding ‘The Play’, not about consuming and thereby turning the 
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playtext into a commodity, into the Master Signifier of ‘The Text’, and hence precisely 
not about appropriation, ownership, and authority. Far from merely rethinking the 
production of performance (and one should pause here to reflect on the direct 
connection to the simultaneously solidifying contexts of industrial, capitalist modes of 
production in the nineteenth century), Regie is not at all exhaustively grasped as 
merely a new ‘craft’ of staging a text, hence as solely functional relation. Far from 
articulating the ‘practical’ representation of a playtext, Regie is a in the Hegelian sense 
‘speculative’ practice. At the very moment when the gap between text and 
performance, just as much as the gap between the material world and our rational 
understanding, became a prime concern, mise en scène entered the scene as a 
resolutely autonomous, third factor that sets in motion the dialectical ‘play’ – a 
relational process which sees the continuous metamorphosis of the same play-text in 
its persistent mediation and sublation, above all, in its persistent motion that cannot 
afford static standstill: set in motion by the mise en scène, we are offered non-
standardised, non-unified, non-homogenised gazes of play that offer us, precisely, a 
(parallax) perspective. Schillerian play is the name for this ceaseless transposition that 
never arrests a structure in fixed hierarchies or stable positions. That is what the 
theatral practices of Regie and mise en scène, as historically specific manifestations of 
‘theatre directing’, share with the (quintessentially Hegelian) aesthetics of Continental 
idealism. 
 
The legacy of Regie as the organisation of texts, spaces, bodies, voices and sounds, 
costumes, light, and not the least of the spectating public in order to think through 
representation strikes me as particularly relevant in the context of our own mediatised 
digital global economy of the 21st century. Let me conclude by just pointing briefly to 
the three most crucial prompts which directing and Regietheater as a ‘thinking theatre’ 
may offer: 
 
There is, to start with, the insistence on play as a resolutely non-pragmatic, 
non-functional autonomous act, where ‘playing’ or ‘thinking’ is precisely not 
‘doing’ in the sense of performative instantiation – we should here bear in mind 
the uncanny cross-over between ideologies of ‘performance’ in theatre and in 
economic globalisation, which Jon McKenzie had reminded us about 
(McKenzie, 2001). 
 
Equally important is, secondly, a reflection on our own role as theorists. 
Directors as well as academics and philosophers are only too prone to assume 
the position of the ‘Masters’ who possess the knowledge. We may think of 
Lacan’s analysis of the inaugural moment of philosophy – which is precisely the 
appropriation of Knowledge by the Master, its universalisation and detachment 
as ‘disinterested knowledge’ from the Slave’s utilitarian practical application 
(Lacan, 1988: 21) Rancière insists, of course, in the face of this intellectual 
alienation on ‘ignorance’ as the basis of emancipation.  
 
Lastly, directing offers us a model for negotiating our relation with the past, with 
history and legacies, as embodied in the canon of Western playwriting. Have 
we not been inclined to discard the past, precisely by assuming a superior, 
knowing standpoint of ‘critical deconstruction’? Not the least Derrida himself 
had in the very term of de-construction offered a far more nuanced outline for 
what me might also term an, in the Schillerian sense, ‘playful’ reappropriation 
and reflection of our enlightened tradition. Similarly, Žižek’s re-thinking of Hegel 
and the legacy of German idealism, Badiou’s appropriation of the Pauline 
  12	  
legacy, and not the least Schiller’s own revocation of the Greek chorus follow 
precisely the structural model of re-thinking the dramatic legacy in 
contemporary Regie and its controversial mises en scène. 
 
Perhaps, it has become a central challenge for us today not to leave the conservation 
of our legacies to the ‘Conservatives with the Capital C’. One of the lessons to be 
learned not only from Schiller, especially from his work towards the end of his life, 
when after a thirteen year hiatus that followed 1789 he returned to playwriting, is that 
rejecting the symbolic and imaginary orders also deprives us from the only position of 
agency to engage with the realities of our lives, and prevents us from glimpsing ‘real’ 
freedom in play which Schiller made out as the core of being humane. 
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How Wrestling Thinks: professional wrestling and embodied politics 
 
Broderick Chow 
Brunel University London 
Tom Wells 
Independent artist and researcher 
 
This short paper attempts to document a presentation in which we rehearsed both 
verbally and physically, some theoretical reflections towards an embodied politics, 
considered through an unlikely source, the art and craft of professional wrestling. As 
the reader of this may gather from the images that accompany this text, our original 
presentation attempted to disseminate an embodied or tacit knowledge through a 
demonstration of practice. Live, in the studio, among what Fischer-Lichte (2008) calls 
‘bodily co-presence’ of performer and audience, this knowledge is communicated not 
only through the synthesis of verbal and visual signifiers, but through the conjunction 
of such signifiers with a series of affects — I remember sounds (‘bumps’), heat, 
sweat. This raises a problem common to most practice-as-research projects: if the 
‘thinking’ immanent to practice exists only in the moment of practice, how can it be 
inscribed, set-down, transformed into ‘knowledge’? In this paper we acknowledge but 
do not solve (how could we?) this fundamental difficulty: our contribution to these 
conference proceedings reflects the dual methodological strands of the research 
project. On the one hand, the project is an ethnographic exploration of professional 
wrestling training and culture, in which Broderick as researcher trains, watches, and 
writes in the manner of what the sociologist Loïc Wacquant, in his auto-ethnography 
of boxing, calls ‘observant participation’, contra participant observation (Wacquant, 
2007). On the other hand, the project is an artistic exploration through practice, as 
Tom and Broderick work through wrestling, contact improvisation and other forms of 
contemporary dance in the studio, building a unique dialogue between bodies that 
trades in a dialectic of conflict and cooperation, antagonism and intimacy, friction and 
flow. In this vein, we offer here some theoretical reflections along with an excursus 
on practice, in the hopes that the tacit, embodied knowledge we describe might be 
captured in another form.  
 
 On ‘work’... 
 
Professional wrestling (or ‘pro-wrestling’, and hereafter, simply ‘wrestling’) is often 
presented as the worst example of what Adorno and Horkheimer call ‘the culture 
industry’, the distribution of spectacle in order to placate and pacify the masses. The 
journalist Chris Hedges’ description is representative of such thinking: ‘[the] ritualised 
battles give those packed in the arenas a temporary, heady release from mundane 
lives. [...] For most, it is only in the illusion of the ring that they are able to rise above 
their small stations in life and engage in a heroic battle to fight back’ (Hedges, 2009). 
Wrestling is often criticised for its characters and personae (gimmicks) as well as its 
story-lines, which have been read as jingoistic, racist, sexist and/or homophobic. But 
concomitant with this vulgar exterior is an opportunity through physical and 
embodied practice for the labouring bodies of wrestlers to model, practice, and live 
the political principle of solidarity. Crucial to this reading is the notion of ‘work’, which 
is at the heart of professional wrestling as a practice. In the early 20th century, 
American promoters discovered that by determining the outcome of a match in 
advance they were able to present increasingly spectacular moves and draw in 
greater crowds, as audiences were less interested in gambling on the outcome of 
matches than in other sports. These predetermined matches were known as ‘worked 
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fights.’ Today work is a complex term that signifies a number of conventions: the 
repeated attack on a certain body part (‘work the arm’); the ability to string together 
an improvised series of moves (matches are not choreographed, contrary to popular 
opinion, with the exception of the finish, though certain ‘spots’ are worked out in 
advance); the ability to ‘sell’ moves as real; and the ability to work with and for one’s 
opponent. The opposite of work is shoot, the ever-present potential for real violence, 
injury and pain. Therefore, working, in wrestling can be read as a duty of care to the 
other worker, the practice of protecting one’s partner/opponent from violence. The 
form therefore presents a fundamental contradiction, in that it can be read by its 
audience as manifestly antagonistic and violent, and felt by its performers as 
cooperative and empathetic.  
 
 On ‘action’ and ‘thinking’... 
 
In keeping with the theme of the conference, we argue that the practice of work is a 
form of ‘embodied political thinking.’ However, such a concept raises a number of 
issues. Not least of these, for scholars interested in articulating the relationship 
between artistic practice, theory, and a practice of concrete social change, is the 
distinction raised by Hannah Arendt (1958, 1999) between the viva activa and the 
viva contemplativa, between action, which is to say, politics itself, and thinking. 
Thinking can be about politics, but, for Arendt at least, it was not yet politics-in-itself. 
And yet the viva contemplativa is necessary lest we hasten into action that will 
ultimately make things worse; this is the fear of mis-recognition with which the 
relation of theory and practice has long been fraught. To embody thought, then, is to 
do it, to practice it, bringing the viva contemplativa into the realm of the viva activa. 
Therefore, we submit that the practice of chain wrestling is a practice of the principle 
of solidarity, and thinks, in that it presents a new and uncertain situation to be 
negotiated between its practicing bodies with each performance — a condition it 
shares with Contact Improvisation (which we develop in further detail below).  
 
The individual body in relation to the political sphere raises other issues. Foremost is 
the relation between the body as a site of individual agency and the structuring 
metaphor of the social body. The body is that which does upon the world, and that 
through which power operates, as in Michel Foucault’s analysis the body as the 
‘object and target’ of power. But extended agency, in political terms, often unifies 
many bodies under the signifier of a single ‘body’: consider the term ‘public sector 
bodies.’ The body is physically inserted into economies of work, production and 
consumption, but is also an important social metaphor and synecdoche. In our 
practice, we are aware of the body, specifically our male bodies, as real, individual, 
carnal — the body as an instrument that works and labours, and is circulated as 
variable capital. But we are also conscious of working bodies as metaphorical and 
synecdochal, reflecting and refracting larger narratives of the public body. Fintan 
Walsh argues that the male body in performance may help to define the limits of 
hegemonic norms, and thus the ‘boundaries of the body politic’ (Walsh, 2011). While 
Walsh is interested in instances of performance that pierce and penetrate the male 
body, exposing its ‘resilience and resistance [...] through endurance,’ (Ibid.) wrestling 
offers the possibility for practicing radical politics within hegemonic norms, while all 
the same, challenging them. 
 
Excursus on/through practice: on wrestling and ‘conflict improvisation’ 
 
BRODERICK: 
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Wrestling emphasises kinaesthetic or proprioceptive awareness. A worker must drill 
and train in order to embody a number of different performance traits simultaneously. 
One must learn ‘ring awareness’, what workers call ‘psychology’ (that is, the logic of 
the match), ‘storytelling’, moves, and safety, both for oneself, and one’s opponent. 
This impressive range of performance skills is made more impressive by the 
improvisatory nature of the practice. This is most evident in the technique of ‘chain 
wrestling’, which refers to the process of stringing together a series of moves with a 
partner.  
Image 1: Conflict Improvisation. Chow and Wells. 
 
TOM: 
After my introduction to Contact Improvisation nearly eight years ago I have worked 
as both a solo/ensemble movement artist and movement director. 
Contact Improvisation (CI) and Contact Choreography feature heavily in both the 
style and approach to my creative work. Until Broderick introduced me to the form, 
wrestling was unfamiliar however similarities and correlations to Contact 
Improvisation became apparent. In our most recent piece Work Songs, I have 
worked to integrate the two disciplines to enrich and form a coherent piece of 
physical performance. As forms of physical practice that are based in working with 
partners both contact improvisation and chain wrestling involve a physical dialogue 
that then speaks to the spectator. Both forms rely heavily on learning through doing; 
in all aspects the performers must learn to understand not just the technique 
and discipline but also the signals spoken by the partner’s body.  
 
Contact Improvisation as a dance form originated in America in the early 1970s and 
is accredited mainly to the choreographer Steve Paxton. Contact Improvisation UK 
describes it as an ‘art-sport’, which is ‘about sharing weight, rolling, suspending, 
falling, passive and active, energy and awareness’ (http://www.contactimprovisation. 
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co.uk/, accessed 11 July 2012). Since its earliest days, fighting forms have been 
related to CI. Paxton himself notes that what he had previously learnt in the 
Japanese martial art of Aikido had developed the nature of Contact Improvisation on 
an ‘unconscious level’ (Paxton, cited in Burt, 1995). The performance Magnesium 
(1972), was described ‘like drunken wrestling at times’ (Novack, 1990).  But as the 
form developed from ‘[...] a rough and ready, all-male wrestling dancing’ (Burt, 1995) 
into an internationally practiced discipline and a major feature of post modern dance, 
certain repeated features, or structures developed which might be said to foster free 
play. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 2: Contact 
Improvisation. Chow and Wells. 
 
Similarly, as Laurence de Garis writes, chain wrestling provides ‘endless 
opportunities for creativity within certain structures’ (De Garis, 2005: 192-212). The 
wrestlers dance a duet bound with a language spoken with hidden rules, the end 
result being a beautifully brutal practice of what we can call ‘conflict 
improvisation.’ Holds, grips and other set moves are worked with and not against by 
the partner in an improvised manner. In both wrestling and contact improvisation, 
certain expressive movements between bodies that ‘flow’ can be seen to echo again 
and again. The awareness of one’s partner is paramount in both forms. As partners 
become attuned to each other, they can manipulate instinctual reactions, resulting in 
a safe flow of movement. 
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BRODERICK: 
Observing and participating in training, I have noted that bodily cues that wrestlers 
respond to are either semiotic or purely somatic. For example, a worker will slap his 
chest twice as if to signal aggression, though this reads to the partner as ‘let’s lock-
up’, but as R. Tyson Smith notes, sometimes no visual or audible cues are shared at 
all (Smith, 2008: 157-176). This is called working ‘loose’, which is valued by 
seasoned workers — and Smith himself likens this synchronicity to two dancers well 
acquainted with each other’s bodies. Pro-wrestling requires a kind of internalised 
physical dramaturgy — what workers call ‘logic.’ De Garis describes this with regard 
to a headlock: ‘Both wrestlers must internalise the logic of the headlock in order to be 
completely effective. Not only does the wrestler applying the hold need to make it 
look like pressure is being applied; the wrestler in the headlock must “sell” the pain to 
illustrate the effectiveness of the hold’ (De Garis, 2005: 192-212).  
 
 
Image 3: Internalised physical dramaturgy. Chow and Wells. 
 
TOM: 
In terms of dramaturgy, the professional wrestling match is an augmented version of 
sporting reality. The narrative mimics the turbulence of the real life contest and 
struggle. Similarly, the body of the dancer also highlights and reflects a heightened 
version of reality, movements of support and physical proximity between bodies 
mirrors internal emotional states. The dialogue of the dance exchanged between 
dancing bodies then on a metaphorical level connects and evokes a sense of 
familiarity with the spectator on a larger level. We, as spectators, interpret these 
signifiers in the context of life or the sporting arena.  
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Image 4: Dancing Bodies. Chow and Wells. 
 
BRODERICK: 
See, for example, Roland Barthes’ analysis of the mythic nature of pro-wrestling.  
 
TOM: 
And this myth is structured through logical codes — Barthes himself wrote that   
wrestlers must make each movement logical (Barthes, 1957, 2009). Using contact 
improvisation and/or wrestling in the studio to devise movement I have found that 
logic as a concept plays a vital role. Filming our improvisations, which sometimes 
last over an hour, we can order these to create a ‘contact choreography’ with 
meaning and legitimacy. The sequenced dance born from improvisation gains 
integrity as it begins to mirrors the fluctuations of the relationship between us as 
dancers/characters/personae. The concept of the ‘spot’ in wrestling usefully reflects 
this process. The spot is a rehearsed sequence used to structure the fight, so that 
the eventual improvisation is underpinned with set check points which are recalled 
and returned to during the live event. But the audience read the movement as a 
coherent drama, especially when combined with expressions of the face: the ‘sell’ of 
the wrestler to depict pain is no different to the face of the dancer expressing their 
emotion.  
 
BRODERICK: 
So in practice our synthesis of wrestling and Contact Improvisation exists 
somewhere in a dialectic between structure and free play. Using certain structures, 
codified moves, holds and so on allows us as performers to attune and open up to 
the other. This attuning to affective, embodied gestures of trust and reciprocity is, I 
would argue, an ethical act, one that we like to describe as an ‘ethics of rowdy play.’  
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Image 5: Contact Improvisation. Chow and Wells. 
 
On ‘shoot’: the political economy of pro-wrestling… 
 
Like a dance form such as CI, wrestling is a cooperative physical practice. Just like 
the practice has certain structures and limitations that bring a freedom of play, 
wrestling as a performance form exists within certain structures, against which it can 
be read as a practice of freedom. In the ‘real world’ of wrestling, the embodied 
practice of solidarity of wrestling work both resists and is constituted by its labour 
conditions which can only be described as ‘precarious.’ Precarity, in labour analysis, 
marks those workers who do not and cannot claim forms of security enjoyed under 
Fordist capitalism — for example, job security, pensions, stable working hours or 
contracts, and maternity pay. Wrestlers are defined, even in the WWE, as 
‘independent contractors’ and therefore cannot legally form a union of their own. As 
David Harvey (2009) argues, the body of a worker makes visible his/her insertion 
into what, in Marxian theory is called the circulation of variable capital. For example, 
certain bodily ‘disciplinary practices’ may be adopted. In the precarious labour 
economy of wrestling such practices are clear, all taking the form of damage to the 
physical body. Often, wrestlers work injured. Others may elect to work for promoters 
who go for extreme wrestling, with ‘death matches’ featuring smashed light tubes, 
staple guns, and barbed wire increasingly common. Above all there are the extreme 
physical training measures workers adopt, to attain a hyper-muscular ideal, with the 
use of anabolic steroids a common practice (see, for example, the case of Chris 
Benoit).  
 
But while the wrestler’s body is alienated, reproduced and endlessly circulated in a 
punishing economy of precarious labour, that same body is also a site of resistance, 
following Foucault’s suggestion that ‘power, after investing itself in a body, finds itself 
exposed to a counter-attack in that same body’ (Foucault, 1985). Work, for wrestlers, 
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has value separate to that of the money wage for which that work is remunerated. 
We might characterise this value as ethical or political; Smith suggests emotional: 
‘hostility is almost always displayed, although empathic feelings of cooperation, trust 
and protection are actually being felt’ (Smith, 2008). The underlying bond of trust in 
work, in laying down one’s health and safety to another — this is a bond we can call 
solidarity. Working allows wrestlers, regardless of differences in identities, to identify 
with each other through practice. In an economy of precarious labour where survival 
is individual rather than collective, such solidarity may be seen as radical as it refers 
back to disappearing organisational models of guilds and craftsmen.  
 
Perhaps, however, solidarity is better replaced by ‘friendship.’ The political theorist 
Leela Gandhi conceives of friendship thus, drawing on Derrida: ‘all those invisible 
affective gestures that refuse alignment along the secure axes of filiation to seek 
expression outside, if not against, possessive communities of belonging’ (Gandhi, 
2006). A politics of friendship, is crucially not based on shared identity. In the case of 
wrestlers’ work, these particular affective gestures, which manifest as violent, might 
be thought of as a way of practicing, through the body, a resistance to the 
individualising nature of the economy of precarity. One historical example may help 
to illustrate my claim: in the early 1940s, an Argentinian wrestler of Italian descent, 
Antonino Rocca, was brought to New York by a promoter and quickly rose to 
prominence. In a shameless piece of stereotyping designed solely to bring in money 
and audiences, promoters played up the ‘Italian’ angle, in order to draw in the local 
immigrant community. All the same, a practice of physical cooperation is taking place 
between Rocca and his American opponent/partners, which might not have taken 
place if friendship were solely based on shared identity. It is the practice and training 
of a subjectivity open to the other. 
 
  Conclusions… 
 
Bringing an observant participation of wrestling training into cooperative conflict with 
the practice of Contact Improvisation in a creative, generative studio process has 
provoked reflections on the affective gestures of trust, friendship and physical 
communication beyond the verbal or visual. Reading these reflections against the 
labour economies of professional wrestling, we can argue that the affective gestures 
of wrestling work can be read as a form of embodied politics. Yet it is important to 
acknowledge that such embodied politics exist in a strange paradoxical relation with 
the exploitative conditions which generate them. How can such embodied politics be 
expanded from the work between two individual bodies to the larger social body? 
Let’s return to the problem of the relation between the body and the body politic. If 
we take Fintan Walsh’s argument that the male body in performance might be read 
as a social synecdoche, the limits of which reflect the limits of hegemonic norms, the 
practice of wrestling operates well within hypermasculine and individualistic limits. In 
other words, while ‘what’s in it for the workers’ is solidarity and friendship, ‘what’s in it 
for the fans’? How might the experience of cheering on a melodramatic physical 
theatre of antagonism between caricatured and stereotypical personae be read as 
anything other than politically regressive? Sharon Mazer’s (2005) study on wrestling 
fans suggests one answer. For Mazer, it is not only wrestlers who work, but fans too. 
Wrestling involves ‘kayfabe’ (a term which refers to the convention by which staged 
events are treated as real) on both levels. Fans are savvy enough to read wrestling 
in terms of its codes, looking for the moment when work collapses into shoot (these 
fans are referred to as ‘smart marks’). In the event of a wrestling performance, this 
encompassing work of wrestling and reading points towards the possibility of a 
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shared community of practice, the experience of affective bonds that cut across 
fields of differences.  
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Choreographic Presence: Time, Memory, and Affects 
 
Noyale Colin 
Middlesex University, United Kingdom 
 
My doctoral inquiry into collaborative practices has led me to question the implication 
of the mediatised history of performances. While drawing on historical analysis my 
research seeks to demonstrate how performance practice could account for a 
rethinking of historical time in the way in which it endures in our immediate present, 
beyond representation. I have engaged in a meta-discourse, which reflects upon the 
way in which contemporary choreography can reposition time not as the subject of 
our thinking but as a constitutive force of our process of thoughts. This paper 
examines how the question of memory relates to the way in which the past survives 
in the present, through the emergence of a choreographic presence in the events of 
performance. Through the discussion of the choreographic process of my solo, ‘They 
tried to stand [I am still falling]’, I will explore the issues around the capacity of a 
performer’s body to be always in adjustment with the real. While this work focuses 
on exploring how the audience members could be considered as an imagined 
component of composition in becoming, I will focus on examining how presence in 
dance composition contributes to the articulation of a choreographic thinking in terms 
of time. 
 
In his work Of the Presence of the Body, Andre Lepecki re-assesses the tradition in 
dance studies to consider the ephemeral nature of movement as a weakness of the 
form. Drawing on notions of deconstruction, Lepecki problematizes the theorisation 
of performance ephemerality as ‘the body’s self-erasure in time’. He suggests to 
consider how is it that ‘presence’ challenges the very stability of the body.  He 
argues that this challenge of presence of the body constitutes dance’s unique 
relation to temporality.4 
  
The problem of disappearance persists in dance if we consider the body to exist only 
in a boxed present. Henri Bergson proposed we think of time in terms of duration: ‘to 
explore inner experience –the sensation of qualities and affects – things, he argues, 
that cannot be measured.’ 5 Drawing on such thought, Brian Massumi affirms that ‘it 
is not the present that moves from the past to the future. It is the future-past that 
continually moves through the present’. He observes that ‘a body present is in a 
dissolve [...] a thing cannot be understood without reference to the non-present 
dimension it compresses and...expresses in continuity’.6  
 
The performance element of this inquiry is in dialogue with these ideas, which are 
explored here through an assessment of the legacy of the Judson Church Theatre 
Group - the avant-garde New York-based collective which is widely credited with the 
creation of postmodern dance. Although less concerned with the idea of 
reconstruction itself, ‘They tried to stand [I am still falling]’ (TTS) draws on visual 
research techniques. In the first section, for example, I have copied three typical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 André Lepecki, Of the Presence of the Body: Essay on Performance and Dance Theory, Wesleyan 
University Press, USA, 2004, p. 5. 
5 Susan Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henry Bergson, New York, Cornell University 
Press, 2006, p. 5. 
6 Brian Massumi, Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affects, Sensations, Durham & London, Duke 
University Press, 2002, p. 201. 
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poses of Judsonite aesthetics from photographic documentation of three leading 
group members, namely Yvonne Rainer, Trisha Brown and Steve Paxton. 
 
While in the performance I reproduce these poses, the audience will perceive them 
changing through time – or through duration – through becoming. Framed in that 
way, the body is unable to hold the pose. Instead, the body, being alive, transforms 
the pose and then in the absence of impulse the pose dissolves.  
 
   
 
Image 1: Poses. Colin. 
 
The body is unable to maintain its fixity with the past. Instead, what remains seems 
to embody the capacity of the body, in Paxton’s terms, to be always in adjustment 
with the real. What, then, are the implications of the notion that the body is always in 
such adjustment?  
 
In TTS, I seek to problematise the historicising of live-ness in dance. How can 
choreography, at the level of reception as well as at the level of practice, allows us to 
explore ways to engage with the non-present dimension (abstract yet real) of things 
to find a logic of thinking in terms of time? I will discuss this with reference to a 
section of my performance where I have sought to deconstruct work associated with 
the piece - Continuous Project – Altered Daily initiated by Yvonne Rainer.  
 
The section begins with the voice of Yuri Gagarin, the first cosmonaut to voyage into 
outer space in 1961. A description of Continuous Project – Altered Daily has been 
produced by Banes, drawing on film footage of rehearsals and an account from 
Rainer.  
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dressed casual 
from one  to another   as if it is a ball 
the attempted hoist turns into a pas 
de deux 
looking as if she’s about  to block a 
pass 
punts 
laughs 
twarting the expectations of the group 
as if they are playing in water 
the interchangeablity of the box and 
the body 
seeing how far they can  
like football players between plays 
boxing movements 
a game 
in kickoff   position 
gymnast’s flying angels 
using each other’s weight to lean, 
stand and sit 
they try to stand 
she couldn’t get up so i used that 
now we are discussing how 
balance of subdued formal carrying 
out of tasks and informality 
then i have to try to see what it feels 
like7 
 
 
Image 2: Continuous Project. 
 
Text from this description - ‘Dressed casually, a game, etc’ - appears on screen 
during my performance. Using improvisation I began to create connection between 
this account of Rainer’s piece and the abstract link with gravity in the cosmonaut’s 
experience. I have then edited the words of Gagarin and Banes, and with my 
voice, re-appropriated their words while suspending the movement of the dancing 
body. Standing down stage I perform this section gazing at individual spectators.  
 
This section can be seen as an accumulation of the previous one, by which I mean 
that elements are repeated, even if sequences are not mathematically duplicated. 
Instead, I re-present material that the audience has already seen/heard (Gagarin’s 
voice, text from Banes and Rainer, and my own movement) through another form: 
my speaking body.  
 
While the main intention in juxtaposing the voice and the body was to explore the 
embodiment of the thinking body engaged in a process of affective exchange, I 
also explored the potentiality of meaning created by the colliding of accumulated 
elements of performance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Text edited from Sally Banes, Terpsichore in Sneakers. Post-Modern Dance: with a new 
introduction, Wesleyan University Press, USA, 1987. 
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Image 3: Colin. 
 
As I am looking out and in, my body connects to those different potentialities in 
relation with the spectators, exploring what Trisha Brown has powerfully 
encapsulated when talking of her solo Accumulation with talking: ‘the silence 
suspends my intention while the audience continues with theirs.’8 
 
Before discussing in more detail what this composition might imply in terms of 
thinking in time I would like to return to the problematic of the body always being in 
adjustment with the real. If we consider the time of performance as a unfolding of 
multiple events or, in Laura Cull’s terms, as a constructed event ‘in which differential 
presence is released’9, what is the real for each individual bodies involved in the 
experience of the performance. 
 
In order to discuss further the choreographic thinking of that section I would like to 
expand on the notion of event borrowing from the Deleuzian concept as an empirical 
fit to my work. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze posits that the relationship between 
events ‘seem to be formed [of] extrinsic relations of silence compatibility and 
incompatibility, or conjunction and disjunction, which are very difficult to 
apprehend.’10 Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, Elizabeth Grosz argues for a shift 
away from notions of deconstruction and representation to a re-grounding of the 
politics of becoming capable of accounting for a real without unity or boundaries and 
outside representation - a ‘non textual real’ which she then identifies as chaos.11 She 
defines the event as, ‘the impact of chaos on the body with multiple resonances, 
fluid, unpredictable and dynamic, [which] is irreducible to a structure.’12 I propose 
here to locate the moment of the performance which I have been discussing earlier 
as a space of intensification of the event – a suspension of the time of the 
performance into a durational dimension, or in Bergson’s term a time of hesitation.13  
Although the timing of the light frame is set, in this section the perception of time 
contracts or expands depending on the number and positioning of the spectator(s). 
While fragments of phrases are being stammered, my speaking body vibrates traces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ann Livet, ‘Trisha Brown: an interview’ in Contemporary Dance New York, Abbeville 44-54, 1978, p. 
48. 
9 Laura Cull, 'Deleuze and differential presence in performance', unpublished conference paper 
delivered at Performing Presence conference, University of Exeter, March 2009. 
10 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 170. 
11 Elizabeth Grosz: keynote at the 2007 Feminist Theory Workshop, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwHoswjw5yo (accessed 23 June 2011). 
12 Ibid. 
13 ‘Thus the living being essentially has duration; it has duration precisely because it is continuously 
elaborating what is new and because there is no elaboration without searching, no searching without 
groping. Time is the very hesitation.’ Henri Bergson, The Creative mind: an Introduction to 
Metaphysics, New York, Wisdom Library, 1946, p. 109. 
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of a dance engaged in a kinetic dynamic with the audience – on the verge of 
movements and words. What interests me here in terms of compositional technique 
is the potential for the body of the audience to become one of the components of the 
composition and therefore to contribute to the emergence of choreographic presence 
in the events of performance. 
 
While my intention was not to re-construct historical dance pieces, in this work I have 
informed my creative process by a historical research. I was interested to explore 
questions of presence of a dancer’s body in relationship to time and more specifically 
historical time. What were the relationships between my dancing body, its own 
history of performance, training and the way in which dance had been historically 
recorded?  
 
In another section I use three improvised versions of Rainer's seminal solo Trio A.  
As Rainer’s instructions of the solo are being typed on the screen I perform my 
interpretation of the tasks in low-intensity level movements. Another fully danced 
version follows in silence, followed by a filmed version in a busy London street 
accompanied by Rainer’s voiceover. 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 4: Trio A. Colin. 
 
This section loops back to the first part of the piece, following again an accumulative 
sequencing from written words - to quasi-movements - to movements - to re-
contextualised movements. It persists in addressing the issues around the capacity 
of a dancing body to be always in adjustment with the real. A sense of continuity 
defies the transformations, which raises the questions of how the dance is resisting 
the context, whether historical, personal or ontological.  
 
What is left of the original ‘dance’?  
What has been re-appropriated?  
 
The question of memory in this performance was crucial to explore the relations 
between my dancing body and its history of performance. If we adopt here a 
Bergsonian approach to ‘thinking in time’,14 we can assume that memory is part of 
time and time – defined in terms of duration15 – is a force, which is constantly at work 
in the compositional plane of a performance as well as in the reception of a live 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ‘Thinking in time, Bergson affirms, requires the breaking of many frames. It lets us recognize the 
obsession with space that orients western philosophy, limiting what we think.’ He suggests that 
thinking in term of space leads to a ‘static conception of time [which] is a defence against the 
heterogeneity of the real ’. See: Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henry Bergson, pp. 2-3 
15 Guerlac defines Bergson first approach to duration in term of the exploration of’ inner experience -
the sensation of qualities and affects – things, he argues, that cannot be measured.’ See Guerlac, 
Thinking in Time, p. 5. 
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piece. If as I have previously demonstrated the emergence of choreographic 
presence implies the foregrounding of the body of the performer and of the 
spectators at the centre of an extended experience of time, the way in which 
performance relates body and memory is equally important to understand the 
experience of time in performance. Suzanne Guerlac, offers important insights into 
Bergson’s views of the relationship between body and memory. Guerlac underscores 
that whereas ‘the body is a centre of action that acts in the present’, consciousness - 
which is here equivalent to memory and therefore to the past - operates as a coping 
mechanism for the body ‘by synthesising the heterogeneous rhythms of duration into 
temporal horizons of past, present, and future.’16  
 
In this performance, two main compositional devices conditioned the involvement of 
memory/consciousness for the audience members as well as for the performer. 
Firstly the use of an accumulative structure generates that each addition to the 
composition changes the perception of the whole. While this structure intensifies the 
spectator’s process of consciously thinking through what they have previously 
experienced, it also intends to stimulate the subjectivity of each participants’ 
perception, which according to Bergson ‘consists above all in what memory brings to 
it’.17 
 
Similarly, the intervention of particular musical soundscapes is also used to suggest 
temporal information potentially memorised in individual consciousness. However, if 
as previously mentioned the soundtrack of Yuri Gagarin’s first space flight is a 
deliberate choice to contextualise the Judson Church Theatre Group’s era with the 
echoes of a highpoint of the Cold War, it might not be a recognisable reference for 
the spectators who experience the aural montage while seeing me running through 
space.  
 
However, as previously mentioned, my intention in this work was not to reconstruct a 
repertory piece or to represent dance history, but rather to explore the potential of 
choreographic practice to ‘render time sensational’18, through what I have previously 
termed a choreographic presence. If we return to Bergson we find that the difference 
between representation and presence is again inherent to the relationship between 
time (duration) and the body (sensation). Representation forms through memory 
which refers to the past, and the present is sensed through perceptions which occur 
in time. What would be the implications of this finding for the practice of 
choreographic presence? If representation fixes to the past, what strategies can we 
explore to grasp the movement of the past in the present? Bergson suggests a 
theory of recognition that he defines as an ‘attentive recognition’ when ‘memory 
images [past] regularly rejoin present perception’19, affecting the interpretation of the 
incoming perception’. If this phenomenon of memory affecting perception is an 
assumed condition to the state of attentiveness required for a dancer to perform – by 
which I mean that part of the skills of a performer is the development of enhanced 
perceptive awareness, an ‘extra-daily’ use of the body and mind which is acquired 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid, p. 122. 
17 Ibid, p. 121. 
18 Drawing on Deleuze’ concept of the ‘force if time’ Grosz affirms that the goal of art is to be ‘’always 
seeking a way to render time sensational, to make time resonate sensibly. For no art can freeze time 
or transform its forces except through the invention of new techniques, new forces and energies.’’ 
Elizabeth Grosz: Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the framing of the earth, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2008, p. 87. 
19 Ibid, p. 131. 
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through training20 – in thinking about the reception of the piece, it is the potential for 
memory to interfere during perception that I have chosen to use as a material for 
composition. Being explored is the production of affects that can emerge from a 
combination such as the disembodied recording of a historical moment – which does 
not occur in space – and the movement of my body running through the space of 
performance; or how the intensity of the sound of the space shuttle taking off, 
layered with the over-triumphant classical soundtrack and the human voices 
including Gagarin himself telling each other that everything is normal,21 might trigger 
individual memories (past) and intensifies the live (present) repeated (in becoming) 
action of running.  
 
While the musical references which I have chosen to include in the piece relate to 
precise historical time, this practical inquiry has been concerned with an aspect of 
time which does not refer to the cognitive thinking of representing things in term of 
past but rather following Bergson to an experiential approach of the heterogeneous 
rhythms of duration. Bergson demonstrates that this quality of time is only 
experienced through ‘an effort of intuition’, which is fundamentally 
unrepresentative.22 If choreographic practice can be considered as a composition of 
relation between time (duration) and bodies (sensations) - which perceived through 
the affect of memory - forms a presence operating at the level of the imagination of 
the audience members, my choreographic thinking – in dialogue with theoretical 
discourses - rehearses a re-appropriation of their ideas as a way to professionally 
engage with elements, which are of greater significance for the practitioner. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For the theatre practitioner Eugenio Barba the development of the performer’s awareness is central 
to what he calls ‘technique’. Barba suggests that ‘In an organised performance situation the 
performer's physical and mental presence is modelled according to principles which are different from 
those applied in daily life. This extra-daily use of the body-mind is what is called technique.’ See: 
Eugenio Barba, Nicola Savarese, A Dictionary of Theatre Anthropology: The Secret Art of The 
Performer, Routledge, first published in 1991, 2004, p. 7. 
21 This soundtrack is extracted from the film The First Orbit by Christopher Riley with original music by 
composer Philip Shepperd. http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2011/apr/17/yuri-gagarin-first-space-
orbit-video?intcmp=239 (accessed on 11 November 2011). 
22 Bergson speculates that, ‘duration must be defined as unity and multiplicity at the same time? But 
singularly enough, however much I manipulate the two concepts, portion them out, combine them 
differently; practice on them the most subtle operation of mental chemistry. I never obtain anything 
which resemble the simple intuition that I have of duration; while, on the contrary, when I replace 
myself in duration by an effort of intuition, I immediately perceived how it is unity, multiplicity, and 
many other things besides.’ Bergson in An Introduction to Metaphysics, Hackett Publishing Company, 
USA, 1999, English translation first published in 1912, p. 31. 
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SPA(E)CIOUS PRESENT, Dynamics of collective and individual experiences of 
space and duration within specious present, adopting technologies for 
enhancing audience engagement, while producing forms of documentation23 
 
Elena Cologni 
University of Cambridge 
 
 
 
Rationale: 
I consider the workshop as a form of peripatetic participatory practice where 
produced and shared knowledge informs the artist's creative process. This is based 
on the multidisciplinary approach of my current project Rockfluid (rockfluid.com), 
where site specific art practice is underpinned by elements of cognitive psychology 
and philosophy. Hence, here the relationship Memory – Time – Perception is 
informed by Bergson's notion of the present within duration and as produced by the 
body in space,24 and by Merleau-Ponty's reference to 'sensation' as the basis for 
knowledge.25 On the other hand the role of memory in the present is seen from a 
shared perspective (psychology and philosophy of science) including the definition of 
specious present26 as well as the nature of retention as involving perception of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Micro-geographies, microphies. 
24 Bergson, Matière et Mémoire, 138-139, ‘present as that which is, when it is simply what is 
happening. [...] in this continuity of becoming which is reality itself, the present moment is constituted 
through the quasi-instantaneous cut that our perception operates in the mass in the process of flow".   
“My present consists in the consciousness I have of my body. Extended in space, my body 
experiences sensations and at the same time executes movements. Sensations and movements 
become localized at determinate points in this extension; at any given moment, there can only be one 
system of movements and sensations. . . The actuality of our present consists of its actual state. 
Considered as extension in space, matter, in our opinion, should be defined as a present that is 
always beginning again. 
25 Merleau-Ponty citation of Gestaltd Theory in ‘Association And The Projection Of Memories, 
Phenomenology Of Perception, 13-25, p 18, “Our perceptual field is made up of ‘things’ and ‘spaces 
between things’” and:  ‘our bodily experience of movement is not a particular case of knowledge; it 
provides us with a way of access to the world and the object, with a Praktognosia, which has to be 
recognised as original and perhaps as primary.’ p.140. 
26 James, William. 1890. Principles of Psychology 2 vols. New York: Henry Holt, p 608, in Anonymous 
[E. Robert Kelly], The Alternative: A Study in Psychology (London: Macmillan and Co.,1882), p. 168. 
Time, then, considered relatively to human apprehension, consists of four parts, viz., the obvious 
past, the specious present, the real present, and the future. Omitting the specious present, it consists 
of three … nonentities – the past, which does not exist, the future, which does not exist, and their 
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duration.27 The variable within this is an element of interference in our experience, 
which will vary every time Spa(e)cious takes place28 (e.g. the image above is for the 
next few events where exercises will take place on an unstable platform). As the 
series develops from this, a dialogue with art critic and film maker Helena Blaker also 
shapes the contextualisation of the outcomes. 
   
Methods: 
The exercise aims at creating the physical and psychological conditions to enhance 
an awareness of the perception of time and space through interaction in three parts, 
involving psychology, drawing, video and performance. 
 
- what happened: 
Participants followed instructions, within this overall condition: audiences and 
participants can see two projections, one of the views is from above and the other 
view is from the remote CCTV camera on one of the participants. The latter will 
record their movements within proximal space. They experienced: 
 
Memory in the present.  To focus on moving through space and  retaining 
information. It is believed that by introducing an element of interference in 
space our awareness of the present condition is enhanced. 
   
How has digital time disrupted our sense of subjective time? The 
perception of time, subjective time (non measured time) and distance in 
specious present (the time duration wherein a state of consciousness is 
experienced as being in the present). The exercise will test how differently we 
experience distance within a set amount of time, depending on certain 
conditions.  
 
How does technology effect our perception and memorization of place? 
by relating memory to our experience of space in time. Starting from the 
observation that there is a time distance between the now of perception and 
the after of the recollection, and a space distance between where we start 
from and where we return:  What does ‘this’ gap tell us?  Is such gap there at 
all? Starting from a memory exercise (participants to draw the walking activity 
from memory), this will highlight similarities and differences between our 
mnemonic archive and technology produced documents of personal space, 
which I shall call microphies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conterminous, the present; the faculty from which it proceeds lies to us in the fiction of the specious 
present 
27 Metaphysic of Experience (1898) 4 vols. London: Longman, Green, and Co. [reprint (1980), 
Garland Publishing, New York]. pp 59, 60, 71, Now retention, or memory in its lowest terms … is 
actually involved in the perceived element of duration. [...] the least possible empirical present 
moment is one in which perception and memory (in the sense of simple retention) are 
indistinguishable from each other è[ ...] retention of a past in a present moment, has now been shown 
to take its place among the ultimate facts of experience, being involved in the simplest cases of 
perception, for which, in fact, it is but another name. 
28 Spa(e)cious presentations include: Re-Collect, Wysing Arts Centre,  Bourn, UK, 28 June 2012                                                        
!KF Institut für künstlerische Forschung Berlin, Germany, 17 September 2012 
Cose Cosmiche, Artra Gallery, Milan, 27 September 2012. MK Gallery, Milton Keynes, UK, 25 
October; 8,15 November 2012 
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Image 1: From a participant’s viewpoint (thank you Michelle) 
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Images 2–4: How long did it take? Which shape was it? 
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The Context: 
SPA(E)CIOUS, is one of the outcomes of the project ROCKFLUID. This develops 
from a residency at the Faculty of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge 
(since March 2011), with a collaboration with scientist Lisa Saksida, with whom 
Elena shares a research interest in the relationship between memory and 
perception. The dialogue evolves and is highlighted by open events in front of an 
audience (e.g. Science Festival 2011, Science Festival 2012 chaired by Caterina 
Albano), to inform the artist's creative process.  As the project developed particular 
focus is on the influence of interferences of various nature on the perception in the 
present of space and time. After a number of people have responded to a call for 
participation (Wysing Arts Centre Open July 2011) to suggest places in Cambridge 
to meet the artist and share related memories with the participants (October-
November 2011), Cologni recollected those journeys form memory and produced a 
body of work including drawings and a public art intervention (presented on 5th July 
at Anglia Ruskin University Gallery). The latter is based on peoples suggested 
locations in space as well as a game the artist used to play in her childhood. 
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Throughout the project on of the driving concerns was to do with how technology has 
influenced our way of conceive space and mapping. Through her work Cologni 
wants to point the attention towards the experience of physical space and in 
particular the space proximal to the body, in relation to other views to which our 
technology filled life allows access to ('views from above' video and text installation, 
Institute of Astronomy June 2012).  
 
Since my PhD (2004) I claim my art research to be part of the critique to the ocular-
centric discourse within western philosophy, with reference to Martin Jay. Yet, the 
fascination I have for perception and its psychology, and geometry (all linked to the 
primacy of vision) is a recurring aspect in my enquiry. My critical position is 
manifested through overturning given assumptions therein by adopting paradoxical 
formats, including: juxtaposing visual perception with physical positioning in space, 
drawing 'proto-geometric', non-exact shapes, setting up contradictory research 
hypotheses. In this context 'SPA(E)CIOUS' is built around a need to make the viewer 
aware of the space proximal to the body in the present. This in relation to a 
technology driven life where most of us become increasingly familiar with (and 
hooked into) the views form above (GPS, Googleearth, NASA satellites). A way to 
feel in control, by locating ourselves in the world, which Cologni parallels to 
renaissance perspective systems, whereby the central focus perspective represents 
man and structures of power.   
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Images 5–6: Images from documentation of SPA(E)CIOUS, Wysing Arts Centre, 28 
June 2012 
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The International Theatre Festival: Gaps, Interruptions and Unpredictable 
Crossovers. 
 
Jenny Duffy 
Northumbria University. 
 
Hello. 
My name is Jenny, but you can call me Jen. 
Everybody does. 
J-e-n. 
Jen. 
Juh – eh – nuh 
Jen. 
Like the bird - wren.  
(Start wings action) 
Jenny Wren. 
(Look down at chest) 
Women? 
Jen. 
(Smile) 
Is there anybody else here whose name is Jen?  
Or Jenny?  
Or, whose name begins with a J? 
…  
 
(Yes? No?) 
So, it begins with a J …  
Maybe it’s j for jetlagged. Maybe its j for joining in. Maybe it’s j for journey. 
For the journeys which you took to get here. Maybe some on the midnight train. 
Journey … Midnight train … 
Like the song by Journey! The 80’s band, YOU know the one: 
(Sings) 
‘Just a small town girl, livin’ in a lonely world. She took the midnight train going 
anywhere …’  
        (Cain, Perry & Schon, 1981) 
 
Jenny singing Journey!  
Talking about journeys, singing about journeys … 
…. 
 
Maybe it’s J for is she JOKING? 
But, for now at least, it looks like it’s just J for Jenny.  
So it begins with a Jenny.  
And this Jenny begins: 
 
And then, somehow, it’s four (one, two, three, four) or maybe even five in the 
morning and you find yourself attempting to teach a Croatian MA student a rhythm, 
(a rhythm which looks almost like a dance step, but which is much, MUCH, more 
complicated than this implies), a rhythm, which actually sounds like a beat, which 
actually was part of a show which you made three years ago, which you performed 
at another festival, a Romanian festival, not a Croatian festival, a Romanian festival 
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where you met this Croatian, the one you’re trying, slightly drunkenly and completely 
exhaustedly to teach this rhythm to.  
 
 “It begins with energy (an impulse, an idea, an intuition, a hunch)” 
(Fleishman 2012, 34)  
 
So it begins with energy, which might be an impulse, or an idea or an intuition. 
Or a rhythm. 
 
And so, somehow, you find yourself, trying, very hard, to teach this energy, this 
rhythm, this small piece of your training to the Croatian. The rhythm, the beat (one, 
two, three, four), from the show, which he remembered from when you first met. In 
Romania. Three years ago. The Croatian’s name is Peda, who, you remember was 
actually dressed as a penguin the first time you met, back when you were both at the 
beginning of your respective trainings: it began with a J, for Jenny, for joining in and 
a P, for Peda, for penguin and now look at you both!  
 
Look how far you’ve come! 
 
It’s four (one, two, three, four) or maybe even five in the morning and you’re in a 
corridor of some army barracks, in Dakovo, in the North East of Croatia where you 
are staying, along with 165 other students (and the soldiers), to participate in the 
Dioniz International Festival of Student Theatre! Trying to teach Peda, the penguin, 
the rhythm, the beat, from the show... 
 
And the corridor is full of them. Students. Some, maybe fifty, even sixty. From the far 
flung corners of Europe and just beyond, some Slovenian, some Czech, some 
Turkish, some Slovakian, some Austrian, some singing, some dancing, all chatting, 
shouting, all languages, all drinking, many smoking, too many smoking, and you 
remember just how difficult the rhythm, the beat, from the show, was to learn 
yourself, let alone to try and teach it to Peda, the penguin, under the influence of the 
couple of strong, European, post show beers you had in the festival bar.  
 
But here you are! Look at you!  
 
“We see something that is the tip of a creative and ideological iceberg … we 
… see a whole Pandora's Box of experiences opened up via the act of 
performance”. 
(Witts 2011, 1/2) 
 
And then Pandora’s Box is flung wide open as, somehow, you find yourself being 
pulled into the army barracks urinals by another Croatian, one that you haven’t met 
before. This Croatian wants to discuss setting up an Erasmus scheme between your 
respective institutions, he wants to discuss his potential PhD application, he wants to 
know what you want to do with your life and then he wants to discuss the politics of 
performance and capital P, for Politics today.  
 
It’s four, (one, two, three, four) maybe even five in the morning and you’re in the 
urinals, of some army barracks, in a small Croatian town, being asked about why you 
think the riots happened in London last summer. 
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And then you remember, in the urinals, in the army barracks urinals, the words of 
your Professor: 
 
“We are in deep educational, political and ideological water”. 
         (Witts 2011, ibid) 
 
The Croatian continues and begins to comment on the show that you (the UK reps) 
made specifically to perform at the festival, to represent your training grounds.  
 
He comments on the openness of the show, on the invitation to (J for) join in, on the 
freedom of the students, on the stylistic choices you made, how the potential of 
these interested and excited him.  
 
He also asks what the show was about. What the point of it was? He wants to know 
what next …  
 
(At this point, a stranger enters the urinals and throws her arms around you and the 
Croatian (whose name you’re still not entirely sure of) and kisses you both.) 
 
You say: “Good questions”. 
 
What does it mean to come together in a space, a festival space, a theatre space, a 
studio space, a run down, graffitied amphitheatre space, a cinema masquerading as 
a theatre space, a classroom on the first floor of a rundown old fire station, which is 
now a rehearsal room space?  
 
What does it mean to come together in these spaces? 
  
Together, gathered, gathered together by a festival, in an unknown corridor, in a 
foreign city, in a new space constructed by, for and through a specific group of 
people, individuals. 
 
Writing with regard to the paradoxes of political art, philosopher Jacques Rancière 
states:  
 
“Politics invents new forms of collective enunciation; it re-frames the given by 
inventing new ways of making sense of the sensible, new configurations 
between the visible and the invisible, and between the audible and the 
inaudible, new distributions of space and time – in short, new bodily 
capacities”.  
(2010, 139) 
 
Is this Politics? Could this be Politics? Should it be? 
 
What it does feel like is a new distribution of space and time. A new space. An 
alternative space perhaps. But above all an open space to begin to attempt to 
explore what matters.  
 
Does this, this conversation at four (one, two, three, four) maybe even five in the 
morning, in the army barracks, in the army barracks urinals, with the Croatian 
student whose name you’re not entirely sure of, matter? 
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Does it matter that you’re slightly drunk? 
Does it matter?  
 
And then you realise, of course: 
 
“Creative research, respecting the materiality of thought – its localisation in 
the act of invention – has a different object. It studies complexity and it 
defends complex systems of communication against over simplification. It 
explores the irreducible heterogeneity of cultural identity, the always 
unfinished process of making and remaking ourselves through our symbolic 
forms”  
(Carter 2004, 13)  
 
In the middle is the interval. 
 
*This* is the interval, the middle, the gap.  
 
In between. 
 
How does it feel? 
 
Aware of what’s come. Not sure where the hell this is going, perhaps. Unsure but 
excited, hopefully, you attempt to begin to understand what exactly is going on here. 
 
Here are some thoughts then: 
 
The core thing that happens at these festivals is the opening up of space and of 
potential opportunities and of experience. It’s about the opportunities which are 
created as a result of the coming together of a diverse group of people, individuals, 
in a specific context. A context, where you might find yourself scrambling around on 
the floor outside a bar playing a silly kids game with various well respected 
Professors of Theatre. It might sound like that what happens is everyone drinks a lot 
and just ‘has a good time’ and, of course, there is that part and that, arguably, is an 
important part, but there’s also the part which leads to that part being a possibility to 
be able to happen and the part where it becomes a reality, even if fleetingly. The 
process part. So maybe it is as Bahktin highlighted in his discussion of 
Carnivalesque, about a: “place for working out a new mode of interrelationship 
between individuals” (’65 p. 123). Maybe that’s a large part of it. I think it is a large 
part of it. And this is enabled through the space created by the context. The space 
and freedom to play and move between different roles, to interrelate, to encounter, to 
initiate accidental explosions, to participate and I’m not talking about participation in 
the way you can ‘like’ something on Facebook or the way you can ‘follow’ someone 
or something on Twitter, or the way you might increasingly find that funding streams 
necessary for you to make work, to make things happen, are shaped by a language 
surrounding ‘participation’ which feels slightly unsettling. They want everyone 
involved. Especially in those areas which have low participation in the arts and 
possibly high unemployment and high truancy rates in the local public schools, which 
are quite possibly underfunded and therefore participating in the arts, is a must 
because, after all, participation is about J for joining in and consenting and unifying 
and being an active participant or an active citizen (uh oh). I’m also not (necessarily) 
wishing to undermine those ways of J for joining in either because they have their 
uses, and we have seen this through global events of massive significance, and, of 
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course, increasing participation in the arts in areas which experience low levels, is an 
important thing; but these also have their own set of uses for corporations and 
businesses and the Government who utilise them and they also have their own 
language.  
 
“Deep educational, political and ideological water”.  
          (ibid) 
If, as John Tusa highlighted back in November last year:  
 
“giving the arts a chance to be excellent – and we are talking of chance, of 
risk, of the variable, the impulsive, the uncertain, the irrational, the 
uncalculated, the shocking – depends on allowing the arts to talk of what they 
do, argue for what they do, justify what they do and explain what they do in 
their own terms.”  
(Tusa 2011)  
 
Then, perhaps, providing a space, a context for this to occur, creating space, 
opening up a space, perhaps this is the core thing that happens. Maybe it’s about 
taking yourself outside of your comfort zone, or of your country, or of your language, 
or of your expectations of what a certain context might produce. Maybe it’s really 
about feeling, the experience of feeling something uncertain or irrational or maybe 
even shocking (ibid). Maybe it is this feeling of participating, of J for joining in, which 
is the core thing that happens in these spaces and through this we begin to see the 
potential of operating in the interval, of being in a process, in the process of working 
it out. (One, two, three, four). 
 
 
A breathing space.  
(Breathe deeply) 
 
 
An open space to just experience, in a new context, maybe it is that which is at the 
core.  
 
Maybe that’s what it’s about.  
 
Maybe if the Croatian, who’s name, appallingly, you still can’t quite remember, 
maybe if you see him again you’ll be prepared with your answers. 
 
So, what next? 
 
As part of a talk commissioned by London International Festival of Theatre for a 
recent symposium on the future of festivals, Tim Etchells highlighted the importance 
of:  
 
“processes which along with togetherness, sharing and mutuality also involve 
difficulty, dissent, and disagreement, hard work, uncertainty, doubt and 
dispute. They flow. They alter. They contradict. They involve tension and 
change.”  
(Etchells 2012).  
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Maybe in this space, in the process of figuring out what this space might mean or the 
‘pedagogical potential’, which the abstract for this paper spoke of, somewhere in the 
midst of it all, we experience something extraordinary.  
 
So, this is the part where you realise that: 
 
Your supervisor was right when she said: 
 
“A festival is a place where anything can happen”.  
(Craddock 2012, Personal Communication)  
 
 As another wise woman, Luce Irigaray, once said:  
 
“In spite of everything, I have a great desire to be with you. But how will we 
succeed in being present and together at the same time? Here an entire 
history must be examined: not only yours and mine, our small 
misunderstandings and differences, but also that of a culture which for 
centuries, and still today, does not allow us to be two, as two, with each 
other.” 
          (’00 p.98)  
So I refer back to a man (uh oh), Fleishman, who, in his paper The Difference of 
Performance as Research states:  
 
“We need to find ways to feel and live the intervals’. This is the radical project 
of performance as research”.  
          (2012, 35) 
 
- Because maybe that’s what it’s really all about.  
 
Being RADICAL.  
Finding ways to live the intervals, the gaps, the interruptions.  
Being open to the possibility that this could, and perhaps should, be radical. Creating 
the freedom to explore. Exploring the edges, the space in between, the interactions.  
Crossing and sharing of practice. 
Practicing research, finding ways to be together, in uncertainty, working it out. (One, 
two, three, four) 
Making connections. 
The radical nature of the space of performance as research, of festival as a 
methodology of this.  
 
And so it ends with an L for list. 
 
A List of learning. 
Of festival learning. 
 
Learning to sit with your eyes closed for half an hour, amongst a group of students 
from Croatia, Romania, Turkey and Austria, speaking only sentences which began 
with:  
 
‘The silence when … ’ 
The value of the space created by silence. The potential and sound of silence. 
The first verse and chorus of ‘The Sound of Silence’ by Simon and Garfunkel. 
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You learn a new devising exercise. The one where you choose a spot in the space, 
walk to it, do an action and deliver a line of text. 
You know the one.  
 
This one: 
“I’ve had tonsillitis thirteen times” 
(Walks into space, slaps face) 
That being ‘vegetarian’ in Croatian often means you will be referred to as a 
vegetable. 
 
You learn about the current difference in price of living and renting in Croatia 
compared with the UK.  
How to say thank you in Croatian … 
‘Hvala’. 
You learn, or, re-learn, or just remember, that, if you were ever in doubt, when 
you’ve been inside a tiny festival bar for four (one, two, three, four) maybe even five 
hours, just what a good idea the smoking ban was. 
That ‘Sali’ is Turkish for Tuesday. 
 
You learn about your body in a different space, a different context.  
 
That using your body, your face, your eyes, your facial expressions, your hand 
gestures, your awareness, and your mannerisms can speak volumes, crossing 
language barriers. 
 
The importance of presence and smiling. 
(Smile) 
The value of looking people in the eye. 
(Look them in the eye) 
So maybe what you’ve actually learnt is the importance of communicating ideas, 
offering ideas, being open to accepting and exploring new ideas. 
 
You learn again, that football, is a universal language and that the middle-aged 
soldier who desperately wanted to communicate with you, despite you speaking no 
Croatian and him hardly any English, of course knew that Newcastle Football Club 
are called the ‘toon army’.  
 
You re-learn the importance of experiencing freedom to operate in an open space, 
where someone assumes that you are a Croatian. Before discovering that you are, in 
fact, a British female amongst a Croatian body of performers.  
 
Jen blends, remade in her symbolic form. 
This is festival thinking. Festival as thinking.  
 
I refer again to Paul Carter, who highlights:  
 
“To work collaboratively, passing the shuttle of creative vision back and forth, 
in a way that advances or changes the pattern … is a technique for making 
sense of the gaps, interruptions and unpredictable crossovers.” 
          (2004, 5) 
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What I’m positing, what I’m attempting to try to (not so drunkenly but slightly 
exhaustedly) playfully illustrate, what I’m trying to say, is that this model of 
international theatre festivals matter.  
 
The potential of the space created within this context matters. 
 
That the opportunity to explore and participate, to ‘do’, in a complex network of social 
relations, outside of corporate or government intervention, outside of expectations of 
what, could or should or will happen, that operating within this specific context, 
through the localisation of creative research, might provide a grounding for and the 
roots of something radical. 
 
Here is where we might begin to see the potential of festival as thinking today. 
 
I would like to end with a reflection from the Polish theatre maker Tadeusz Kantor, 
shared with Professor Noel Witts, which he kindly shared with me: 
 
Kantor, reflecting on his own situation, in another country at another time: 
  
“Freedom in art is a gift neither from the politicians, nor from the authorities, 
Freedom is not bestowed on art by the authorities, Freedom exists inside us. 
We have to fight for freedom, within ourselves”.  
            (Witts 2011, 10) 
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Staging the World: Performance, Object-Oriented Ontology, and that thing 
called Knowing1 
 
João Florêncio 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
 
Introduction: The State of Affairs 
 
Today, we hear, performance is everywhere. It has become an everyday word, 
heard in every corner of the world, from the black box of theatres and the white cube 
of galleries to the billboards outside advertising the latest model of sport car or, at an 
ever increasing rate, as part of the guidelines of our higher education funding 
councils. However, regardless of all the nonhuman behaviours increasingly 
measured or grasped in terms of performance – e.g., rituals of animal courtship, 
fluctuations of stock market indexes, or the behaviour of computer viruses – we, 
performance theorists, are still used to think performance from a humanist 
standpoint, to see it as the exclusive domain of humans and their displays of 
behaviour. Performance, in our habitual work theorising human rituals or our actions 
on stage, has very rarely been pushed beyond its actualisation as performance-by-
us. In the very few occasions we have looked beyond the human in search for 
instances of performance, e.g., Nicholas Ridout writing about animals on stage 
(Ridout 2006), Richard Schechner reflecting on animal performances in the wild 
(Schechner 2003), or Jon McKenzie trying to intersect cultural, organisational, and 
technological performance (McKenzie 2001), our concerns have still been on the 
side of the human: what can animal performances tell us about our own? What can 
performance reveal about our societies when it is used as an indicator of the speed 
of our computers? Even if performance has gone beyond performance-by-us in 
these cases, by its always referring back to the human as its ultimate referent, it has 
never really become something other than performance-for-us: this being the farthest 
we have allowed it to go. In the end, we are the masters, we are at the top of the 
food chain, we are the lords of the land, the conveyors of meaning. Surely, 
performance must stick with us if we are to keep our titles. 
 
However, while we obsess with ourselves, like Narcissus by the lake, the world 
around us seems to have become increasingly unpredictable, unapologetically 
strange, unforgiving. Stuff has been happening that we can’t seem to be able to 
control: economies have crashed, hurricanes have destroyed cities, previously 
curable diseases have now started killing millions, and airplanes have become the 
new bullets. Everywhere, from the glaciers of Greenland to the computers that 
literally keep us alive and well, from the devalued dreams of a single European 
currency to the viruses that have started learning how to resist our chemical attacks, 
the world has become foreign, and all the certainties claimed hitherto by the men of 
science and those of letters have, slowly but surely, started melting away. Our reign 
as masters of the universe has never before been questioned to such an extent. 
Progressively, we have started realising that the world exists and that it will keep on 
existing despite us. 
 
In recent years, academia itself has become increasingly aware of the faults in our 
current paradigms of knowledge, in the way we seem to justify the existence of the 
world with our own existence. From Manuel DeLanda’s work on assemblage theory 
to Bruno Latour’s development of Actor-Network Theory; from a recent renewed 
interest in panpsychism to the increasing popularity of Speculative Realism; from the 
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new materialism of Jane Bennett to the several conferences on the so-called 
“nonhuman turn” that are popping out everywhere around the globe, academia 
seems to be firmly en route to think a world in which we are not present or, at least, 
not in control. 
 
Given all that, what is left for Performance Studies? How can we, performance 
theorists, contribute to the current academic debates that seem to posit our main 
object of study, the human actor, out of the equation or, at least, to make it share 
with fellow nonhuman actors a newly found and widely distributed notion of agency? 
How can performance think a nonhuman world or, most importantly perhaps, how 
can performance survive it? If the whole world is a stage, can there be a theatre 
without humans? What happens when performance becomes not only the way 
through which humans give shape to their world but also the way through which the 
whole world is able to both experience and express itself regardless of there being 
humans present at the scene or not? 
 
In what follows, I will try to explore these questions in the style of a provocation. 
While being largely informed by the postulates of object-oriented philosophy, the 
following section of this paper has tried to leave behind more established forms of 
academic discourse and to replace them with a style of writing that is closer to 
storytelling and the anecdote than to dominant styles of knowledge production and 
dissemination. The reasons for that are manifold but can be staid to derive both from 
the interest that, since the 1990s, performance theorists have shown for writing as 
performance, and from an awareness that, if writing is indeed to try to tackle the 
nonhuman, it must simultaneously become aware of and think its own materiality. 
Like Ian Bogost has proposed in his recent book Alien Phenomenology, in order for 
philosophy to approach the nonhuman, it must become a craft, the thinker, himself, 
having to become a carpenter of thoughts (Bogost 2012, 90). In other words, thought 
(and writing) must become performance.  
 
Now, do take this as a provocation: The Whole World is a Stage 
 
The West African priest summoned the sacred. From behind a sculpture carved out 
of wood, the sacred flickered and announced its unfathomable presence. The 
congregation started singing and dancing in awe and reverence while, a few miles 
away on the coast, an army of conquerers disembarked a flotilla of ships flagging the 
colours of ‘civilisation.’ Scared of the power wielded by the carved wooden fetish, 
Western priests, soldiers, and philosophers quickly took over the reins of knowledge 
and claimed the supremacy of the human and its immunity to the flickering presence 
of objects, to their inhuman attraction. Today, if the object is to keep any kind of 
glimmer, its glimmer is that of the commodity; if it is to wield any power, its power is 
that of demanding consumption. In our societies, deprived as they are of shamanic 
rituals, first by the autocracy of the church and then by the priesthood of reason, 
objects can only find their lost glimmer in the shopping jungle of our high streets or 
within the sweaty walls of the fetish club, the last remaining temples where objects 
are still allowed to glimmer beyond their givenness in experience, where a pair of 
leather trousers is always so much more than what you will ever do with it. Touch 
them, wear them, smell them, lick them, and still you will never be able to exhaust 
their being. 
 
Nevertheless, and to the increasing despair of the lords of the land, objects do 
sometimes still surprise us when we least expect it. Say, for instance, in this moment 
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(right now) when I stand here reading the words on this sheet of paper. As I get on 
with it, I know the paper only in as much as it works as a blank support for the words 
I’m reading (right here, right now). I can say, when asked what am I doing, that “I am 
reading this piece of paper”. However, what I am in fact doing is reading the words 
printed on it (right here, right now). This is my current relation to this sheet of paper, 
this is metonymy: knowing this piece of paper through the words that are contiguous 
with it. 
 
Another relation can follow the first one (however, only if I allow it): if, right here, right 
now, I am suddenly taken by a childlike curiosity and a scholarly devotion to 
knowledge, I cease to be satisfied with knowing this piece of paper simply though the 
words printed on this page and my eyes start wandering over it, attempting to probe 
its being – top, bottom, left, and right. All of a sudden the black ink of these words 
becomes merely accidental to the being of the paper, it matters no more. I realise 
that other words could have been written right → here ← and still the paper would 
have remained the same. I look beyond these accidental words and, with a smile on 
my face, I dive into the blankness of the page (right here → ←, right now). The 
paper becomes this 11.69 x 8.27 inches of whiteness and I feel reassured: I must be 
on to something. Still, there must be more – there is always something more – as I 
become aware of all the qualities of the paper I had hitherto not taken into account: 
its touch, its texture, its ability to be turned into a boat, a hat, or a paper plane; its 
capacity to be burnt by an unexpected fire or to soak up the water from a puddle into 
which it has been thrown and then quickly forgotten… I am drawn to accept the 
blank canvas I had previously thought this sheet of paper to be as just an instance of 
the innumerable metonymic relations I may come to establish with it, as one of the 
many roles it can play for me. 
 
And yet, yet here I am (right here, right now), not having really grasped the true 
substance of this piece of paper and suddenly aware that I might never be able to do 
so. No matter how differently I may have approached it – with my eyes or with my 
hands, or with my nose or with my ears, or with my tongue or with my thought – this 
piece of paper kept on refusing to fully disclose itself to me. Like the black leather 
trousers I wear when the lights are dim and touch and smell replace sight, this piece 
of paper, like any other fetish, has proved itself to always be more than what I will 
ever make of it and, by doing so, has made me aware of the secret that is its being. 
 
A burning question now arises (and, quickly, I put my hands under cold running 
water to prevent any blisters): if I can never really access the hidden being of this 
piece of paper, if the closest I can get to it is by letting myself notice (and be 
obfuscated by) its glimmering aura, by being aware of its presence while never really 
knowing it, then what is this thing we call knowing? How can I know something 
without ever being in direct contact with it, if my relation to it is always tangential, 
metonymic? How can I summon the opposite margin of a river I won’t ever be able to 
cross (because no engineering will ever be able to bridge the here and the there; 
because no matter how much you love something or someone, you will always be 
loving at a distance, all touch never really touching, all distance never really being 
walked… Zeno’s paradox)? What is this world we live in, a world in which, no matter 
where we are, we are always far away from all the other objects around us? What is 
the real if not a world of fourth walls, walls that have never really been broken down, 
walls that will always exist between the tips of our fingers, or the edge of our noses, 
or the surface of our tongues, or the retina in our eyes, or the membrane in our ears, 
or the thoughts in our heads, and everything else that we touch, smell, taste, see, 
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hear, or think. This is a world of theatrics, a world of performers and audiences, 
where every encounter happens at a distance, where communication is always both 
partial and noisy: the information being transmitted hitting bumps and holes, rubbing 
up against other messages and other bodies that refract it on its ways from object to 
object, from performer to audience. The whole world is a theatron, a place for 
seeing, in which communication attracts parasitic information, accidental data, 
feedback noise. On its rocky path from here to there, from real object to perceived 
phenomenon, information changes and becomes a contingent, incomplete, and 
provisional translation of its original, carrying with it the traces of the innumerable 
obstacles it has encountered in the space between you and me. No window is ever 
fully clear, no telescope can ever look this far away, no performance can provide me 
with full access to the being of the performer, be it human, animal, or thing, material 
or abstract, dream or reality. no matter how devoted I am to this object, to this piece 
of paper, no matter how much strength and dedication I expend in trying to know it, 
the only thing I will ever get from it is one of its masks, one of its personae. Every 
time I try to approach it, it gives me one of its characters, one of its performances. 
Sometimes it plays the surface for my writing, sometimes the raw material for my 
paper boat; sometimes it convinces me it is a letter, sometimes it reminds me it is 
nothing but the trace of a tree. Understood in this way, performance implies the 
transformation of an always hidden real object into a graspable phenomenon, the 
translation of performer into performed, of actor into role being played, of idea into 
movement or sound, of body into image, of real into world. And stage after stage, 
performance after performance, I keep on chasing it, from tree to paper to letter to 
boat, trying hard to overcome the white blindness caused by the stage lights that 
follow me in my crusade. However, no matter how fast I run or how educated I am in 
the thespian arts, I can never reach the dressing room backstage where (in my 
dreams at least) the object calmly removes its costume and cleans up its make-up 
before sitting there, naked, on the sofa by the lit mirror, waiting for me to come 
knocking on its door.  
 
Having said that, you should never think objects perform only for us. In the end, the 
show is open, free, and everyone and everything has been invited. (Advice: come 
early if you don’t want to sit on the floor at the back of the room.) Imagine the black 
ink of these words, for instance. Even if, unlike me, it can access the paper’s 
capacity to absorb liquids (by itself being absorbed), it still can’t experience its shade 
of white or its capacity to be turned into a paper plane. Or, to expand this scene 
slightly, imagine a tree being cut by an axe (it can, if you want, be the same tree that 
produced the cellulose for this sheet of paper – it’s always good to keep things in the 
family, you know?). So the axe hits the trunk of the tree (once, twice). The tree trunk 
screams open with the impact of the blade. An axe-imprint, an image or a 
performance, is left on the inner surface of the trunk, now exposed to the 
atmosphere and bleeding dry at the mercy of the elements. Yet the tree grasps 
nothing of the axe but the shape and momentum of its blade; it has no access to its 
colour and is oblivious of the shape of the handle attached to it, of its temperature, 
texture, or even of the muscled harm of the hot lumberjack holding it. The axe hits 
again (and again, and again), expanding the surface of the cut, licking open the 
wound. The tree falls and becomes paper for this writing, canvas for these words. 
And still (and again), while the ink penetrates the paper and slowly dries in the empty 
spaces amongst its cellulose fibres, it remains blind to the tree that the paper once 
was and to the particular shade of white it has in my eyes. 
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And now we are back at the beginning, just before I realised this piece of paper must 
be more than the words written on it, more than its blankness, more than its look, 
touch, taste, smell, or sound; more than any thought I will ever have on it, more than 
any use I will ever give to it.  
 
And so, both here with this piece of paper and out there where the tress keep on 
growing, the world has suddenly become a quasi-Brechtian play, one of those in 
which the foreigness of the actor behind the persona is revealed and the 
unbridgeable distance between audience and action is announced: 
Verfremdungseffekt. This, however, is not due to the fact that the masks were too 
loose or the acting not up to scratch. It has only to do with a particular way of 
looking, one that makes us aware of the absolute alienness of all objects beyond any 
acts through which they make themselves appear to us: a special way of looking that 
is usually associated with the experience of something we call art. But don’t be 
fooled: more than a specially crafted object waiting to be experienced, art is first and 
foremost a way of looking (in doubt, just ask Marcel Duchamp): looking beyond 
accidental appearances, beyond givenness in experience; looking beyond the 
ordinary in search for the world’s hidden surprises while nevertheless knowing that 
what lies beyond appearances and beyond the reassuring ordinary will always 
remain dark, silent, and inaccessible. However, this is not a game to be won. This is 
the game of the rediscovered joy of playing, not the game of accumulated victories. 
And it is happening everywhere: it is happening here, it is happening out there in 
theatres and gallery spaces, it is happening everywhere else around you, from the 
internet to the ozone layer, from bird nests to fairytales, from dreams to microwaves, 
from libraries to the rusting metal of the benches outside. You just have to look 
around and embrace the game. 
 
 
Note 
 
1 A shorter version of this paper has been published as part of the pamphlet for 
“Field Static,” an exhibition curated by Devin King and Caroline Picard, which has 
taken place at the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Chicago, Illinois. The pamphlet was 
published by Holon Press. 
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The Thinking Performance: René Pollesch’s Interpassive Theatre and Beyond 
 
Moritz Gansen and Elisabeth Schilling 
Free University, Berlin and Freelance Dance Artist 
 
Philosopher and Dancer enter the stage. 
 
B: NO! NO! You simply can’t tell me that any role I’m supposed to identify 
with refers to reality. It only ever refers to the theatre. The ancient Greeks, 
all of that only ever refers to the theatre. Please, nobody tell me this aims at 
my reality, this old old old male gibberish! […] But it simply has to be 
possible to say something about a life that is being lived. And that is without 
this machine of awe. It simply has to be possible to say something that can 
be shot coldly from the hip. (Pollesch 2009e, 209)1 
 
How can we think, how can we express what actually concerns us? Gilles Deleuze, 
in his preface to Difference and Repetition, anticipated a time “when it will hardly be 
possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been done for so long” (Deleuze 
2004, XX). Today, we (but who are we?) find ourselves no less (perhaps more than 
ever), thrown into a “search for new means of philosophical expression”, pursued not 
least, as Deleuze wrote, “in relation to the renewal of certain other arts, such as the 
theatre or the cinema” (Deleuze 2004, XX). Here and now we would thus like to 
examine one of these arts, namely theatre, or the performative arts more generally, 
as another mode of doing philosophy, or, more precisely, of doing thinking. 
 
You will have gathered from our title (and possibly also from the introductory quote) 
that we will take the experimental practice of the German author and director René 
Pollesch (it is in fact difficult to determine what exactly he is) as a way of 
approaching the question of how performance thinks. Based on our literature review, 
we assume that anglophone audiences are relatively unfamiliar with Pollesch’s work. 
Although he spent some time in London on a working scholarship at the Royal Court 
Theatre as early as 1996 (‘once I was in London, and I was absolutely desperate 
because of the shitty theatre that is being produced there’; Pollesch 2009g, 330), it 
was only in late 2008, when Death of a Trainee was shown as part of the 
contemporary visual arts exhibition Molten States at the Royal Academy of Arts, that 
British audiences were for the first time introduced to one of his pieces (a year 
earlier, in 2007, Pollesch’s 24 Stunden sind kein Tag / Escape from New York was 
restaged at the New York Theatre Workshop). At the time, Pollesch was advertised 
as “one of the most influential and exciting directors working in Germany today” 
(“Welcome to the Now Show” 2008) – but as far as we know, his work has never 
returned to the UK (in fact, Pollesch did not even make it onto an actual theatre 
stage there in 2008!). Yet this predicate seems nevertheless still valid, regardless of 
Pollesch’s recent lack of innovation (and one might add, that after all he seeks to 
escape the neoliberal capitalist logic of innovation). Especially among younger 
academic audiences, Pollesch enjoys great popularity; he has been commissioned 
to produce performances of his work at stages throughout the country and has won a 
number of awards (at present, the Berlin theatre Volksbühne lists six of his pieces as 
part of their repertoire). But we cannot go into all this here. What is most important 
for us now is that over the past decade or two Pollesch has been seen as a true 
theatre revolutionary. His signature style of collective theatre practice goes hand in 
hand with the development of a new form of discursive theatre, a strange hybrid of 
metatheatre and metatheory (– always grounded in concrete experience –) that 
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presents a multilayered performance of thinking, or, as we will show, a thinking 
performance. 
 
For Pollesch, theatre, or rather public performance (it is very difficult to merely resort 
to the term ‘theatre’), must be a way of thinking, ideally of thinking something 
different. Performance must be part of the thinking that changes our lives (see 
Pollesch 2009a, 305). It is thus quite appropriate that the initial step of Pollesch’s 
staging of thought is always to be found in his peculiar production practice. The first 
week or so of rehearsals usually consists of reading and discussion sessions with 
the actors. Pollesch himself brings his own unfinished manuscript alongside various 
theoretical texts, and within a few weeks author and actors produce a cast- and often 
also site-specific performance. Fragmentary ideas and quotes from a relatively wide 
range of contemporary theory (one could for instance mention Jean Baudrillard or 
Giorgio Agamben) are incorporated into the text, a text in motion, one that is in the 
process of being thought together (a composition in community) (see Pollesch 
2009g, 328, 331). Writing these texts is hence a “writing-further” of theory (Pollesch 
2009b, 348). They are assembled around a few crucial phrases that fold and unfold 
along an axis of individual experience; they are spun further and sometimes 
repeated ad nauseam or developed ad absurdum. In this sense, we can understand 
the performance as extending into the very making of the text, the process of 
production. 
 
But let us just consider another example, a very brief section from Love Is Colder 
than Capital: 
 
K: There hasn’t always been filming backstage! Or has there? 
F: Everybody ready! Setup for Mr Stephenson! 
K: Darling! What has happened to reality? It used to be here in the back. 
You know, it’s as if the two of us play noughts and crosses and you keep 
erasing my crosses. I cannot play like this, with you always breaking the 
rules that our reality is based on. One used to be able to exit a stage, 
that was tradition! 
S: But perhaps only a collapsed reality is real. Perhaps we need another 
visit of the shah in order to become aware of the police state that is so 
obviously turning against its citizens. This confusion that makes our 
unspoken social rules or realities break down. Perhaps we need them? 
Rules which otherwise remain quite invisible. (Pollesch 2009e, 176) 
 
As one can hopefully see from this example (it is very difficult to excerpt a passage 
from Pollesch’s plays), we can understand primary text in Pollesch (and his scripts 
consist almost exclusively of primary text) as a discursive performance of thought 
rather than traditional dialogue between characters. Pollesch’s plays are non-
figurative. The actors on stage do not enact intact body-speech relationships (what 
we might call a person, a character); they are rather the media of a discursive (and 
experience-based) abstraction that speaks through them (see Pollesch 2009g, 328-
332). One could perhaps think of conceptual personae moving from one actor to the 
next and back. 
 
With this movement of thought, theatre becomes transformed. A different theatre 
must allow for the staging of different thoughts beyond and in defiance of, as 
Pollesch calls it, an “anti-democratic” institution that essentially conserves outdated 
social and economic modes and relations (Pollesch 2009d, 323-326). Theory has to 
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be liberated from the booklets and left to roam the stage (“In the theatre, theory 
always has to be held captive in booklets, otherwise it would blow up the entire 
institution.”  Pollesch 2009f, 306). Theatre must become “a thinking space”, one that, 
as Pollesch says, “has to do with community” insofar as it negotiates new modes of 
subjectivity as well as collectivity (Pollesch 2011b). But what exactly is this thinking 
space (or thinking environment), and how is it constituted? How does performance 
think? 
 
Here we can, although the connection is not explicitly made by Pollesch himself, 
draw upon an experimental notion that he has introduced in more recent plays such 
as I Look You in the Eyes, Societal Relation of Blindness (Ich schau dir in die Augen, 
gesellschaftlicher Verblendungszusammenhang) and Whatever you do, don’t do it 
yourself (Was du auch machst, mach es nicht selbst): “interpassive theatre”. The 
concept of interpassivity was largely developed in a philosophical exchange between 
Slavoj Žižek and the Austrian philosopher Robert Pfaller (although arguably we find 
a prefiguration of this notion in Lacan’s discussion of the chorus in Greek tragedy or 
even in aspects of Aristotle’s notion of catharsis). In a nutshell, we can say that 
interpassivity is the obverse of interactivity. Pfaller sees an interactive artwork as one 
that is “not yet finished”, one to which the observer is expected to add some creative 
work. The interpassive artwork, on the other hand, is already “more than finished” – 
neither creative activity nor receptive passivity have to be added to it. In a sense, the 
interpassive artwork is entirely self-sufficient (Pfaller and Žižek invoke examples 
such as the canned laughter that laughs for us, the VCR that watches our favourite 
movie for us, and the Tibetan prayer wheel that prays for us; see Pfaller 2000; Žižek 
1997, 144-147). 
 
Pfaller’s theory of interpassivity is immensely problematic, and we cannot adequately 
discuss it in its own right here. Instead, we would like to focus on Pollesch’s 
transformative use of the notion of interpassivity, which should eventually enable us 
to come to terms with the idea of performance as a thinking subject. In the works we 
have mentioned, Pollesch presents the idea that the apparently inevitable art of 
interactive theatre, which has “terrorised” audiences for decades now, forcing them 
into an undesired ideal of activity, has to be overcome. 
 
J: Interpassive theatre, in contrast, could mean that one does not 
experience the things one had thought one wanted to experience. For 
instance the repeated broadcast of your favourite movie on TV. Most of 
the time you would set your VCR in order to then watch your favourite 
movie some time later. But possibly we have already, without knowing it, 
delegated this to the VCR. After all, it has already seen our favourite 
movie for us. And perhaps we are then finally redeemed from the things 
that we love. 
[…] 
L: Delegate your enjoyment of art to the artwork! Just like the Greeks did it 
through the chorus. […] The ancient Greeks, they didn’t know emotion, 
the chorus delivered them from it. They would have declared war on any 
form of interactive theatre. […] They could lean back, the ancient Greeks, 
and leave emotion to the others. The chorus comes on and they are free 
of all sorrows because it bears their emotion. The chorus says that our 
most intimate emotions can be transferred to others. Artists go on dates 
instead of their audiences, correspond with their acquaintances, crash 
their cars. The goal is relief. Nobody reads, we relieve ourselves from 
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reading. The book that you wanted to read. I’ve photocopied it! The copier 
has read it for you. And here I stand now, happy and with a feeling of 
redemption! (Pollesch 2011a) 
 
But what is this interpassive theatre really? One could, of course, think of it in terms 
of a generalised notion of catharsis through vicarious experience. But that would not 
actually add anything to theatre – it would not construct a different (as we might call 
it with Deleuze) “image of thought”.2 Let us thus try to take the notion of interpassive 
theatre seriously and, importantly, beyond Pfaller. 
 
Generally speaking, Pollesch’s critique of interactive theatre is that it has lost all 
emancipatory potential and can now only ever assist the reproduction of hegemonic 
forms of subjectivity that dictate the desires of a good life (activity, flexibility, etc.). In 
short: interactive theatre has lost the ability to say something different – it can no 
longer think. Interpassive theatre, on the other hand, Pollesch suggests, might 
introduce a new and hitherto unknown freedom into artistic and cultural practice; it 
might ultimately prove to be the key to the construction of a different subjectivity, a 
different image of thought (Pollesch 2011a). For Pollesch, interpassivity is mainly, as 
we have seen, the art of delegating that which one used to think one wanted to 
experience to something else (having the VCR watch the film, etc.); it is a freeing 
from the burden of being governed by the desires of a given subjectivity. We can 
hence assume that if Pollesch’s discursive theory-theatre is indeed interpassive 
(which may remain debatable), its main task must be to allow its audience to 
delegate their thinking to the performance, thus creating a “thinking space” that 
thinks for them. Only in this way can we make sense of the idea of interpassivity in 
the context of Pollesch’s theatrical experiments: the image of thought as an internal 
process that draws the boundaries of the classical thinking subject (I think therefore I 
am I) must be transformed into one that understands thought as something external 
to such a (de)limited subject. Thinking must come to be conceived as a collective 
process which itself inaugurates a different sense of collective subjectivity. Ideally, 
then, the performance in its entirety assembles a multiplicity as a thinking 
community. Thinking is no longer a matter of the individual audience member but a 
collective discursive process. There is no more drama on the stage (we are post-
dramatic) – all there is are dramatic thoughts in the process of being uttered and 
developed. In fact, there is not even a stage anymore – there is only a performance, 
a thinking space (Pollesch 2008). 
 
All this leaves us with the question what such a conception of a thinking performance 
might have to offer for contemporary performance in general. We will hence, by way 
of a long conclusion, raise two questions that arise from Pollesch’s method of 
bringing thought to the stage. 
 
Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, Pollesch has repeatedly formulated the 
contemporary artist’s double-bind: what has long been considered the freedom of the 
aesthetic is “no more than the training for a demand for creativity out there” (Pollesch 
2011a). “Initiative, flexibility, and creativity” are the key requirements for both the 
artist and the contemporary individual in general (Pollesch 2011a). In a sense, the 
artist-subject has become the caricature of subjectivity under neoliberal capitalism.3 
Of course this problem extends far beyond the theatre. Allow us to take the practice 
of contemporary dance as an example. Besides being highly-skilled performance 
workers, dancers are moreover required to correspond to the dance scene’s image 
of what it means to be an artist: to be creative and proactive, to have a strong 
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personality and opinion, and to display an individual style of movement and 
presence. However, traditionally, the production process in contemporary dance 
includes a single legislator (behind which we can suspect the forces of the market), a 
master-subject giving tasks that represent his or her artistic interests to the dancers 
who are then expected to adequately respond to them. Creative expressivity tends to 
be treated as a raw material or force to be moulded and canalised at the 
choreographer’s will. Although the avant-gardes of the 1960s and after (one could for 
instance think of the influence of the Judson Church) have tried to overcome this 
predicament, we still find the performative arts in a largely “anti-democratic” state of 
existence (Pollesch 2009d, 323-326). Realistically speaking, even the idea of 
collective creation (and this criticism may easily include Pollesch’s own rules of 
production), so frequently evoked as a method of research in contemporary dance 
practice insofar as it allows dancers to have an impact on the artistic process, is 
usually framed by an external set of rules that remains beyond their influence. 
Ultimately, performance may seem doomed to stay disconnected from any process 
of real collective thinking. As a consequence, a performance that truly thinks must 
always be a threat to the established image of performance. 
 
As Pollesch points out, this renders the creation of a genuinely thinking performance 
virtually impossible: “thought, [or] theatre that actually forms resistance […] is 
immediately absorbed or defamed” (Pollesch 2009d, 325). His works can hence 
(both in terms of form and content) be understood precisely as an ongoing search for 
ways of thinking throughout the overall process of performance, ways of thinking 
beyond the prevalent rules of language and institutions, beyond the “automatism of 
the master language” (Pollesch 2009c, 360). 
 
But it is here that we must raise our second question. It concerns, once again, the 
nature of the thinking that is at stake. Especially (but not only) if we extend 
Pollesch’s interpassive theatre to performance as such, we encounter an inadequacy 
regarding the new image of thought: something gets lost if we focus exclusively on 
the performance as a collective thinking subject. It is not the least of the virtues of 
dance and performance that they are capable of investigations into sensibility. And 
indeed, in the same works in which the idea of interpassive theatre was invented, 
Pollesch also poses the problem of the body: 
 
J: Why are the bodies invisible? After all, we do encounter them. None of the 
words of our culture tells us anything about our bodies. Not a single one. 
They’re always supposed to go away! That which cannot be thought! (Pollesch 
2011a) 
 
Bodies are, Pollesch suggests with reference to Jean-Luc Nancy, always hidden 
from sight, overcoded by structures of meaning. There is no language of bodies – 
traditionally neither theatre nor dance have been able to conceive one (Pollesch 
2011b). The new task is thus precisely to develop such a language, a form of 
experience that allows bodies to be freed from structures of meaning that are only 
contingently and conventionally connected to them. What could non-hidden bodies 
be, and how are we to discover them? 
 
The question of a new subjectivity must thus not only be posed in terms of thinking 
but also, more generally, in terms of sensibility (here we can only in passing mention 
Jacques Rancière’s work on the sensus communis). We can understand the 
performative arts as a play of sensibilities between perception, experience, and 
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thought. Performance can then become the site of general adventures and 
experiments that enable us to construct new forms of subjectivity – the interpassive 
performance must thus not only conceive a new image of thought based in a 
collective subject, but also create new collective sensibilities. In the words of 
Whatever you do, don’t do it yourself: 
 
J: We need an adventure, and perhaps it is this: to act as if all of this didn’t 
yet exist. These tools such as arms and legs, and the manner in which one 
touches them, in which one encounters them. It isn’t enough to just dig up 
our bones and only find embraces again, and arms that make this an arm 
or this a leg; none of that is obvious. (Pollesch 2011a) 
 
Notes 
 
The colours indicate the performative situation of the presentation: passages 
given in brown were read by Elisabeth, those in black by Moritz, and the purple 
parentheses are optional for the reader. 
 
1 Although Pollesch’s works have occasionally been translated into other languages, 
all publications so far are in German. Accordingly, all translations in this paper are 
ours. 
2 On the image of thought, see Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. 
3 See also McRobbie 2004 and Boltanski and Chiapello 2005. 
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And here's something prepared earlier OR Museum of the Sublime: relic # 9 
 
Nikki Heywood 
University of Wollongong NSW Australia 
 
This paper reshuffles selected moments from some of the eight relic ‘exhibits’ I have 
presented in Sydney and Wollongong over the last two years, where I have been 
performing a series of small linked studies under the title Museum of the Sublime: 
relics. 
 
I attempt to speak simultaneously through the remembered past and a hypothetical 
future of this serial work in progress, such that it becomes another staging - the 9th 
variation - on a fragmentary theme of a fragmented body.  My intention in this telling 
is to allow you the listener / reader to experience the described parts and pieces, to 
reassemble them into some kind of virtual whole; for you to witness, and think 
through, an unseen performance across your own time and in whatever dimension 
this jumbled reading offers. 
 
My usual approach in these works is curatorial, where I construct a loose 
choreography in relation to a collection of objects that have caught my attention, that 
I have sniffed out or stumbled across, and allow the gathered things themselves to 
speak, to move, to look back at me, to move me, and to speak to each other. 
Assembling objects that range from the banal & everyday- such as a rope, a mirror, 
a stick - to the more elliptical - a desiccated fur coat, a text from Proverbs or George 
Bathaille - and hovering ideas that refer to or approach the sublime – such as 
paintings by Rembrandt and the figures on the walls of Lascaux ... These objects 
offer up their particular qualities and textures to the ‘museum’, and as their curator I 
am at their service, I put them in place, in shifting contexts where their 'meaning' is 
not quite stable; in these contexts I am performed by them and their qualities, or by 
the logic of their proximity to each other and to me as performing subject inside the 
unfolding space and shape of performed time. My presence slips between the role of 
curator and that of an exhibit, shifting between poles of curatorial wilfulness on one 
hand and a surrender to their thinking on the other. 
 
As something I might have prepared earlier, this paper is a record of some new and 
some left over ideas for action - my intention being that, through presentation before 
attentive witnesses, testing the usefulness of memory joined with conjecture, some 
new thinking and questions may arise toward the emergence of relic#10 and 
beyond. 
 
First memory 
In relic #1 a heavy stone mortar and pestle grinds and grinds … rhythmic, stone on 
stone, pounding down on black, white and red peppercorns... until a sneeze is 
imminent. But it never ah ah ah... it never arrives. 
 
Second memory 
In relic #3 the audience are gathered outside. They have been spoken to... a 
woman, one finger pointing upward, gives a kind of framing talk…. 'the research 
question is...' that kind of thing. 
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Then she disappears. 
Moments pass. A male attendant stands before the big door as it opens a crack for 
you, the audience to be admitted. Strictly one by one. 
The doorway is a narrow seam, in this instance - a defined threshold to pass 
through, and you are told by the attendant to 'mind the gap'. 
 
As you squeeze through she is right there, just inside, too close, slightly blocking 
your entry, forcing you into a further side-on manoeuvre beyond the threshold.  
At least she seems to be there, but she is not available, attention elsewhere. 
How can she have absented herself so quickly? Twice disappeared. 
She wears white gloves and is working on a puzzle, a mess of fine coloured paper 
threads, right there at the door, by a mirror, and you pass by her and the mirror, so 
that you see yourself and her at the same time as you hear her breath, her 
muttering, and you catch her eye and then she sees you in the mirror too.  Ah so she 
is there!  Mind the gap'. 
 
 
 
You have entered a large curtained room that is completely empty but for a plinth 
somewhere close to the centre that holds a scale model that you are drawn to look in 
upon.  It is a model of the same room that you are in. A room inside a room, and 
your location is marked. 
 
When the others have squeezed through the crack (and there are maybe 20? of you, 
and you are small inside the large near empty room - and even smaller in the 
simulacra room), a pervasive droning sound that you hadn't noticed until it stops, 
stops. And the sound falling away empties the room further to make room for the 20 
of you. Without sound, the room is even emptier. 
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You turn back toward the door and she has moved the mirror at such an angle that 
she sees you all in the room. Spread out and quiet... In her empty room. 
 
Then the lights go out and as your eyes adjust there is only enough light to see that 
she has gone... but then you hear her stumbling about behind the heavy curtain, as 
she slowly and clumsily navigates the hidden perimeter of the room. She mumbles 
and curses and hums to herself, opens boxes and intermittently opens a crack in the 
curtain to insert an object into the space. Your curiosity draws you toward these 
small exhibits. One of them being this wooden bear, with a letter attached. 
 
 
 
... and so on. She later makes an appearance, pulls back a side curtain to reveal a 
row of seating for the audience, an event unfolds, etcetera ... 
At a mid point she appears in a tattered full length fur coat (looking like a tired 
Catherine Deneuve or maybe Gina Rowlands in her later roles) with an exploding 
party popper. 
 
Near the end, accompanied by a loud bang, the curtain opens in a corner of the 
room, and there you see the fur coat that she had worn earlier, suspended upside 
down by butcher’s hooks. Empty, arms hanging, it’s smooth inside lining catching the 
light. 
Returned to a 'skin'. An animal hide. 
 
 
***** 
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In Rembrandt's painting 'the Slaughtered Ox', the hanging carcass has no head, no 
entrails and no skin.  In her essay ‘Bathsheba or the Interior Bible’ Helen Cixous 
(1998) describes the animal’s flayed eviscerated body: 
 
 before me spreads the agitated space with its sombre thicknesses of fatty 
haunted gold, ... of flayed scarlet stairs in the geologic matter, the ground 
sheer like a deep hanging, past upon past, ...overflowing.., with thoughts , 
with passions, with kin, before me my personal foreign land: everything that in 
its night dough, I discern for the first time , I recognise. The world before me 
so great, is inside, it is the immense limitless life hidden behind restricted life. 
 
 
***** 
 
One week ago (a week in April 2012), I caught sight of the original Rembrandt in a 
darkened room in the Louvre and audibly gasped...  
 
Having for so long held the reproduced image of the Slaughtered beast in the cellar 
as some kind of borrowed memory or teleological totem, after meditating on the 
mystery and carnality of this painting, especially as seen through incisive beauty of 
Cixous' language, I had been engaged in a personal myth making, a vaguely pagan 
idolatry... and here was the real artefact. The original. Although as the original it is 
already a conscious re-presentation and, for me, highly mediated by the writings of 
Cixous and John Berger.  
 
‘The Slaughtered Ox’ 1655. A potently distilled memento of the savagery concealed 
beneath the civil codes of our existence. We kill things and remove their entrails. 
Mostly out of sight. And here is the hidden sacrifice. The corpse beneath the stairs.... 
or as Cixous would have it ‘our anonymous humanity… the portrait of our mortality’. 
 
There it was, still waiting in a dusty wing of the Louvre for another visiting pilgrim. 
Was it pleased to see me, breathing life, cells vibrating, as Rembrandt himself in              
portraits of all ages – youth to senex – looked on sagely from across the room? 
 
And there ‘Bathsheba bathing’ (1654), just as Cixous promises, luminous on the 
other side, still holding the page in her hand… 
 
before us, very near, very far from us… We see a mixture of slowness and 
agitation… 
It’s dark here. We’re down below. We’re here. 
In the breast. Immediately. Such an absence of exterior!  
The country is a room of palpitating folds… 
The source of the light is cut off. The light remains. The secret fire that 
emanates from the flesh.  
Of what secret lights are we made? Of what densities? 
 
To close the performance of relic #3, for over 2 minutes the woman moves from 
standing to sitting, impossibly slowly, poised to read the small bear's sad letter. The 
words are difficult for her to see, she needs her glasses and to move the page to a 
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distance where they do not blur. She squints and mouths the scratchy words of the 
animal in fading light. 
 
Fourth Memory 
Relic #4 … a small gathering in an antechamber where the floor has just been 
washed, calling for a yellow plastic sign – SLIPPERY WHEN WET. 
 
Here, I am wondering how to have the audience actively shift their focal length and 
thus mildly alter their perceptual field. To move from our normal fixed-point focus and 
perhaps in doing so, to shift from the position of passive audience to that of 
witness/participant. To rethink their looking. I introduce an eye exercise chart that 
firstly instructs the user to breathe deeply, to relax and soften the gaze. By focusing 
on their own finger in front of two large dots on a page, then removing the finger but 
retaining the altered focal length, it is possible for the 2 dots to become 4 then 3 and 
then one. There are also exercises with 4 dots that become 8 that become 2 that 
become one. With some practice! 
 
I later decide (and even later reject the same idea) that this process is the perfect 
model for my thesis as well as for the presentation of the performed material. Each 
dot as a discreet image or conceptual thread that may be held apart or, by softening 
the gaze and shifting distance and perspective, the ideas blur at the edges, overlap 
temporarily and mark a momentary synthesis. 
 
After the eye chart my audience are given the image of a small boy standing with a 
balloon in the doorway of a 16th century Flemish house. The balloon is of course 
made from the bladder of the flayed animal suspended further inside the room. And I 
tell them that it was not uncommon for painters of this period to place an air filled 
bladder/balloon as a counterweight to the heavy presence of death. It lightly 
connotes the spirit, the immortal. For me the balloon is the held breath, the personal 
exhalation captured and creating form, filling the membrane, a space within a space, 
a small cell within the larger cell of the room... where one becomes two. 
 
For somatic practitioner Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen, whose teaching is Body Mind 
Centering, the bladder is the organ that stores both that which is being eliminated 
and the instinctive essence of our creativity... the creativity that Australian 
philosopher Elizabeth Grosz (2008) refers to in Chaos, Territory and Art as the 
excess of our being. 
 
With their new found flexible focal capacity, the audience are asked to put an X in 
one dot and an O in the other, and then allow them to merge into one. They are 
given a lolly bag with sweets to eat and a balloon for them to blow and fill and hold. A 
short time later they are led, one by one, holding their balloon, up some stairs where, 
exhibited in a dim light, they briefly see the curved back of a nude reclining on fur. 
She is looking out of her frame at them in the small mirror she holds. 
 
I conjecture that in a later museum... perhaps relic #11, there will be a flickering film 
of the reclining woman's body, framed, revealed from behind the curtain. 
I imagine that this may be at the beginning. Just her, as large as life. 
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She looks back at you as you read her contours, her curves a country you remember 
visiting. 
Perhaps you can go behind the curtain and it will be as though you are seeing 
yourself. 
As though from the inside. Or as though you see the world through her eyes. 
It is possible. Even that her gaze detaches itself from her body and floats around the 
room. 
It is possible, with special cameras and things.... to confound the point of view.   
 
Or perhaps, with every other part dimmed, rather than revealing her back, your eyes 
will be drawn to see only her navel, there at the centre of things. Again this is after 
Rembrandt, who as Berger (2001) observes, made Bathsheba’s ‘nubile stomach and 
navel the focus of the entire painting… and painted them with love and pity as if they 
were a face.’  
 
Fifth Memory 
Back to relic #4 and the woman up the stairs... I almost forgot that she had a rope 
around her ankle. Downstairs, the rope later becomes its own moving exhibit... in a 
tightly focused circle of light, with the audience gathered close, the rope circles on 
itself, tangles, twists... and writhes.... in undulating rhythm, snaking white on the dark 
floor , it scribes graphic lines.... 
 
In my conjecture I focally cross 2 of the exhibits … the empty fur skin standing in for 
Rembrandt's eviscerated corpse, and the writhing rope for a bond or tether / turned 
intestine. 
 
In this way I take my place as curator and put the animal back together. 
 
Our bodies speak back to art and nature, art and nature also observes us. 
 
In this work ... desire and curiosity draw open the curtain onto the thinking interior. 
The animal (with attendant ropes and sticks) offers a doorway into ‘the immense 
limitless life hidden behind restricted life’. Inside the work I wait for the animal to 
speak back to the woman.... For us one animal can stand for all the other animals of 
that species... one single bear, ox, deer, donkey …can hold the unwritten history of 
its kind… a history folded in complex pleats into the fabric of human history… our 
history obsessed with objects and their taxonomy.  I assemble a small and 
exhausted array of objects that resonate with the flesh, with a type of music, with the 
animal, the feminine and speechlessness… in search, in a clumsy way, for those 
relics to find a voice through their appearance in an abject museum of the sublime. 
 
Note 
 
All photographs by Heidrun Lohr, taken from a showing of material developed during 
a Critical Path Research Residency in Io Myers Studio, University of New South 
Wales, August 2010. 
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Idle fancies, lucid dreams, startling memories: Remembering as a form of 
active spectatorship 
 
Katja Hilevaara 
Queen Mary University of London 
 
The claim 
 
I would like to begin with a claim that contemporary theatre is a vehicle for extending 
perception. Theatre is a cultural practice that enables the spectator to enter a dream-
like state in which unexpected, unforeseen memories circulate and come together; 
mixing and amalgamating; bouncing and ricocheting off each other, generating 
indeterminate new connections and tangents, expanding what is perceived. 
 
The spectator is invited to engage in a creative act of interpretation, to play a game 
of dots where the dots shift perpetually and the completed image is unexpected. The 
play between the theatre maker’s prompts and the spectator’s reactions generates 
perceptual material that extends beyond the anticipated, known responses.  By 
striving for unpredictability, deliberately complicating perception, theatre makers are 
tapping into radical innovation that genuinely creates responses that cannot be 
known in advance. By creating conditions for imagining and conscious dreaming in 
which perception is prolonged, theatre makers invite indisputably new thinking.  
 
A few signposts 
 
In this paper I will exercise an idea about remembering as a form of active 
spectatorship. Remembering in this context is intrinsically linked to perception, the 
thing that the spectator does. First, using Ivana Müller’s performance Playing 
Ensemble Again and Again (2008)29 as an example, I will examine the strategy of 
temporal interference in contemporary performance and how it produces a delay in 
the spectator’s perception. I will argue next, perching on the shoulders of Henri 
Bergson that this delay extends perception, because it allows an increased multitude 
of interposed and unpredictable memories to come to the surface to interpret the 
perceived materials. These startling memories, referred to in the title, produce 
undeterminable, unforeseen and genuinely new responses for the spectator. I will 
conclude the paper by proposing some implications that the idea of theatre as a 
vehicle for extended perception might provoke. 
 
So, let me first say a few words about time and performance in general before 
examining it as a strategy of temporal interference in Müller’s Playing Ensemble 
Again and Again.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Müller, Ivana. Playing Ensemble Again and Again. 2008. Concept, choreography and direction: 
Ivana Müller; Performers: Daniel Almgren-Recén, Katja Dreyer, Pedro Inês, Karen Røise Kielland, 
Bojana Mladenović and Rodrigo Sobarzo; Text: Ivana Müller, Bill Aitchison 
and the performers; Lighting design: Martin Kaffarnik; Sound design: Viljam Nybacka; Artistic advise: 
Bill Aitchison. The references here are made to two performances I “attended”; a live performance at 
the Lilian Baylis Studio at Sadlers Wells, London, 21 January 2010 and a DVD recording made at Hau 
2, Berlin, October 2009, courtesy of the artist; viewed November 2011-March 2012.  
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Time in performance 
 
In The Nick of Time Elizabeth Grosz writes that “[w]e can think [of time] only in 
passing moments, through ruptures, nicks, cuts, in instances of dislocation, though it 
contains no moments or ruptures and has no being or presence, functioning only as 
continuous becoming.” (Grosz, 2004:5) Theatre performance is an opportunity for us 
to stand back from time and explore its ‘nicks’, discontinuities and disruptions. 
Although partaking in an act of watching/experiencing/perceiving in real time - in time 
that envelops us, moves on, passes by, and becomes - the layers of temporality that 
performance makes tangible provide us a glimpse into the ruptures Grosz refers to. 
The abstract quality of time which ordinarily remains beyond our grasp due to our 
complete immersion in it, is made more concrete within a performance that engages 
in play with time. Repetition, slow motion and velocity in performance draw our 
attention to disrupted time and how these temporal peculiarities influence our 
experience. We question the repeated sequences, look for concealed meaning in the 
slowed down gestures, and see situations anew in light of the rhythms generated by 
speeded up actions or text. Narration that travels from the end to the beginning, 
flashbacks from the present to the past or the future, and allusions to rewinding and 
fastforwarding that leap across the present time equally contribute to the distorted 
experience of time. Following a story made up of fragments belonging to different 
time frames heightens our perceiving faculties and the temporal leaps force us to 
adjust and process the unfolding stories again and again. Theatre as a form of 
storytelling makes use of a variety of strategies that manipulate our concept of time. 
Not only is the narrative spoken, sung, whispered, recited and so on, but the layers 
of different theatrical signs – bodies, objects, sounds, lights and the intricate shifts of 
focus highlighting or obscuring any combination of these elements – are able to 
narrate simultaneous and overlapping time structures. By using a combination of 
visual, aural, textual and illusory and all manner of perceptible sensory stimuli, 
theatre performance cuts into the fabric of time an opening, through which time stops 
momentarily and then starts again.  
 
I argue that in theatre performance that deliberately manipulates time, Grosz’s 
ruptures are commonplace, and their effects manifest as delays in perception. These 
delays in turn enable the circulation of an increased number of memory images 
which as a result enhance the meaning-making process. In other words, the 
temporal interference strategies at theatre-makers’ disposal enable a perception of 
time as a postponement, a delay, a break, which is then filled with unexpected 
memory connections that produce new meanings. 
 
Time and Playing Ensemble Again and Again 
 
Let me next briefly describe the performance of Playing Ensemble Again and Again. 
It was conceived in 2008 by the theatre company of Ivana Müller who is a Paris- and 
Amsterdam-based choreographer, artist and writer.30 I saw the performance in 
January 2010 at the Lilian Baylis Studio at Sadlers Wells. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Further biographical information of Ivana Müller, a short video excerpt of Playing Ensemble Again 
and Again and details of other works available on http://www.ivanamuller.com/ [accessed 13 April 
2012]. 
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Condensing a theatrical convention to its core, Playing Ensemble Again and Again 
revolves around the final bow, the curtain call. The piece opens with an empty stage, 
and pre-recorded applause. After a while, the performers slowly arrive to the stage 
through the back curtain. Gradually the spectator adjusts to the physical language of 
slow motion. The final curtain call has been decelerated, slowed right down, and this 
slow motion mode is maintained throughout the performance. The performers arrive, 
or apparently return, take a couple of bows, exit to the wings, come back the second 
time, exit again to arrive for the third and final time, and then leave for the real 
ending of the show – all this in slow motion. The economy of movement is paired 
with the six performers’ speech – all text also revolving around the act of bowing. 
Thoughts are voiced out loud about standing there and then, in front of the spectator; 
thoughts are spoken about the experience of tonight’s show, albeit imaginary; and 
thoughts are projected about self and others in relation to the show, the company 
and the audience.  
 
The convention of a bow is put on a pedestal in the performance, its status is raised 
from an appendix to the focal point, and its role as the no-man’s land between the 
performance and the bar is flipped backwards to become the main event. There is no 
performance other than the bow. And conversely, it is in the distillation of this gesture 
that a multiplicity of possibilities is opened up. When nothing happens, the smallest 
things become epic. In slowing the action down, by choosing the physical register of 
slow motion, Playing Ensemble Again and Again further invites the spectator in. 
Once the spectator realises that the slow formation of the row of performers smiling 
directly at the audience, reaching for each others’ hands, stooping and rising again, 
walking backwards and forwards and to the wings will be the only action on show, 
they begin to take notice of the smallest details. The amplification of gesture possible 
through the paring down of action foregrounds the imagination.  
 
Time extended 
 
Let us then think about slow motion in terms of a delay, or a series of ruptures that 
not only allow us a glimpse of time itself, but extend our capacity to perceive. Slow 
motion obscures and ‘makes strange’ an ordinary gesture. In Playing Ensemble 
Again and Again, the bow, slowed right down, becomes a site for extended 
perception. Because the gesture is so slow, not only does it highlight the minute 
details of the bodies but in doing so, expands the potential material that we perceive. 
The time it takes for the body to perform its task leaves the spectator’s mind idling. 
Because it does not quickly have to process information in order to move on, it can 
take its time. And in its idleness, it entertains itself by trying to make what it sees 
interesting, paying attention to the minutiae, playing with thoughts that come, 
associations that arrive. This space for remembering thickens the perception 
process, and potentially acts as a trigger for slightly longer delays in which the 
perceiving faculties process more memories, and more unexpected connections and 
responses emerge. In a paradoxical way, to enable the mind to be more active, it 
ought to be idle. This idle state of mind that does not have to ‘act,’ verges on 
Bergson’s ‘plane of dreams’. Bergson describes the relationship between perception 
and remembering as an electric circuit in which concentric circles contain the 
memory-images of the past.  
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In his diagram, the object of perception holds the circuit in mutual tension by 
continuous movement. The present object of perception is in the middle (O), right 
behind an afterimage of it (A), and then ever widening circles (B, C, D) that contain 
contracting and expanding details of past memories. The outer circle contains the 
exact detail of our experience but only ever by chance, or in dreams, will those 
recollections be remembered exactly, most of the time they lend just a part of 
themselves to perception. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1  
 
 
(Bergson 1988, p105)31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Closer to action the memory gets, less like the original memory it is. It is only 
revealing a fragmentary detail that is “thinned and sharpened” (Bergson, 1988:106) 
and follows the body’s necessity for action. As Bergson states, “there comes a 
moment when the recollection thus brought down is capable of blending so well with 
the present perception that we cannot say where the perception ends and where 
memory begins.” (Bergson, 1988:106) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This image of the diagram of Bergson’s electric circuit is published in Bergson, Matter and Memory, 
p105. 
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We call upon; from the whole of our memory, the useful memory-images that best 
blend in with perception, that best serve the demands of the future we continuously 
tend towards. However, for Bergson memory is elastic, it can exist in more or less 
contracted or dilated state. Each circuit contains the whole of our memory in varying 
intensity, as the concentric circles become increasingly open the further away from 
the object of perception and action they are.  
 
The most contracted memories merge with perception and are illuminated only 
partially, and serve only to shed light to the present for the facilitation of the future. 
The most dilated memories, on the other hand, cannot be accessed in their entirety 
anywhere but dreams. For Bergson, “[p]ast images, reproduced exactly as they 
were, with all their details and even with their affective colouring, are the images of 
idle fancy or of dream.” (Bergson, 1988:106) In sleep, the constraints imposed on 
perception by impending action are completely relaxed.32 The detachment from 
action enables a free movement of exact, precise memory images. Therefore a 
dream has the potential to reproduce memories. In this sense lucid dreaming like 
imagining or daydreaming also bring us closer to the concrete past images. 
Disconnecting from the demands of action enables a stream of memory images to 
enter consciousness. And because there is no action to fulfil, no instant response to 
produce, lucid dreaming extends the delay which is filled with an “incalculable 
multitude of remembered elements.” (Bergson, 1988:150) Therefore, the more the 
reaction to the stimulus is prolonged, the more indeterminate the response. The 
more the action-driven present is relaxed and the tension between the stimulus and 
response eased, the more extensively the startling memories and their unpredictable 
connections emerge. 
 
Back to performance 
 
As I have discussed in relation to Playing Ensemble Again and Again, theatre can 
fabricate a space for lucid dreaming by manipulating time. Returning to the idea that 
temporal interference in theatre produces a delay in the spectator’s perception, it can 
be argued that spectatorship can resemble daydreaming. The spectator’s use of 
imagination, her willingness to think laterally and her openness to a playful 
interaction with the performance undoubtedly extends perception time and hence the 
delay is flooded with unanticipated memories. And it is this delay in perception that 
can be seen to facilitate creativity. Trying to understand what one sees triggers a 
process of adjustment, of leaping back and forth between past memories and what is 
presented on stage. The more elusive the object of perception - as it is in the case of 
deliberately meaning-shy performance - the more elastic the remembering, and the 
more undeterminable the responses. 
 
The implications 
 
The critical practice of examining the work of memory in the spectatorship of 
contemporary theatre highlights several valuable implications within performance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 I am indebted to Elizabeth Grosz’s reading of Bergson’s theory of memory and her detailed analysis 
of delay in perception, see Grosz, Elizabeth. Time Travels: Feminism, Nature, Power. Durham and 
London: Duke UP. 2005, especially pp93-111; and Grosz explicates the disconnection between action 
and sleep p101. 
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studies. Memory could challenge at least one particularly persistent notion about 
performance, the primacy of liveness. If the present indeed has one foot in the past 
whilst tending towards the future, the idea that performance’s only life is in the 
present is immediately complicated, if not impossible. Not only would doing away 
with liveness activate a surge of new standpoints in terms of definitions and 
categorisations of performance, and in particular its documentation, but the tendency 
to write mournfully of performance, positing the writer in an inferior, unworthy 
relationship describing that which no longer exists and self-pityingly apologising for 
the inadequacies of description could become a thing of the past.  
 
Overall, though, memory democratises theatre. For one, the relationship between 
the makers and the perceivers stand on an equal footing when the performance that 
exists between them has a life beyond the present. In addition, as theatre makers 
relinquish the meaning-making to the spectators, the transformation of the 
performance continues ad infinitum, in the quotidian yet extraordinary and unique 
memories of those who were there. As each spectator has their own version of what 
they have seen, there are a multitude of transformations in motion.  
 
Significantly, these quotidian ‘lay’ responses might offer us a more accurate 
understanding of theatre’s potential as opposed to relying on the privileged few who 
professionally respond to what they have seen. As Helen Freshwater has pointed 
out, scholars shy away from asking what the ‘ordinary’ theatre-goer makes of the 
performance.33 In this sense, the kinds of master narratives and canons that emerge 
from those whose stories and memories are deemed valuable would be diluted and 
a greater breadth of theatre experiences might be mapped out.  
 
More specifically, in thinking about the delay in perception this paper has attempted 
to identify instances in performance that, instead of producing anticipated and 
predictable responses rather create emergent, unforeseen and new reactions. I have 
suggested that these instances are triggered by the manipulation of time, fabricated 
temporal disjointedness which sets Bergson’s perceptual faculties in motion – 
extending, delaying, and deferring the connections the mind makes.  
 
If theatre then has a potential for generating new thinking, what are the 
consequences?  Are spectators ‘allowed’ to misinterpret, misunderstand, and mis-
read what they are presented? Creative perception no doubt produces inaccuracies, 
‘red herrings’ and, in ‘wrong hands’ potentially harmful responses, but which version 
of the performance is the right one, the maker’s or the spectator’s? Or indeed, does 
it matter? Unleashing our unpredictable memories onto the fabric of a performance 
indubitably produces indeterminable connections. But the question does not have to 
be about right and wrong, about objectivity and subjectivity or about original and 
recorded. What about thinking about theatre as an opportunity to create, whether as 
a maker or a spectator? What if the evaluation of theatre lies in its ability to produce 
the most imaginative responses in its audience? Shouldn’t we then anticipate theatre 
that is able to exercise our imaginations, take us closer to our minds able to lucidly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See further discussion of prejudicing the spectator in Freshwater, Helen. Theatre and Audience. 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2009. p4. 
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dream? Isn’t there value in attending to our own creative thoughts, prompted by a set 
of theatrical stimuli? I will leave you with these questions. 
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Acting on behalf of thought: thinking on how performative expression acts, in 
rehearsal, performance, and non-theatrical contexts 
 
Rebecca Hillman 
University of Reading 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper considers how performance can be understood as a way of thinking in its 
own right, producing valuable and indigenous knowledge and experiences in and of 
itself, as well as existing as a medium for the application or illustration of pre-existing 
thoughts and experiences. One way of considering how performance thinks is to ask, 
in relation to a specific performative event: ‘if this event hadn’t involved processes of 
theatrical performance and performance-making, what couldn’t it have achieved, and 
what would it have achieved differently?’ By choosing a few examples it should be 
possible to offer some analysis of what elements of performance practice create 
specific outcomes, and how. 
 
So, as well as contemplating in general terms what is distinctive about performance 
and how it ‘thinks’, this paper makes reference to a two month rehearsal process that 
formed part of my on-going practice as research Ph.D., in an attempt to demonstrate 
how these qualities are significant for processes of performance practice that seek to 
facilitate critical political debates and praxis among local people. It considers how 
qualities of performance that developed in the project’s devising and ‘open’ rehearsal 
process can be understood as having thought ‘through’ and ‘with’ participants and 
audience members, and to what effect. The paper closes by asking how 
performance can be understood as a mode of expression operating beyond 
theatrical contexts, and considers how recognising ‘how performance thinks’ could 
qualify modes of expression that fall outside prevailing and authenticated 
conventions of the communication of thought. Reflexively, it asks what the broader 
socio-political events that circulated the project might mean for theatre practitioners 
and scholars interested in politically empowering communities by means of live 
performance practice, and/or allowing concerns, identities and expressions of 
communities to shape their work. In particular, it looks back to the 2011 England 
Riots that happened to coincide with the first day of the project’s rehearsals to 
provoke thought (performative or otherwise) on to what extent recent and emergent 
social-political communities have been evolved/repressed, and what relationship to 
performance or other discursive modes these positions bear. 
 
The Pact 
 
My practice as research Ph.D.asks what modes and combinations of theatrical 
response can be effective for engaging people around specific economic and 
political circumstances impacting their communities and environments, and how 
devising processes and ‘open rehearsals’ can facilitate engagement with syndicalist 
objectives and methodologies, and critical political debates among local people. It 
also asks how these engagements may depend of the cultural significance of the site 
in which they take place, and how processes of performance making could 
appropriate particular community organising methodologies. The Organiser Model, 
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for example, usually associated with trade unionism and community activism more 
broadly, fosters activity through listening to what matters to a collective and 
motivates an individual, and builds participation and buy-in through delegation of 
tasks which gradually require more responsibility and skill to work towards an 
achievable goal. This was one model of practice that the project attempted to adapt 
and apply to a theatrical context. (See Saul D. Alinsky 1969 and ‘The Organiser 
Model’.) 
 
Anne Bogart asserts that theatre audiences and practitioners ‘crave the feelings 
engendered in the experience of the theatre.’ She describes our ‘attraction’ to theatre 
as caused by ‘the sweep of feeling, of emotion, of adrenaline [as] surges of 
dopamine and serotonin, and new neural pathways forged in the brain [are] 
extended throughout the entire body.’ (Bogart in Hurley 2010: xiv). Theatre practice 
is one of the methodologies through which I explore these questions, and this 
practical process included two-months of rehearsals, leading to four public events 
including an hour long performance called The Pact. The rehearsals, performances 
and their after events all took place in a disused pub in Reading town centre called 
The Coopers Arms.  
 
Because one of the objectives of my project was to facilitate engagement of many 
local community members, including those who may not constitute ‘theatre 
audiences’ or ‘practitioners’, and because it sought to engage people with what it 
understands as political processes of theatre making, as well as the political content 
of the material that comprised the scenes, it was important to locate and advertise 
the project in such a way that it could appeal to as broad a social group as possible. 
One important factor in establishing these conditions of engagement was to draw 
much of the script’s verbatim material from the words of local people I had 
interviewed in the summer. How performance thinks is partly defined by who 
imagines and animates it into being, and the generation and deployment of verbatim 
material was a crucial element for socially rooting the project, during pre-production 
process, as well as in performance. 
 
Another important factor was the site-specificity of the venue. The Coopers Arms is 
situated in Reading’s town centre and close to the train station and a consistent 
traffic of shoppers and commuters pass its front doors throughout the day and late 
into the evening. The pub also has a somewhat controversial political history and 
had been closed down for more than a year when we began rehearsing there. In this 
way, the spatial, social and political identities of the venue instigated curiosity and 
accessibility. Responses from local people throughout the rehearsal process and 
after the performances indicated that the venue had engendered in them familiarity 
and even feelings of belonging and ownership, especially although not exclusively 
from those who had spent time there when the pub had been open. Also, The 
Coopers Arms, whose large windows stretched much of the length of the front of the 
building, provided porosity to the venue. A moving cyclorama of central Reading 
provided a thematic backdrop for those rehearsing inside, while the aspect of their 
rehearsing provided a curious spectacle for those on the outside, passing by. People 
would often stop to watch through the window, occasionally noticing and very 
occasionally complying with the signs stuck onto the windows themselves, inviting 
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them in, interested in the unusual phenomenon and display of theatrical rehearsal in 
the town centre. 
 
In an attempt to kindle latent desires for Bogart’s ‘sweep of feeling...’ in our 
prospective audience members, and not classify the production as high-brow or 
overtly ‘political’, our promotional posters consisted of few words and a bold comic-
strip, whose panels depicted dark, expressive, images. Each image was constructed 
to captivate interest and hint at a dramatic narrative, whilst giving no precise content 
of the events it advertised. I chose performance as a medium through which to 
facilitate creative, critical and accessible spaces for political discussion among local 
people for a number of reasons. If framed in the ‘right way’, I anticipated that 
qualities that fundamentally constitute theatrical (live or mediated) performance 
would work, almost automatically, to attract people in the first place. Imitation, or 
mimesis, defined in Aristotle’s Poetics as a primary and universal human pleasure, 
would seduce people, promising the psychic transportation of the spectator to 
another place, or an impression of another world for spectators to admire, invest in 
and perhaps even to some extent, believe in. Such attractions, lacking in other 
forums for the facilitation of community debate and activism, might facilitate 
interesting and diverse engagements. 
 
Rehearsal Processes 
 
The escapism or ‘other world’ quality that performance can provide can arguably 
also come about through processes of artistic production. ‘What the spectator, […] 
enjoys about art’, claimed Brecht, ‘is the making of art, the active creative element.’ 
(Brecht quoted in Robert Baker-White 1999: 55). For Bogart: ‘the process of 
rehearsal as well as performance is life heated up, intensified, and put under a 
microscope.’ (Bogart in Hurley 2010: xiv) Timberlake Wertenbaker, speaking at the 
University of Reading recently (SCUDD Conference, 30th-31st March 2012) referred 
to the extent to which, through involving herself in processes of performance 
production, she has experienced its own intimate and specific dimensions. She 
described re-entering a theatre in which she had been involved in the development 
of one of her plays, after the set has been struck, to experience ‘a loss after some 
sort of paradise.’ The production team ‘have been in a world together,’ she 
explained; ‘we have lived together’.  
 
In terms of my research practice project, I was interested in the divergent 
possibilities for community engagement that allowing public access to rehearsal 
spaces might engender. The cast and I held ‘open rehearsals’ in the Coopers Arms, 
whereby members of the public would be invited to come inside and engage with the 
production process. On the one hand, a rehearsal space could provide an 
entertaining, non-demanding, inclusive and experimental environment, existing for 
members of the community to dip in and out of at their leisure. On the other hand, 
the performance for which the rehearsals were a preparation could be devised in 
such a way as to benefit and rely on a range of inputs and skills, meaning that the 
rehearsal space could also exist as an appropriate forum to foster participation and 
mutual responsibility among constituents of diverse backgrounds. Susan Letzer Cole 
remarks that: ‘Rehearsal is behind-the-scene work: it is also behind-the-seen work 
[…] the kind of seeing the interrupted rhythms of rehearsal make possible is not 
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transferable to any viewing of performance’(Cole in Baker-White 1999: 56).As well 
as promoting the performance project and developing a model that could 
accommodate and benefit from the practical involvement of community members, 
there are other ways that rehearsals, in and of themselves can be understood as 
having potential to engage people ‘politically’. What political ramifications are there in 
processes that demonstrate that there is a level at which experiencing or witnessing 
something is in itself not a passive act, but a creative one, and that foreground 
modes of ‘seeing’, ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’, and the slippage between reality and 
representation, construction and deconstruction? 
 
I was interested to explore dynamics of the rehearsal space as a micro-society, run 
according to specific rules, intentions and constraints, wherein reality (and its 
representation) is produced through practice, debate and intervention, where 
hierarchical, democratic, collaborative and/or autonomous power structures can be 
placed in the foreground, and become tested and contested.  
 
Through open rehearsals specifically, I was interested in reconstructing relationships 
between spectators and performers and foregrounding this in discussion during the 
rehearsals. For Nicholas Ridout, in his 2007 hypotheses on actual relations of labour 
and consumption that occur in the fictionalised context of the theatrical event, these 
relations inherently create disquieting moments of intersubjectivity.  For a 
performance whose ‘content’ consisted of critiques of social, economic and political 
power relations, and whose processes explicitly sought to revise traditional relations 
of performance and spectatorship, this hypothesis was thematically and literally 
pertinent.  
 
I was also interested to expose processes of performative thought and action in 
order to foreground and explore relationships between spectators and performers in 
order to facilitate and extend the kind of ‘political’ engagements advocated by 
practitioners like Augusto Boal (1979), John McGrath (2002) and Bertolt Brecht (in 
Willet 1994).Robert Baker-White explores rehearsals in relation to Brecht’s 
methodological approaches for activating audiences critically, around political issues. 
Of course it is the critical nature of engagement, as well as the subject matter 
engaged with, that contributes to the politics of Brechtian theatre practice. ‘In effect’ 
writes Baker-White, ‘Brecht calls for audiences to function as theatre artists, to 
behave as if they were in the rehearsal themselves.’ (Baker-White 1999: 49) 
 
Rehearsing actors, as well as animating narrative, explicitly and by definition 
demonstrate the construction of that narrative and animation through processes of 
repetition; they think through performance and can demonstrate, in rehearsal, how 
performance thinks. In rehearsal, ‘the various aspects of production are expected to 
influence the development of others.’ (Ibid: 51) Baker-White points out that ‘rehearsal 
is always a site of the Barthesian distance between signifier and signified, because it 
is a site of the becoming of relations, a process where things and their referents are 
not yet firmly attached’. So, introducing spectators into the rehearsal space facilitated 
their encountering art that not only expressed reality but also signified it. In other 
words, by attempting to provide the ‘open-ended ethos of rehearsal’ (Ibid: 51) that 
Brecht called for to dominate performance, I intended to build participation and 
knowledge up among a broader group of people than those working consistently on 
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the project. I wanted to explore whether ‘open rehearsals’ could be one effective way 
of achieving Brecht’s ‘theatre full of experts’ and creating the possibility of the 
spectator/participant at the rehearsal to actually, ‘by means of a certain 
interchangability of circumstances and occurrences, [be] given the possibility (and 
duty) of assembling, experimenting and abstracting.’(Ibid: 50-51).The intention was 
that spectators/participants would debate and develop authentic and relevant subject 
matter, as Boal put it, to encounter simultaneously the ‘Truth’ of the performance 
itself. By participating, claimed Boal, ‘the Spect-Actor is not fictional [but] exists in the 
scene and outside of it, in a dual reality. By taking possession of the stage in theatre 
he acts: not just in the fiction but also in his social reality.’ (Boal 1979: xx-
xxi)Rehearsal as a collective and creative activity, read my hypothesis, would 
maximise engagement with, McGrath’s‘basic emotional imperative of solidarity’: ‘that 
what happens to other people matters.’ As he pointed out, ‘these things theatre can 
actually embody: in its content, and in its processes.’ (McGrath in Holdsworth 2004: 
178) 
 
Community and Performer Engagement 
 
Pooling ideas and stories through processes of devising collectively offer sone model 
for creating performance that reflects experiences and appeals to people of different 
backgrounds and sensibilities. But what does that process mean for its actors, and 
other regular practitioners? For practitioners involved in my practical project with 
some background in theatre, and who had given specific commitment to the 
rehearsal process, conventions of rehearsal and performance were integral to the 
way the space was conceived, the way in which we conducted ourselves, and how 
we managed our expectations and intentions. We also felt that there were processes 
of explanation and demonstration to go through in order to initiate those members of 
the cast and crew who had not worked on a theatrical production before. 
 
There was a script under construction, but in committing to the project, people 
understood that one of the objectives was to collectively devise material relating to 
what they understood as their social, political and economic conditions. Everyone 
brought material forward, but initially of course, only those with experiences of 
rehearsing and devising understood that theatrical performance attends to, seeks to 
find meaning in, and creates poetic and subjective experience and expression. It was 
these people, therefore, that were able to communicate that material in ways that 
would be unconventional in another setting. 
 
Personal stories, some of which were quite traumatic, were offered to the production 
by cast-members. In speaking to those cast-members about their decision to revisit 
difficult times in their lives, they suggested that regurgitating such material for 
performance somehow ‘made use of it’ and qualified it. They even implied that 
sharing their experiences in this way somehow exorcised the experience, giving it 
new life. Estranged from the person whose story it was, transformed and shared 
through gesture and intonation of performance, these experiences became textured 
and re-contextualised. Sharing material through the exposing dynamics of rehearsal 
and performance facilitated the possibility of not only understanding the conditions 
under which material was brought into being, but also understanding its relationship 
with ourselves and one another, as we witnessed, and were witnessed. Meanwhile, 
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storytelling in a narrative sense was only one avenue through which to express ones 
perspectives through performance. Eventually, the script included two scenes written 
by different cast members, while one of those scenes was directed by another cast 
member, whose rhythmic, mechanical and monotonous choreography articulated her 
experience of and attitude towards a particular kind of workplace. Thought was now 
performing, and thinking aloud for people. Through processes of rehearsal and 
performance, thought was embodied and cadenced and performance was sharing 
what had begun to knock around unhelpfully against the inside of our individual 
heads. 
 
I am interested in returning to theatre and mimesis, and the suggestions in 
Wertenbaker’s description of the way that people involved with processes of making 
and watching performance encounter reality, to ask what ramifications does the fact 
of having real emotional responses to fictionalised situations have for participants in 
the creation of theatrical performance? Conventionally, dramatic performance is 
understood as a representation of reality, or as reality at one remove. Performance 
can offer a break from reality and an intimacy with alternative realities, free from the 
constraints imposed on our daily or ‘real’ lives, regardless of the extent to which the 
performance may deal with ‘real life’ issues. However, because of this, performance 
is also a form that offers practitioners and audience the opportunity to connect 
profoundly with reality. Faith can be placed playfully, experimentally and without risk 
in a process and form that exists only fleetingly, and which, although it might gesture 
towards the real, is defined by its difference from it. What harm can come of an act 
which only intends to perform, and vanish again, as though it never was? And 
because of this representational status, to what extent can audiences and 
participants let habitual inhibitions go, to invest uniquely and whole-heartedly in the 
act of performing, or otherwise engaging with performance?  
 
It is precisely because this sort of performance (usually) does not explicitly claim to 
intervene directly with real existence that it can perform outlandish, controversial and 
fantastic events, apparently (safely) contained in the realm of mimesis and make-
believe. Herein lies its attraction, and duplicitous nature. To what extent is the idea 
that performance is somehow separate from reality reliant on how one thinks about 
performance? What is more of a pretence: to build a set or to strike it; brushing away 
all evidence that it ever happened? 
 
Erin Hurley quotes Poll Pelletier in her book Theatre & Feeling in relation to this 
liminal nature of performance, and the exposure that takes place in potentially risky 
rehearsal processes. Pelletier speaks of the ‘emotional forces that can be released 
through the really, truly brutal relationship between actors within the fictional 
circumstances of theatrical production.’ (Hurley 2010: 7)The ‘experimental’ rehearsal 
space seemed to equate to a ‘safe’ space during the first couple of rehearsals of the 
practical project, in which people brought forward dramatic, emotionally charged and 
autobiographical material in improvisation exercises. The flexibility of the devising 
process and the range of possibilities available for staging any moment of the 
production meant that any story brought forward could be performed in such a way 
that the storyteller could choose to remain at what he or she considered a ‘safe’ 
distance from it (when re-performing it themselves, for example, even in a fictional 
context, might be too difficult). However, these parameters were established through 
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trial and error. Expectations associated with the rehearsal and performance, as well 
as leading to positive or creative circumstances, unleashed unguarded presentations 
of personal and generally private material, leading to some emotionally painful 
moments for some cast members. We had to convene on this matter to redraw 
parameters, for ourselves and one another, as to what we should be wary of 
exorcising via processes of rehearsal and performance, which had taken us by 
surprise, in their ability to act as a powerful medium between our performative and 
private selves. 
 
According to Stanton B. Garner JR, ‘our vocabulary fails to capture the experiential 
weight of this ‘as if’ response to theatrical (or other) phenomena, this mutuality of the 
real and unreal at the heart of what we call “actuality.”’ He says ‘the theatrical mode 
of this presence, or givenness – transgresses while ‘never fully erasing the 
boundaries between “is” and “as if”’, and thus, the performing body occupies a 
paradoxical role ‘as both the activating agent of such dualities as 
presentation/representation, sign/reference, reality/illusion and that, which most 
dramatically threatens to collapse them.’ (Garner 1994: 42-44) Politically motivated 
practitioners have historically challenged parameters that appear to separate 
performance from reality, highlighting instead how performance alters reality despite 
sometimes giving the appearance it is not doing so, and making performance that 
tests out and foregrounds this idea. Encountering and foregrounding this mutuality of 
the real and the unreal in performance produces different engagements that can be 
both risky, and productive.  
 
Performative Community Action 
 
I want to end this paper by asking a few questions about ‘performances’ that 
encircled and shaped the practical project. Although the performative action I will 
refer is different to the performance processes focused on above, I am still 
concerned with questions of performance and duality: how performance can appear 
because it is only temporary; because it is not real, yet at the same time how it 
happens, unequivocally. I want to consider how and why it makes an impact, and 
how it finds itself able to think and act, (similarly to some of the experiences outlined 
above that I have argued were engendered through processes of performance and 
rehearsal), in terms of permission, and collectivity. 
 
On August 6th(during our first rehearsal), 60 miles away in Tottenham, a 
demonstration in response to the fatal police shooting of Mark Duggan sparked an 
unprecedented chain of events that caught and spread through 14 London boroughs, 
and then to towns and cities across the country. On Sunday 7thsites surged with 
fears and with anger; the hailing of friends and relatives in affected areas, or the 
hurling of abuses, soon to be echoed by the prime minister, deputy prime minister 
and many other upstanding figures. Extensive looting simultaneously used and 
abused consumerist conventions, as many protagonists of that week’s media 
spectacle provoked significant material consequences for themselves and their local 
communities and economies. The riots and looting began in financially deprived 
areas where effects of recent government policy were especially overt. 34 people 
were unemployed for every job vacancy in Tottenham at the time. (Slovo 2011: 54) 
Nationally, unemployment had risen by 48,000 at the beginning of 2011 as prospects 
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declined, particularly for young people. Youth centres closed after 75% service cuts, 
unemployment hit a fresh 17-year high as the number of unemployed young people 
climbed steadily to reach over one million by November.(The Guardian 2012)  
Meanwhile, even our conservative newspapers bulged with reports of banker’s and 
CEOs pocketing the most enormous profits yet.  
 
The attitudes and actions of those involved in the England riots have been often 
understood as retributive towards the state and its apparatuses of power, but only 
fragments of political utterance from rioters appeared in a sea of discourse that 
explained the events as ‘mindless’, knocking off-course the potential discursive or 
powerful interjection of intentional, motivated or knowing action. Despite the 
spontaneity, scale, and glaringly problematic economic contexts of events, the 
vandalism and the looting struggled to become qualified as ‘political’. I wondered at 
the time: ‘what is “mindless” behaviour, action or performance?’ Does performance 
always think? Do destructive actions described as ‘mindless’ lack thought, as such? 
Does mindless action constitute action that cannot/will not consider consequence – 
action without empathy/instinctual action, or selfish/selfless action?  Or is it is 
performance that prefers to act despite the consequence or action that decides to act 
towards a consequence or derived from a cause others cannot/will not rationalize or 
observe? Performance may not explain itself, leaving itself open to interpretation. But 
it might also leave traces that can be understood.  
 
The nature of the riots and what of them was captured and represented, 
predominantly demonstrated physical articulations of frustration and desire. In 
general, other means of articulation appear to have been either unavailable or 
inadequate for rioters, while the rupturing of social conditions suggested inbuilt 
mechanisms for altering those conditions to be equivalently unavailable or 
inadequate. The packaging and re-presenting of physical actions back to 
communities by media and communication experts then raises questions about how 
certain communities can(not) express themselves, sustainably impact their social 
and material conditions, or construct their own sustainable identities through 
dominant/endorsed modes of communication. It also raises questions about cultural 
means of production; the privileging and perfecting of certain modes of discourse, 
relative to certain others, whereby expertise and the development of any mode of 
discourse is in many ways liberating and progressive for those who (can) nurture it, 
but potentially prohibitive for others who do not/cannot. With an eye on performance 
and the physical, how can other communicative modes transcend cultural and 
linguistic boundaries, and boundaries that are economically induced?  How and to 
what extent have recent emerging social-political communities been 
evolved/repressed, and what relationship to performance or other discursive modes 
do these positions bear? 
 
When communities perform en masse, or spectacularly, the impact of these 
performances/actions/interventions become palpable. Performance acts on behalf of 
thought, whether it derives from an invisible thought process or it thinks/produces 
thought through its emergence. Performance thinks through application and 
response, cerebrally and corporeally. Performance is the animated, thinking body: 
the limbs, movements and impacts of thought in action. It is the moment in which 
thought is declared or recognized. It is often said that performance is inherently 
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political, and I have argued for its political aptitude in relation to my performance 
project above. Is it also considered inherently political because it thinks through 
practice? When performance thinks, it never does so to itself, and never does so 
without consequence, however insignificantly, progressively, problematically, or 
revolutionarily, for its environment. I am interested in how, by working on how 
performance thinks, it is possible to validate, nurture and make sense of 
performative action in a variety of contexts that can otherwise go missing, become 
suppressed, or fail to appear in the first place. Rehearsal spaces however 
temporary, can allow a community to think performatively, or act on behalf of 
thought.  
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Watching the(m) play 
 
Stefanie Husel 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt / Main 
 
This paper refers to two questions raised by the call for papers of the conference 
How Performance Thinks: Can performance be understood as a kind of thinking? 
And if so, how does performance produce knowledge in itself? Even if the first of 
these questions could be considered as a theoretical, or even philosophical 
concern, and the second one as a methodological question, they are, in my 
opinion, deeply interwoven. To approach both questions, I want to suggest two 
shifts in the view on performance: Firstly, to focus on audiences rather than on the 
activity of performers. And secondly, to take a close look at the rehearsing 
process of performances. (Picture 1: Bloody Mess characters looking at the 
audience.) 
 
These views seem to contradict one another at the first glance: One is concerned 
with the very situation of the performance, whilst the other is directed towards the 
production-process of the piece. I want to argue, however, that both ways of 
questioning can be activated to actually support each other in explaining how 
performances raise questions, explore new fields and reflect presuppositions. To 
put it briefly: I think, that these approaches could help to explain, in a very 
practical way, how performance thinks. Given the small frame of this paper, I will 
address both questions mostly via some anecdotes from my ongoing research. 
My method could be considered ethno-graphic (in a literal sense), since I 
developed a routine of sketching during my research process; this is why I would 
like to include some of my drawings also.  
 
The gorilla for instance (Picture 2) is a portrait of a character from Forced 
Entertainment’s piece Bloody Mess. I often used this picture to illustrate what I do 
myself, running back and forward between theory and praxis, carrying stuff (like 
anecdotes, perceptions, concepts... Fooling along in praxis and theory, sometimes 
making a fool of myself). 
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Picture 1: Bloody Mess 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2: Gorilla, Bloody Mess 
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In fact, the first time I came across the idea that performance could be described as 
a “thinking process” was when I got to know the Sheffield-based theatre company 
Forced Entertainment; I saw their piece First Night in 2001. In this show, eight 
entertainer-characters present a vaudeville show, full of laughter and glamour, stunts 
and skits.34 And everything goes awfully, desperately, wrong. Playing out this very 
ironic scenario of failure, showing the frame of theatre almost breaking down over 
two hours playtime, this show taught me a great deal about performance as such. It 
made me feel very involved with the piece and with its figures. What struck me was 
that First Night directed the attention of its spectators towards the very situation of 
the performance. In doing so, it presented me/us with a “thinking about the here-and-
now” that was actually happening in the “here and now”.35 Since then I have been 
searching for the trick behind this magic, behind this closeness of reflection and 
involvement. In 2003, I got the opportunity to assist for ten days in rehearsals of 
Forced Entertainment’s Bloody Mess, shortly before the piece was shown as a work 
in progress at Munich’s SpielArt Festival. Picture 3 shows examples from what I 
wrote and doodled in my diary during those rehearsals. 
 
 
Picture 3: Diary Rehearsal Doodle 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See: For First Night http://www.forcedentertainment.com/page/144/First-Night/92, for Bloody Mess 
http://www.forcedentertainment.com/page/144/Bloody-Mess/85  
35 In the same moment, theatre performances like First Night do not communicate pre-existing ideas 
to their audiences; that is to say, they do not present mere mise-en-scènes of dramatic texts or other 
scripts. This is why Hans-Thies Lehmann calls them “post-dramatic”. See Lehmann 2006. 
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One of the first concepts that came into my mind, as I tried to write down what I saw 
then, had to do with the question of how performance thinks: “Doing Thinking, 
Blasted Welttheater” I wrote down on my second day in the rehearsing room. But 
why did I feel like I had witnessed a “blasted Welttheater”? Well, I have to confess, 
that during the first days of my visit, I did not understand a thing! Forced 
Entertainment’s routine of rehearsing was sometimes fun and it made me laugh, but 
mostly it was frustrating to watch from the outside, since I just could not make sense 
of what I saw. What I did understand was this: that Forced Entertainment’s 
rehearsing process consists of a series, alternating between improvised games and 
discussions. The improvising was watched by Forced Entertainment’s co-founder 
Tim Etchells, me, several other guests and a video camera; for the discussions, 
everybody gathered on the floor, we were watching the taped improvisations, 
discussing them, and so on, again and again, playing and watching, then discussing, 
etc. What I did not understand was what the games were all about. I knew well 
enough that Forced Entertainment was not working with any pre-produced script; 
still, I guess I was waiting, or searching, for a structure that the playing – these 
games – was referring to. I really felt lost, lost in an ongoing translation process, 
neither knowing the starting point nor the final aim. Maybe the following anecdote 
about one of my many misunderstandings illustrates the depth of my disorientation in 
those first days: I heard them talk again and again about some “bark”. “Bark?” I 
asked myself, and I searched for something like a “wooff, wooff”. After many hours of 
wondering where the dog was in the performance I found out, that the company was 
searching for a good spot for a piece of music, an excerpt of a Johann Sebastian 
Bach violin concerto. That was when I doodled “Johann Sebastian Bark” (see the left 
upper corner in Picture 3). After a week, though, I began to understand the particular 
rehearsing language of the group. Slowly I understood what they were searching for 
when they played the same games over and over, and watched them again and 
again. And slowly, I also got familiar with the short names, the group used to refer to 
resulting bits and pieces of rehearsed material. During the last two days of my visit, 
the rehearsing routine changed profoundly. The practised games were now 
condensed down, and the resulting scenes were put into fixed sequence. A clear, but 
still beautifully complex, structure arose in the end. The piece was now ready to be 
shown to public. I hardly believed what I saw so very quickly developing before my 
eyes. All of a sudden there was a play, absolutely coherent, ready to be watched and 
enjoyed – by me and any audience to follow. And like First Night, also Forced 
Entertainment’s Bloody Mess seemed to convey a sense of a very involving “thinking 
performance”.  
 
It was during this short assistance period that I learned that watching itself was a 
practice that could succeed or fail in making sense.36 However, I could not use this 
new knowledge by then. It was still implicit, sublime, more like an intuition. It did not 
reveal itself as absolutely crucial. After many further visits to Forced Entertainment 
shows and rehearsals, I started writing a Ph.D thesis. I chose to scrutinise two works 
by the company, Bloody Mess and The World in Pictures, as these were the ones I 
was able to collect the most information and experience about. From the very 
beginning, I was interested in the performances as live thinking processes, that is: I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 One should note that „making sense“ does not refer to the „production“ of anything, as Jean-Luc 
Nancy pointed out in his same-titled article; Nancy compares the „making“ in „making sense“ (FR: 
faire sense) with the one in „making love“  (faire l‘amour). See: Nancy 2011: 215 
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was asking, how the performances made sense as life encounters. Not only trained 
in theatre studies, but also in cultural sociology, I began to use Erving Goffman’s 
frame analysis to describe the performance situations of both pieces.37 This means 
that I searched for all the activities on stage that helped me, as a spectator, to make 
sense of the performance-situation (for instance by “bracketing” its space and its 
time span, or by building its characters). Goffman’s vocabulary helped me to explain 
convincingly how time, space and characters were produced by practices of the 
performers during the performance-situations. Still, I was not happy with my results. I 
felt that to become “thick descriptions”, my results still lacked something.38 And 
everything I had been able to describe clearly pointed towards the audience: I felt 
that there was a strong need to understand which part of this “game” was played by 
the spectators. What work did they do in making sense of the performances? Or, to 
use a concept from ethnomethodology:39 What does the audience do in “doing being 
the audience”?40 All those questions seemed quite urgent to me.  
 
But how do I scrutinise audiences? Given the quite traditional performing situation of 
Bloody Mess and The World in Pictures, with the spectators sitting in the dark, this 
task provided me with several severe problems: Filming audience members turned 
out to be impossible, not only because of reasons of privacy, but also because of the 
lighting requirements during the performances. Questioning audience members 
seemed also an awkward process in several aspects. Firstly, Forced Entertainment 
felt uncomfortable with the idea; thinking about its works as practical research 
themselves, another researcher’s voice bothering spectators seemed to intervene 
rudely in their artworks. Secondly, my search aimed towards a practical knowledge 
of the audience. This is why I did not trust much in things that could be explicitly told 
by spectators – I doubted, that they themselves could possibly be aware of their 
sublime practices in “doing being the audience”. So, I also set the idea of questioning 
aside for a while. This is why I resulted in doing an audio-audience research in 2008: 
I placed a recording device with a 360-degree microphone up over the heads of a 
Bloody Mess audience in Leeds. This device recorded the sound that the audience 
made, fully and spatially.41 In the meantime, I filmed the performance from behind 
the auditorium. I was very excited when I came to listening to the recorded tape; but I 
have to confess, that my first impression of what I heard was: “Oh my God! This is 
terribly boring!” The tape only seemed to prove what I already knew before, from my 
own experience as an audience member: That the performance Bloody Mess 
“functioned” very, very well. Not a single moment of crisis occurred, that could have 
told me anything about the hidden “rules of the game” in the performance, that is, 
about the parameters that kept the relation between piece and audience alive. The 
audience’s sound was awfully perfect! I’d like to show a transcript and a waveform 
which both were derived from the tape; the sequence they describe happened after 
around twenty minutes into the performance time. The context of the moment is this: 
Character “Cathy” is playing a dead person during the last scene, lying on the floor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Goffman 1974 
38 The concept of “thick description” was developed by Clifford Geertz; see Geertz 1973. 
39 A broad overview over ethnomethodology is presented in Coulter 1990. 
40 Harold Garfinkel used this phrase; he tried to describe what people do in “being normal”. See 
Garfinkel in Coulter 1990, pp 187–238. 
41 The French professor of theatre studies Madeleine Mervant-Roux points out the possibilities of 
acoustic audience research, see Mervant-Roux 2010. 
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whilst a strange kind of rock-gig/theatre/sports-event is going on around her, 
accompanied by the rock song “Born To Be Wild” played at a very high volume. 
Then, just as the song ends (this is where my analyses starts) “Cathy” jumps up and 
shouts out that everything is all wrong; she argues with her colleagues over their bad 
choice of music, and finally tells them to “put something else on”. If the audience 
utterances during this sequence are fitted between the lines of “Cathy’s” text, in 
order to show the exact moment when they occurred, it looks like shown in Picture 4 
(below).  
Picture 4: Cathy’s Text 
 
The transcription turns visible that the audience laughs, mostly very shortly, in 
moments when “Cathy” comes up with something new and “funny”; that is, when she 
says things, that are a little absurd, but still intelligible. It also becomes clear, that not 
only the actress takes care of being understandable, for instance by waiting for loud 
laughter to die down, but that also the spectators do listen carefully and seem to 
hush themselves down, as soon as “Cathy” starts to speak anew. Record and 
transcription present an attentive and committed audience, who seems to act very 
orderly.  
 
They highly ordered and also communicative character of laughter in everyday 
conversations was described by linguist Gail Jefferson in her article An Exercise in 
the Transcription and Analysis of Laughter.42 Jefferson shows how badly we 
underestimate the contribution of laughter in conversations. She does so by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Jefferson 1998 
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transcribing carefully what she hears on recordings. One of Jefferson’s examples is 
the chat of three friends. One is telling a story about an absent person, who grows 
orchids in his spare time, or as the speaker puts it: he is... “playing with his orchids”. 
One of the listeners performs to mishear the speaker in favour of some filthy content 
(“...playing with his organ”). He manages to do so by throwing in the question “With 
iz what?” and by producing a suppressed laughter; a third contributor of the little 
conversation then explicates the naughty content; only she masks her explication by 
performing “bubbling” laughter (“Heh huh ,hh PLAXN(h)Wh)IZ O(h)R‘N ya:h I thought 
the same.”) Jefferson’s example shows that laughter and the effects caused by it: “... 
may specifically require, rely upon, and refer its recipients to their own guilty 
knowledge in order to analyze out of the distorted utterance what is being said.” 
Laughter, as Jefferson emphasises, does not function like an “all natural” or “wild” 
utterance, but it expresses and enables a very fine social coordination: In their 
laughing, the contributors of everyday conversations not only become able to 
express rude words in a masked way, but they inform each other about their state of 
knowledge, about the “level” on which they operate in their collective attempt of 
making sense (eg. “this is ironic”).  
 
Taking this conception of laughter into account, the activity of the audience I taped 
seems much more interesting: When “Cathy” starts to “freak out”, she is very clearly 
understandable; the audience produces its laughter almost orchestrated around the 
character’s text (and vice versa). But, in the very end of the sequence, spectators 
become a little more vivid and “Cathy” needs to shout over their uproar, at several 
moments (see last line in the transcription). Whilst the spectators seem to monitor 
“Cathy’s freaking out” in its first moments carefully, and maybe with a grain of doubt, 
they start to perform that they perfectly understand the irony, or playfulness, of the 
scene by laughing louder, “wilder” in the end of the sequence. This evolution of the 
audience’s laughter even can be shown by using a very technical-looking artefact, 
the waveform of the record.  
 
For picture 5 (below), I coloured those parts of the waveform grey, that originate in 
the sound of loud audience laughter; the peaks that were caused by sounds from 
stage remained black. The big black endings of the graphic result from the loud 
songs that were played in the beginning and in the end of the scene. I think that the 
graphic shows quite well how “orderly” the audience behaved during the scene and 
that it only grew a bit lauder in the end of it.  
 
Picture 5: Audience Laughter 
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Only five minutes later, almost the same things are happening on stage. The next 
rock song (Hawkwind’s “Silver Machine”) is over, and “Cathy” starts to complain 
again; only now “the gorilla” – a character dressed in a plush-gorilla-suit (see Picture 
2) – is stumbling dizzily over the stage. But look how very different the waveform of 
this scene appears! (Picture 6). 
 
Picture 6: Audience Laughter 
 
The big black peaks on the left-hand side show the ending of the song “Silver 
Machine”; the grey waves following show the – very loud – laughter of the 
spectators, which is dedicated to “the gorilla” (who looks very cute and funny in its 
stumbling); the sound is so intense that “Cathy’s” shouting is no longer audible (or 
transcribable). The last bit of the graphic shows that the sound dies away: Now “the 
gorilla” takes its head off and character “Claire” starts to speak, still wearing the furry 
body-suit; something new is happening, and in an instance the audience grows silent 
and pays attention to what “Claire” has to say. Angry “Cathy”, on the other hand, 
evidently did not interest the spectators any longer: the audience learned quickly that 
her shouting could be widely ignored. 
 
To sum up what I learned from listening into the auditorium: Interestingly, the 
audience seemed to perform its utterances in a “detailed order” that reacted very 
sensitively to what happened on stage; spectators even seemed to learn quickly 
about the “rules of the game” in Forced Entertainment’s Bloody Mess. The audience 
acted like a well coordinated jazz band – a very happy one, playing along with the 
performance! Now I understood that the magic I felt as an audience member of 
Forced Entertainment’s performances resulted in the experience of a very intense 
collective “sense-making’.  
 
One could stop here. But I still asked myself, how this sense making became 
possible in the first place. After several times of listening to the tape, it nearly gave 
me the impression as if the audience had been rehearsing the piece together with 
the performers. Looking back on my visit to Forced Entertainment’s rehearsals in 
2003, and the experience I had at that time, I subsequently realised that it was not to 
be taken for granted that watching would succeed so well. I remembered how I had 
learned that watching was a practice which could succeed or fail – and that, being a 
practice, watching could be, and sometimes needs to be practised. I, for instance, 
had needed several days of practising until I was able to make sense of the 
rehearsals in 2003, until I began to watch successfully. I also remembered what had 
happened when the piece went ready to be shown to public, that it then became very 
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easy to watch and enjoy, even without having practised beforehand. After the 
rehearsing process, Bloody Mess was not a mess at all! From this point of view, I 
became able to describe performances as structures that can be watched by 
audiences who did not practise watching beforehand, since during the rehearsing 
process, the artists practised for them. 
 
Luckily, at this moment, I got the opportunity to visit Forced Entertainment’s 
rehearsals again; the group was preparing to show their new piece, The Thrill of It All 
in Essen, close to my hometown. This time, I carefully paid attention to the 
rehearsing practices as such. As a conclusion, I want to share some of my 
observations with you, again by using my drawings. 
 
In the rehearsals, performers were playing scenes, this means, they were mostly 
improvising and playing games; they tried out and played around with material, with 
dances, with music and text fragments. In doing so, the performers were absorbed in 
what they did, highly committed in playing their games, involved with all their minds 
and bodies, no longer single persons, but a group. In the meantime, Tim Etchells, 
me, a choreographer-friend of the group and several cameras were watching, being 
an audience for the games of the performers. Whilst the cameras simply recorded, 
the spectators were engaged in noticing what they saw, already beginning to reflect 
their perceptions, taking notes, etc. (See Pictures 7 and 8) 
 
Pictures 7 and 8: Rehearsal Drawings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then all of them would watch what the cameras had recorded; the performers would 
tell their experiences, how it felt to perform this way or that way, while the watchers 
would tell how it looked “from outside”, and how it felt to be in the auditorium and 
witness “this movement” or to hear “this story”, etc. (See Pictures 9, 10 and 11) 
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Pictures 8, 9 and 11: Further Drawings 
 
 
 
 
Then again, they would try out stuff, improvise, watch again; they would practise, till 
they had the impression that the rehearsed material was convenient to watch. In an 
ongoing collective process, that already resembled very much a performance, the 
group would flesh out the paths that the perception of the performance could 
possibly take. And in doing this over and over, again and again, they would multiply 
and iterate these paths, playing with them, and then consolidate them. In this regard, 
Forced Entertainment’s rehearsing proved to be a process, in which knowledge was 
collected, practical knowledge about the act and the experience of watching. This is 
what I want to call “practising the gaze of the other, for the other”. 
 
In this respect, “the performance” here becomes a “third term”, as described by 
Jacques Rancière: 43 something, not only the spectators need to find out about, but 
also the performers. Tim Etchells described this “third term” in an interview he gave 
to me as “the machine”. He told me, that in the rehearsing process it is all about the 
question “What does the piece need?” He continued: “Of what we do, only some 
things are, let’s say, felt to be essential to making this hour and a half, or two hours 
of time as a machine that unfolds (...) Why you decide some things are in and some 
things are out, is to do with trying to make that machine function very well – in public, 
of course. So that the articulation of a journey from A to B to C to D to E throughout 
the thing, kind of, let’s say, works.”44 The resulting performance-situations provide 
multiple paths of possible perceptions; audiences can feel free to try out all the 
previously practised paths without stumbling over any sense-making problems (like I 
did, in the first rehearsals I visited). This is why spectators can feel like playing along 
in the game-like, playful performances Forced Entertainment produce – without 
having to learn the rules first.  
 
To summarise my outlined ideas: Forced Entertainment, but also other makers of 
post-dramatic theatre, live art or devised theatre, produce their shows entirely during 
rehearsing practices. This entails, that the dramaturgy of such plays is embedded 
deeply into every practical moment of the performance. It is a dramaturgy of the 
“gaze of the other” that structures such plays, a dramaturgy that the artists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See Rancière 2004. 
44 A short video-documentary on the working practices of Forced Entertainment can be watched at 
YouTube; it is called “How We Work”. See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jw2RbmuvuW0. My 
interviews with Tim Etchells will be published within my Ph.D., app. December 2012. 
 97	  
	  
themselves do not know before they start rehearsing, something, they need to find 
themselves. In this way, the (deeply social) watching-situation of the performance 
becomes a “third term” to which both, artists and recipients, can refer (in an 
“emancipated” way of watching). Such embedded dramaturgies cause the effect that 
the performance’s spectators get a very strong feeling of being implicated in the 
piece.45  
 
This is why I do think that post-dramatic performances, like those of Forced 
Entertainment, can be described as thinking processes: In providing their audiences 
with experimental watching-situations, they raise questions, they explore new fields, 
and they reflect presuppositions. These performances let their audiences enjoy the 
experience of intense collective sense-making. In referring to our ways of watching, 
in letting us play with the paths of our perception, performances like those of Bloody 
Mess are putting our “aesthetical regimes” at stake, to quote a another concept of 
Rancière.46 To understand how performances become able to do so, I want to 
suggest a rethink of rehearsing practices in order to consider them “practising the 
gaze of the other”, and to scrutinise them profoundly. 
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45 Maaike Bleeker spoke in this regard of “implied spectators” and of “visual involvement”. See 
Bleeker 2008. 
46 See Rancière 2004. 
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Performing processes: thinking worlds into being  
 
Rosanna Irvine 
University of Northampton 
 
Today I’d like to speak as an artist, as a choreographer trained in western 
contemporary dance and with an affiliation to visual art and live art practices.  I’d like 
to speak in proximity to, or in relations with, certain philosophical questions, 
Deleuze’s question, in particular: what is a thought without the image of a thought? 47 
 
My overarching interest as a maker and researcher is in the possibility of conditions 
that produce something that is not ‘about’ something else: conditions that might 
make possible ways of making and doing that are not housed in a pre-intent within a 
mimetics of representation; conditions that might forge something more-than the 
‘recognizing’ that representation entails. 
 
My research project is a Collaborative Doctoral Award with University of 
Northampton and Dance4 – the Nottingham based national dance agency, which 
produces the international dance festival Nottdance. The premise for the research 
includes articulating through practice an aspect of the legacy of Nottdance. It was 
through the programming in this festival that the so-called ‘conceptual dance’ was 
introduced to UK dance audiences in 2000. (The term ‘conceptual dance’ has not 
been agreed – but there seems to be no other agreed naming for this ‘thinking’ kind 
of dance  - so I’ll use ‘conceptual’ here.) According to dance scholar Andre Lepecki 
(2004) a central concern of artists associated with this movement is a mistrust of 
representation and an insistence on presence. My research investigates the working 
methods of particular artists associated with Nottdance who are probing or exposing 
through practice questions of representation and who are extending the potentials for 
practice into ‘non-representational’ modes - or perhaps better to say more-than-
representational modes. I am also addressing non-representational or more-than-
representational in my own making practice. 
 
I’ll talk about two projects today, ‘towards a re-activation of Xavier Le Roy’s Project’ 
and my collaborative dialogue with Katrina Brown ‘what remains and is to come’. I’ll 
talk of the specific practical approaches in the two projects and I’ll suggest how these 
practices, might be understood as ways of approaching thought without the image of 
a thought. I’ll suggest that these practices force different capacities and different 
possibilities of and for thinking and not for recognizing – with a nod here to Isabel 
Stengers’ ‘tools for thinking’ (Stengers, I. 2005). The philosophers among you may 
already be untangling the ontology and epistemology of this, which I won’t attempt to 
do here. For now I’ll speak as an artist and of artistic thinking that is not separate 
from a philosophical questioning – but which is a particular practice and one that 
does not name itself as philosophy. 
 
I’ll touch briefly on the cultivation of perception. Western dance and choreographic 
practices since Judson in the 1960s have adopted and been influenced by particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 I suggest that this question is implicit throughout the chapter ‘The Image of Thought’ in Difference 
and Repetition (2004 
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practices of non-western cultural origin, now commonly found in western dance 
trainings, e.g. aikido, tai’chi, yoga, which cultivate particular qualities of/in thinking. 
What might be understood as ‘in common’ in these divergent practices includes a 
concern with mind body unity, and an approach to training perceptual awareness 
that is grounded in a mutuality of ‘being’ and action. I want to suggest that these 
practices have the potential to train capacities towards engaging in/with the world 
‘beyond’ the dualisms at the origin of Western philosophical thinking - a dualism 
which Peggy Phelan (1993) has suggested, gives rise to representation. I’ll for now 
make a distinction between these mindbody practices and (what is called) somatic 
practices in contemporary dance training. I suggest (and will elaborate elsewhere) 
that some of the so-called ‘somatic practices’ privilege the ‘inside.’ I’m interested in 
those practices that might be understood, or perceived, as cultivating perception in 
ways that do not separate inside and outside. I’m not speaking of ‘overcoming’ 
dualism here. I’m speaking of practices that are not premised on separation of mind 
and body, of self and ‘environment’, of self and other, of inner and outer: practices 
that cultivate, and cultivate differently, ways of being and ways of knowing that are 
not premised on separation. Alva Noë suggests that perception is gained through 
thoughtful and physical acts of enquiry. Practices like yoga, tai’chi and aikido can be 
understood as particular trainings in perceptual awareness which hone and 
importantly bring to conscious awareness the sense of ‘gaining’ perception: a kind of 
knowing-in-sensing; a mutuality of sensing and sense-making. I’m speculating here 
that the prevalence of such trainings in the dance world produces an atmosphere of 
and in choreographic practice that has the potential to influence ways of making and 
doing choreography; that these influences are present in the projects I discuss; and 
that they forge different kinds of possibilities for what we might understand as 
thinking. 
 
French choreographer Xavier Le Roy performed ‘Project’ as part of Nottdance 
Festival 2004. This piece grew out of extensive research over five years (through the 
project E.X.T.E.N.S.I.O.N.S.) addressed relationships between process and product 
and was concerned with a critique of conventional modes of production. It involved 
groups of dancers and choreographers in various European cities. ‘Project’ was 
developed through extended discussions and negotiations with his collaborators to 
develop rules for games that would be ‘performed’ in theatre situations, so 
addressing the co-existing of game rules and choreographic rules. Last week over 
four days I worked with seventeen participant collaborators on the research 
workshop called ‘towards a re-activation of Xavier Le Roy’s ‘Project’’ with public 
sharing on the fourth day. The intention was neither to re-create, nor to re-enact the 
work that Le Roy showed, but to re-activate (differently) processes that are invested 
in his ‘General Rules Score’48 (Le Roy, X. 2005). Le Roy has made available four 
performance scores that are part of ‘Project’. The ‘General Rules Score’ is a set of 
indicators for a process to construct new games and new rules for a performance 
event. This is different from the other scores, which are orientated more towards 
particular procedures for use. In working with the ‘General Rules Score’ a particular 
set of conditions are forced including: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The General Rules Score is available at www.everybodystoolbox.net/?q=node/190 
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• the social context of working-with others and in which there is no 
distinct choreographer / author 
• the need for continual negotiating and decision making in this working-with 
others 
• negotiation and decision-making through language discourses 
• the orientation towards making ‘something’ that, later in the performance 
event, requires particular and specific physical acts of decision-making for that 
‘something’ to come into being 
• the performance event itself constituted through relations with others (you can 
play a game on your own – but that is not what this score invites) 
 
The four days were initial research – a beginning. What follows is a description and 
some thoughts. As they event is so recent these thoughts are not yet honed through 
the reflective lens of time … I’ll describe the processes:  
 
Day 1: We meet for the first time – eighteen people - a handful of people know up to 
three others. The participants have all responded to an open call49, are interested in 
the terrain of the project. Most are from different backgrounds within dance and 
choreography and some are visual artists working in performance. All have been 
selected by me. I have mapped out some games - adaptations of theatre games and 
perceptual sensing activities, games to warm up, to sense each other, to get to know 
each other, to start making decisions. Already activated here is the honing of an 
environment for working together – a particular kind of ‘producing’ of conditions. I 
suggest this kind of approach, the practice of group perceptual sensing, is almost de 
rigueur in contemporary choreographic practices, to the extent that it is virtually 
unnoticed – and is a small example of what I touched on earlier in relation to the 
prevalence of ‘the cultivation of perception.’ 
 
We walk through each other maintaining an equidistance from each other, 
maintaining a particular speed, incrementally increasing speed, stretching and 
contracting the spaces between, as small as possible without touching. If you touch 
you freeze. If someone freezes all freeze. Someone will begin again. Walk again 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Xavier Le Roy performed ‘Project’ as part of Nottdance Festival 2004, a work which, typical of Le 
Roy’s approach, is concerned with posing specific problems. Addressing the relations between 
production, process and product, Le Roy worked with groups of performers to develop rules for 
games that would be ‘performed’ in theatre situations. The problem he probed in ‘Project’ was around 
the co-existence of ‘choreographic rules’ with ‘the application of rules’ that are made for games (Le 
Roy). In situating the subsequent ‘games’ as choreography the project raises questions around 
representation, authorship and spectatorship. For more about ‘Project’ see 
www.insituproductions.net/_eng/frameset Click on ‘Productions’ then on ‘Project 2003.’ 
Le Roy has made available a ‘General Rules Score’ for ‘Project.’ In the research workshop we will 
work with this to begin to construct (new) games and new rules for a performance event. This will 
involve working together while talking, moving, playing, negotiating, agreeing, disagreeing and more.  
It may also involve microphones, pre-recorded music and live video. We will perform these (new) 
games as a choreographic event with a public at the end of the four days, followed by open 
dialogue/discussion. If you would like to participate please contact rosanna.irvine@gmail.com with a 
paragraph about yourself, your background and experiences and why you are interested in the 
project. Dance artists and performers with an interest in conceptually orientated, physical, and 
improvisational approaches to performance making may be particularly interested – but those who are 
less familiar with these (choreographic) approaches and open to the indicated territory in performance 
practices are also invited to get in touch.  
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when ‘someone’ starts. Go in the quality of that person. Then a game to force a 
decision about who begins: eg ‘if you can speak more than two languages’, ‘if you 
are wearing socks.’ Then I pass this out to the group and hear, ‘if you had a cup of 
tea when you got up this morning’ and later ‘if you were late this morning.’ Laughter. 
Getting to know about each other. Getting a sense of each other. We talk a little 
about rules and games, form into four groups and begin to make small group games. 
People talk, try out, make decision. The groups play these games with others 
watching and we talk a lot. 
 
Day 2: Agreement to do shared warm up yoga based each day. People were invited 
to do own warm up, gather in small groups or if they preferred to join with me in 
yoga. All chose to do the latter. Another person in the group was more experienced 
than me so happily she mostly led this. There is a common ‘sense’, not ‘common 
sense’ more a feeling sense in common that through focusing together in this way a 
certain energy is created in the group. This is perhaps obvious to us as performance 
practitioners, and there is perhaps something to be unpicked here in relation to the 
development of group perceptual sensing and how this prepares a field for collective 
decision making …  
 
Big discussion: what is a rule? What is a task? Does a game need an aim? We each 
individually or in small groups – all choose to do individually – write what we consider 
to be rules and based on the indicators in Le Roy’s score. We paste these on the 
wall. Then in two groups of nine we begin to make a game based on some of these 
rules or their adaptation. We work together, talking, trying out, talking, refining rules, 
talking, imposing logic??  Keeping on agreeing and disagreeing, negotiating, 
complexifying, showing to other group, attending, talking, selecting … 
 
Day 3: Yoga and continuing the processes from day two with the big games. We 
revisit small games and modify these through the emerging ‘sense’ of how rules can 
function. The negotiations and discussion seem to be producing some kind of ‘logic’ 
or sense of a logic that is particular in the approach to game making and which is 
different in each particular game. 
 
Day 4 Yoga together. We select from the games we have made, continue 
negotiating, refining, and deciding what we will show later that day. The long 
negotiations we engage in (over the four days) involve discussions about rules, 
about games. They produce questions that are discussed but not fully answered. We 
clarify questions – and the question how does the rule function? - moves the process 
towards a kind of logic. Or logics. These logics are in part derived from our 
understanding of games and include notions of consequences, fairness, imposition 
of penalties, questions of strategies and a non-arbitrariness. There is an emerging 
sense of a particular-to-each-game/situation logic of rules. And there are different 
kinds of logics - different needs – in each game, particularly in terms of duration, 
which may be understood as the workings of choreographic rules. And there is a 
kind of randomness – in terms of how the game begins. Can we call this a non-
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arbitrary randomness, since it has a function (to generate a situation within which the 
rules are played? (This question remained unanswered.)50 
 
‘[W]hat remains and is to come’ is a ‘collaborative dialogue’ with Katrina 
Brown. [For more on this project and images see our blog51] I’ve spoken 
earlier of my overarching interest in the possibility of conditions that 
produce something that is not ‘about’ something else. Working with 
another choreographer and in dialogue – with each bringing her own 
interests and neither bringing a particular theme or specific intent around 
the ‘things’ that might be produced – is an attempt to push further the 
potential for such conditions. We’ve been working on ‘what remains and 
is to come’ for just over a year, over short and dispersed supported 
residency periods. We work with paper, charcoal, body, breath, and 
digital technology agreeing that we prefer not to make work about 
something, and that we will make something. There is a growing sense of 
being-with each other, of being-with the materials, and a growing sense 
of the properties and capacities of/in the different materials. Distinct and 
particular processes continue to emerge.  
 
In the performance event we create seven layers of charcoal markings one on top of 
the other. The images ‘show’ the step-by-step logic that gradually emerged [for a 
sense of these images see here www.whatremains2.wordpress.com/images] – an 
activation of materials in relations, a progression of sorts, a logic in working-with 
materials, a logic which became a particular and systematic enquiry into the 
properties and capacities of and in the materials. Our practices concur perhaps with 
scientist and philosopher Karen Barad who proposes a relational ontology, which 
‘gives matter its due as an active participant in the worlds becoming.’ She proposes 
an understanding of capacities that inheres not in things but in relations: a world 
coming into being not through interaction of pre-existing boundaried objects – but 
through the inseparability of agentially intra-acting ‘components’ (Barad, K. 2003: 
814).  The last layer is a charcoal covered black layer. The body lies on the black 
layer. The body rises and leaves an imprint - an inversion of the earlier mark making. 
Erasure of this image, the wiping of the charcoal, becomes a ‘necessity’ in the work, 
initially as an occurrence in the laying out of a systematic ‘progression’. And there is 
a kind of progression, though the modality of the practice does not favour the goal of 
the Better or Progress. Rather this progression is an ongoing incremental step in a 
systematic accumulating, an accumulating that might lead eventually to a kind of 
exhaustion or depletion as the paper and charcoal can no longer retain the imprint 
and the body can hold no more charcoal. There is another ‘necessity’ for erasure – 
which I will pick up on later. 
 
Early this year we were in residency at Het Veem in Amsterdam. We choose in this 
work period not to work with video technology and to bring greater attention to the 
materiality of body and breath. Breath as yet eludes a systematising, a progression 
or accumulation. We attempt to work with/though the ungraspability of breath. We 
sense breath occupying space, opening the space of the event… We ‘perform’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See this blog post for more on these processes www.dance4.co.uk/profile/rosanna-
irvine/blog/2012-04/moving-and-thinking-towards-reactivation-xavier-le-roys-project 
51 www.whatremains2.wordpress.com 
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breath – we call this  ‘performed breath’ – a deliberate sounding of specific and 
extreme breath patterns that requires extreme mindbody attention for its occurring. 
Breath invisibly comes into a kind of ‘presence’ that in its intra-active appearance 
volumizes (perhaps) the sense of spatial event in performance time. 
 
We work with sound – digitally recording and processing the sounds of making the 
initial charcoal layers. This occurs not in the live event but prior to audience entry 
though in the same place. The captured sounds are of this particular environment. 
When this sound is later released into the event, which is after the sounds have 
occurred in the space during the making of the layers, a kind of uncertainty is 
provoked. Since the sound ‘belongs’ in the space it’s not evident for a while, that it is 
recorded.  It provokes perhaps, a visceral memory in the spectator, an evocation of a 
past time, a history, producing an augmentation of what is past that is still with us, an 
affective suspension … an opening out of spacetime …  
 
This pre-recorded sound is introduced at the moment when all the papers are black. 
The other ‘necessity’ I spoke of earlier relates to a particular problem of spectating 
that presents itself here. Capture is a material capacity of the event of the black layer 
and the body meeting. There is a logic in this capture occurring. It follows the 
systematic unfolding of material capacities. And it opens a different kind of ‘order’ in 
the systematic approach: the inevitability of visual representation - the figurative, the 
human subject, the female nude in western art. There is a risk of loss of the 
processual unfolding, of the potential of the black sheet - this material textured 
blackness that was a kind of completion-in-potentiality. A particular critical concern 
arises with the consequence of the material’s capacities at this point of the black 
sheet and the inevitably of figurative appearance. We choose to continue: to address 
the problem – to go on in the systematic enquiry. To acknowledge the ‘problems’ as 
part of what is now in the situation – to work with it as part of the material. 
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How we are dealing with this now: the ‘object’ lying on the black paper (above) looks 
out and gazes at the audience - then rises and erases the image – wiping it away as 
a continuation of the incremental progression of the system. We continue developing 
the system – identifying the logic of movement out of each image (or figurative 
appearance) a logical progression from figure, to figure and movement, to only 
movement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
So what’s coming through here in these different projects? 
How do these practices approach ‘a thought without an image of a thought’? 
Something of the importance still of language and discursive thinking, of different 
‘logics’ – but logic! Something about decision making engendered in a perceptual 
sensing that is not a separating of mind and body, of self and other, of self and 
‘environment’ (or the places and situations we are part of). Something about 
decisions experienced as actions, honed through sensing, constituted in relations. 
Something about the importance of the activation of sensing processes. Something 
about this producing an event of leakage or emergence – and so producing some 
thing. Something about a singular-to-each-situation process of sensing and of sense 
making producing ‘worlds’ we do not already know. 
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Impossible Ccollaboration: Performance’s Thinking Inbetween 
 
Professor Simon Jones 
University of Bristol 
 
“In every event there are many heterogeneous, always simultaneous 
components, since each of them is a meanwhile, all within the meanwhile that 
makes them communicate through zones of indiscernibility, of undecidability: 
they are variations, modulations, intermezzi, singularities of a new infinite 
order.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 158) 
 
“Art preserves, and it is the only thing that is preserved.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994: 163) 
 
“What is preserved – the thing or work of art – is a bloc of sensations, that is 
to say, a compound of percepts and affects. … The work of art is a being of 
sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 164) 
 
“Flesh is only the developer that disappears in what it develops: the 
compound of sensation.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 183) 
 
This paper will use Deleuze and Guattari’s description of art as realizing sensation to 
explore how collaborations across media in recent performance demonstrate a 
thinking inbetween; and it is this meanwhile that is performance’s contribution to 
philosophy.  Returning to Heidegger’s definition of the artwork, by way of both 
Levinas’ encountering the Other and Lyotard’s differend, the paper will consider 
three works, each with a specific collaboration across visual media. 
 
When I experienced Imitating the Dog’s cine-theatre piece Kellerman (2008), the 
eponymous hero of which was committed to an old-style asylum, I felt I did not know 
what I saw, so deftly did the narrative sequeway from so-called ‘live’ performers on 
stage to video representations of those very same characters on screen.  The more I 
became aware of the slippages between the two media – flesh and screen, the more 
the imaginary world of the protagonist’s mental collapse, constructed by cinematic 
devices – close-ups, tracking shots, dissolves, superimpositions, captions, seemed 
to be conjured in this inbetween, that is, in its staging.  Indeed, Kellerman [visit: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYGwvJ_kh7o] depended on the audience’s 
desire to solve the mystery by tying up the loose ends and filling in the gaps: making 
reality whole.  Usually such conventions encourage us to believe in an ordered, 
comprehensible world: here the continuous narrative attempted to cover over the 
gaps in the means of storytelling, that is, the fundamental discontinuity of theatre.  In 
this classically elusive tale of insanity, diagetically searching for the distinction 
between the real and the fictional, Kellerman achieved its affect through the mood 
produced inbetween the ‘live’ and the ‘mediated’.  The closer the interweaving of 
media, the more the fleshy attempted to perform the cinematic, with stage machinery 
aping tracking shots and overhead angles, the narrow platforms, stacked one upon 
the other, flattening any stage depth and producing a vertical montage of ‘live’ action; 
the more the video created a dizzying theatrical space between two screens, one 
upstage of the acting platform, the other downstage, between which the 
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performances, both ‘live’ and ‘mediated’, took their places.  Indeed, enclosing the 
‘live’ within this doubled imagery obliged it to perform to the ‘recorded’ video track.  
In expressing the (inhuman) technological, the (human) performers were forced to 
stage the impossible: to make the gap between these media of living and non-living 
appear seamless.  And in attempting to close up this difference, putting their 
humanity in bondage to this image-machine, their agony and terror as performers, 
not to slip up, not to go out of sync, opened up that inbetween all the more 
profoundly.  As this inbetween concretized as the event’s compound of sensations, 
Kellerman became about the impossible labour of performing the technological, a 
task Heidegger would have understood as essentially poetic. 
 
“Technology is therefore no mere means.  Technology is a way of revealing. 
… Techne belongs to bringing forth, to poiesis; it is something poetic.” 
(Heidegger, 1978 [1953]: 318) 
 
My attention gestalt-switched from seeing performers enact actions and speak 
dialogue in front of me, to mediated representations of the same actors, in extreme 
close-up, listening to voice-over of their thoughts, falling through an imaginary space 
inside Kellerman’s head.  This required oscillating between two entirely different 
ways of looking: projected sight into the three-dimensional space of the actual; and 
staring at the projected two-dimensional screen image – resulting not in confusing 
the two, nor mixing them together, but a sensation of both expressing compossibly 
alongside each other a mood of being inbetween. 
 
If Imitating the Dog attempted the impossible in trying to close up this discontinuity at 
the heart of all performance, then Forced Entertainment took the opposite strategy 
with Void Story (2010) [visit: http://www.forcedentertainment.com/page/144/Void-
Story/70].  Here I was similarly positioned by a technological breach somewhere 
inbetween hearing and seeing, this time by way of graphic novel and radio play.  
However, here was a child-like, irresponsible pleasure in bursting open the seams 
between media and their versions of reality.  Imitating the Dog’s anxiety in those 
gaps appearing was replaced by delight in technologies’ capacities to produce 
disorientating gulfs between the live and mediated, motive and effect, concept and 
affect.  Void Story’s story and its machinery were governed by hyperbole: to imagine 
twists as absurd as possible in the narrative of the two hapless protagonists; to layer 
frequency modulations and effects as ridiculous as possible on the so-say ‘live’ 
voices.  The fact that the performers were ostensibly following a script added further 
to their blatant disregard for any originating or organizing force: everything was 
subject to a hyperbolic fugacity, a fleeing of the stable centre of a commonsense 
seamless reality.  The aural and visual inbetween between performers on stage, 
images of different performers in the photo-story on screen, the text describing their 
characters’ quest, was in a constant state of being fled, undermined and overwritten.  
Hence Void Story’s mood of absurdity and playfulness: theatre not enslaved to 
technology, but freed by and alongside it to range about this inbetween: to explore a 
new kind of agency – the cyborg techno-human. 
 
“Esse is interesse; essence is interest.” (Levinas, 1998: 4) 
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For me, these two shows work with a quality fundamental to all theatre: namely, that 
when I am interested in something, I am being inbetween: inter—esse.  I am not 
simply projected into the moment’s concerns as a pure impulse towards awareness, 
so that I might survive those circumstances.  Rather something of myself leaves my 
self and moves towards this other something without an immediate return: to dwell in 
the middle: in media res.  Neither is this an out-of-body experience, nor a suspension 
of judgement or belief, since it does not involve losing myself in the other thing.  It 
calls forth an agency just as vivid as that with which I navigate the everyday: indeed, 
it requires of my self significantly more, since it calls upon me to consider potentially 
anything. 
 
“In the being of the artist we encounter the most perspicuous and most 
familiar mode of will to power.  Since it is a matter of illuminating the Being of 
beings, meditation on art has in this regard decisive priority.” (Heidegger, 
1981: 70) 
 
Heidegger wrote of art as preserving: in following Wagner, then Nietzsche, and 
prefiguring Deleuze and Guattari, he thought of art (and here I think he meant 
predominantly painting) as an event, organized by the artist, to set forth a particular 
relation between material [paint] and viewer: art as a meanwhile of participation, as a 
relating of participants. 
 
“Preserving the work means standing within the openness of beings that 
happens in the work.  This ‘standing-within’ of preservation, however, is a 
knowing. … He who truly knows beings knows what he wills to do in the midst 
of them. … [T]he essence of Existenz is out-standing standing-within the 
essential sunderance of the clearing of beings.” (Heidegger, 1978 [1936]: 192) 
 
The art object is only such for as long as the event of relating is sustained between 
material and viewer.  It is inaugurated by the artist determining [willing – to use 
Heidegger’s verb] in advance that essential relation.  Although Heidegger still 
thought of it as between one artist, one kind of material, and one viewer, what is 
necessary about this set-up for art as preserving is the relation of interest: the being 
inbetween.  From this, we can see that performance manifests this being inbetween 
in a particularly intense way, since it foregrounds not only its eventness, its 
happening in that time and in a certain place; but also the manner of its mixing of 
persons, their fleshes and histories, their desires and prospects.  It does this through 
an intensification not of one particular relation between a material, expressed by 
means of a single object, and the solitary viewer; but by compounding the sensations 
of the relation between relations.  One fundamental inbetween, that of different kinds 
of material, each with their own means and media, their own middles that meddle 
each in their own curious ways, is compounded furiously with another inbetween, 
that of the gathering of persons, each aware of the other others as persons each in 
their own right [I’m thinking here of Levinas’ ethical prerogative]. 
 
“This ‘saying to the Other’ – this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, 
this relation with an existent – precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate relation 
in Being.” (Levinas, 1969: 48) 
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Indeed, in performance, in putting my self into the middle of the event as event, its 
being both out of and in time, as I generally know it and then as I am experiencing it 
now, entre-temps as Deleuze and Guattari would have it; and its being both there 
and not there, as I generally position my body in space and there being potentially 
anywhere other than there, I put myself forth in a doubled sense: into the midst of 
various middles amongst others. 
 
Furthermore, if this being inbetween the inbetweens is particularly heightened in 
performance [Derrida did call theatre “the only art of life” in critiquing Artaud’s 
attempt to put himself outside of discourse], then how do I think about this 
experience, this interest?  How can I, if to attend to any specific discourse or practice 
would render the event’s plenitude down to a single field or text?  No, to speak in any 
one language, be it choreographic, musical, pictorial, verbal, would collapse the very 
specificity of the event’s non-specificity, puncture the no-where of its now-here.  I can 
only stalk its realness by way of metaphor, only approach it indirectly by way of such 
forcings of meaning.  Performance’s claim to our attention is not its resistance to 
commodification through either acts of continual disappearance or re-appearance, 
depending on one’s politics, neither flight from, nor submission to modern 
technologies of information capture and transmission.  Performance claims of us a 
special attention because of the affect of its being inbetween the inbetweens, namely 
a not being able to think what we have experienced with any adequacy, evidenced 
only by the compulsively repeated failure of the document after the fact, the 
undeniably partial account after the event, what Lyotard might have described as the 
differend. 
 
“The differend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein 
something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be. … This 
state is signalled by what one ordinarily calls a feeling.” (Lyotard, 1988: 13) 
 
This affect is what remains of performance’s thinking as sensation, since 
performance’s being inbetween the inbetweens remains occluded even in its 
manifesting.  It is impenetrable, that is, impossible to explain and thence have done 
with.  It works away still, as if it were the unconscious, although it has summoned to 
the surface in its performing whatever could have lain beneath.  Its impenetrability is 
a darkness from which light cannot escape, although unlike nature’s black-holes it 
yields ceaselessly.  Lyotard might have described this as the sublime function of art. 
 
“Pleasure in the beautiful occurs when the powers of imagination and 
understanding engage with each other, according to a suitable ‘ratio’, in a kind 
of play.  A play because they compete with each other, one with forms, the 
other with concepts, in an effort to grasp the object.  But it is also play 
because they are accomplices in not determining the object, that is, in not 
grasping it by form and concept as they do in objective knowledge.” (Lyotard, 
1994: 73) 
 
Lyotard’s ‘ratio’ is sensing performance’s being inbetween inbetweens.  Its thinking is 
felt by way of forcing transitionings from the dimensionality of relating to one material 
to the dimensionality of relating to another, moving through one discursive field then 
phasing into another, facing another self then turning to a third.  And in each phase-
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transition, the specific relation to the material is occasioned in its own way: it is 
disclosed as beautiful, since momentarily apparent, observable, recognizable, 
navigable.  This transitioning is as a pulling focus from one plane to another, from 
foreground to background: a zone of interest becoming a place of concern.  The 
work pulls focus from the blur of interest to the hard edge of a definable object of 
attention.  So here, the material’s vagueness, which is felt to haunt the work or 
exceed in potential what the work can possibly manifest, comes suddenly and 
always surprisingly into sharp relief.  However, not as if one were experiencing the 
work through one lens alone, but as if suddenly recognizing the concreteness of one 
particular material rendered all others unintelligible.  In his essay on theatre, Lyotard 
relates this to the fundamental nature of being as libido. 
 
“Theatre, put at the place where dis-placement becomes re-placement, where 
libidinal flux becomes representation, wavers between a semiotics and an 
economic science.” (Lyotard, 1976: 106) 
 
For him this leads to “an energetic theatre [that] would produce events that are 
effectively discontinuous” (109).  This wavering between two mutually exclusive 
ways of knowing, a plastic, figurative sensuality and a totalizing, conceptual 
objectivity, is also the particular relating of each performance.  I could say that, in 
performance, interest dematerializes to the extent that any particular material 
materializes; and it is only in sustaining the materializing of interest, in remaining 
inbetween the betweens of the work, literally un-wording it, utterly un-phrasing it, 
patently blurring it, that interest can be properly opened out as new and progressive 
couplings of thought-sensations.  Properly, that is – by way of an indescribable and 
ultimately mysterious relation to the material earth and material world: since realizing 
the work as a phrase narrows its interest down to a concern, renders it effectively 
and affectively already done with, a closed book, to be read off against the actions 
and statements contained in the work.  Blurring interest can only happen by way of 
forcing it into new relations with the material to hand and the persons attracted into 
the work: this forcing is the metaphoric will of the artist as Heidegger had described 
it. 
 
For Bodies in Flight, the inbetween of performance has always been an essentially 
erotic entanglement, a pre-discursive (I might say – sub-human) projecting into the 
event by both artist and auditor-spectator, and mixing with the fleshes (thence the 
persons) amongst the event, which finds its expression on a number of discursive 
planes.  In order better to work out this entanglement, we have developed a 
methodology, what we call in our private language – a principling, an organizing of 
the work’s potentiality as the being between collaborators.  This produces a 
characteristic or signature set of relatings for each work somewhere between 
concept and function, idea and material, embodied literally in each collaborator, who 
approaches these differently, each from their own point of view, technology, 
repertoire of knowledge and skills, their own homes, each within their own medium. 
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Picture 1: Poster, Bodies in Flight 
 
 
 
In making Model Love (2008-11) with my collaborators in Bodies in Flight, I was 
interested in two aspects of the photograph: its indescribability, the impossibility of 
saying what I was seeing; and its timefulness, its re-presenting something that was 
irretrievably past.  Like Imitating the Dog we crossed the gaps that technology 
opened up; but we were not slaves to the machine.  Like Forced Entertainment we 
chronicled the multiple realities emerging willy-nilly from these inbetweens; but this 
did not make us happy.  The relation between performer—photograph with its 
technologies staged the impossible-to-grasp plenitude of the inbetween between 
collaborators – performer, photographer, choreographer, musician, writer.  We 
began by making three photo-books, whose images provided the conduit for this 
meanwhile to be progressively opened out: from commonplace self-portraiture on 
ready-to-hand mobile devices; through photo-stories of an illicit threesome; to 
multiple versions of a mythic account of voyeurism. 
 
Pictures 2, 3 and 4: Photo Books 
 
   
 
 
In each of these three scenes, a different relation between performer and 
photograph was explored by way of three different technologies: the digital of the 
mobile; the analogue of the video; the wetware of the eye.  In the first, images were 
made as a series of frustrated attempts to express the performer’s personality 
through portrait, set against a cut-up of verbatim postings from dating sites.  In the 
second, inspired by the central scene of Antonioni’s Blow-Up, the performer 
 112	  
	  
interrogated a small book of images apparently recording a three-way tryst, to which 
he himself had been party.  Here the forensic dynamic to expose a finality to truth 
ended in exhaustion, resulting in the third scene, where the performer showed the 
spectator loose images depicting a version of the iconic episode of scopophilia – 
Achtaeon coming up Diana bathing.  The piece ended with him sewing these 
photographs into a new book.  With Model Love, Bodies in Flight used collaborating 
across the space between image and description, between the performer’s point of 
view and the spectator’s, between the times of him saying and what they see 
depicted, as a means of accessing and working performance’s inbetweeness. 
 
Photo 5: New Book 
 
 
 
This paper has proposed that such working across media to disclose and realize 
inbetweeness as sensation is performance’s unique contribution to thinking, 
occasioned by its setting forth a relation between performer and auditor-spectator 
outside of the everyday: indeed, in thus exploring inbetweenness, performance 
stands in for all betweens, including the technological; hence it is the art form sine 
qua non – the art form of all art forms. 
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The Writing on the Wall: Performances of Thinking, Terminal and Interminable 
 
Joe Kelleher 
University of Roehampton 
 
I. 
 
The stage presents a picture, literally. Dominating the back wall of the theatre is a 
massive reproduction of Italian renaissance artist Antonello da Messina’s painting 
Christ Blessing or Salvator Mundi. The picture, which can be seen in the original at 
the National Gallery in London, is here cropped to exclude the hands making the 
gesture of benediction and just show the face. It is one of those portraits that appear 
to look at us looking. It does this throughout the show. As if it sees what we the 
spectators see, sees us, sees everything. The expression, it has been said, is one of 
unspeakable gentleness.52  
 
In front of the painting is a more conventional stage picture, a contemporary 
domestic scene, staged, we might say, naturalistically, amidst white leather and 
chrome furnishings, the actors muttering everyday exchanges, performing habitual 
household activities as if unseen by us. A bearded, white-haired, white dressing-
gowned old man is taking a meal as he watches TV. A younger man, his son, 
wearing a suit and tie, is about to go out. He has things to do in the world, although it 
turns out he will never get back there, not in this life, not out of this picture. The older 
man is incontinent; he shits himself. We see it happen. We see the brown liquid leak 
around him. We smell it too, or imagine that we do, when a sour odour is piped into 
the auditorium later in the performance. The son fetches the towels (white), the 
bucket, the plastic gloves, and cleans his father up. The father apologises. The son 
cracks a joke. It is no big deal, he is his father’s carer, they both know the routine, 
although this evening the routine is endless. Each time the father is cleaned by his 
son, he shits again. This goes on for twenty, thirty, maybe forty minutes, by which 
point both men are exasperated, weeping, exhausted. 
 
I am unsure how long the action lasts, but then this is a play that deals with – that 
sets in juxtaposition – different structures, different experiences of time. There is the 
time it takes for things to happen on stage but there is also represented time. The 
ordinary time, for instance, of the young man and his father, the time of habits and 
routines, this day and every other. But also historical time, as referenced by the 
painting, and if you will cosmic time, the time of religious salvation and existential 
abandonment, as referenced by what the painting depicts. There are also details to 
notice along the way. I mention just one for now. At the side of the stage on a 
bedside table is a screw-top plastic container. It’s a small thing, barely visible; it may 
not catch our attention. Later on, though, the actor playing the old man pours more 
brown liquid from the container, the colour of shit, lots of it, onto the bed, onto the 
stage. Now we see, we can think about this. We can interpret, we can say things. 
Might we say for instance that what the old man’s body – the character’s body as it 
were – cannot help doing, he also performs on purpose, as an actor, perhaps to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Socìetas Raffaello Sanzio, On the Concept of the Face, Regarding the Son of God, dir. Romeo 
Castellucci, 2010. The phrase ‘dolcezza indicibile’ is Castellucci’s. See, for example, Sabrina Cottone, 
‘Il viso di Cristo tra gli escrementi’, Il Giornale (Milan), 19 January 2012.  
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keep his son from leaving? Or maybe another sort of agency is being proposed, a 
timely recognition on someone’s part that there is no point anymore to actorly 
illusion: the fact has already outrun the fiction, we know this already, one may as well 
just distribute the signifiers. It is anyway a familiar enough device in the modern 
theatre, an estrangement or alienation device we might call it. It is a device certainly 
that Romeo Castellucci, the author of the piece, has used before, whether to draw 
attention to the theatre’s own modes of magical thinking, or to provoke critical 
responses to these modes.53 As such, we can make something of it. As Castellucci 
himself has said, speaking as a spectator of his own work: ‘the plastic container [...] 
probably makes us think that he, the father, has projected his weakness, has 
projected the catastrophe, the silence. And everything becomes incomprehensible, 
everything is seen through a mirror that turns everything around.’54 I want to think 
further about this, except now there is a noise outside, I can’t ignore it, although I 
would rather do so. Accusations of blasphemy, of ‘christianophobia’. There have 
been rumours of desecration of the Christ image, tales of shit being having been 
thrown at the face of the son of God. In Paris last year, although the work had 
already been touring Europe for some time without incident, the stage was invaded 
by demonstrators who unfurled a banner, linked arms and attempted to stop the 
show. In January this year, in advance of performances at the Teatro Franco Parenti 
in Milan, a widespread and vicious campaign on certain Catholic blogs – including 
threats against the theatre manager – again tried to stop the work being seen.55 In 
Paris there was a campaign of public support for the theatre makers. In Milan the 
authorities, the mainstream media were largely silent, although the show did go 
ahead. Energetic, co-ordinated stuff. I want to say also opportunistic, thoughtless, 
self-serving stuff. Cut back to the theatre then, where the older actor, standing in his 
nappies, is still there, pouring brown liquid onto the stage furniture. The younger 
actor, in shirt sleeves by this point, approaches the Christ portrait at the back of the 
stage and puts up an arm against the mouth of the picture, as if to stop all speaking, 
at least for a moment, athough it is now that we hear a one-word speech broadcast 
into the theatre, an amplified voice whispering ‘Jesus’. 
 
There follows a sequence where the Christ portrait is torn to pieces from within and a 
viscous black liquid like the juice of the image, like the ink of all the scriptures, all the 
stories, all the interpretations oozes over its breaking surface. In some 
performances, when logistics allow, before this sequence, a group of young boys 
enter and lob hand-grenades at the portrait, as attention-seeking, I suppose, as the 
protests in Paris and Milan and elsewhere. There are anyway booming noises but no 
explosions, and the picture remains undisturbed. The show ends, after the tearing 
and leaking, with the eventual restoration of the implacable image as a video 
projection, although what we also see now is the appearance of writing, a phrase in 
English that shines out in letters of light from the surface of the image’s support. The 
phrase includes a single word – ‘not’ – that appears differently to the others, faded, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 I am thinking of the use of a plastic bottle filled with blood-resembling red liquid in the Brussels 
episode of Tragedia Endogonidia. For a discussion see Ridout 2006. 
54 Unless otherwise stated all quotations are from private correspondence with (and translated from 
Italian by) the author. The correspondence is due to appear in a 2012 issue of Alternatives 
Théâtrales, Brussels. See http://www.alternativestheatrales.be/.    
55 It would appear that these people had not seen the work themselves. For some documents on the 
controversy see http://www.alternativestheatrales.be/  [last accessed 6 July 2012]. 
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more intermittent, slightly less legible, intruding amongst the familiar words of the 
psalm ‘you are (not) my shepherd’.  
 
We may have seen something like this before. For those who know their Scripture, 
or their Rembrandt, or simply have access to the common word-hoard, this writing 
on the back wall of the theatre recalls the ‘writing on the wall’ at Belshazzar’s feast. 
The latter is the Mene Tekel Peres, as recounted in the Book of Daniel, the 
mysterious appearance, inscribed by a ghostly hand, of supposedly familiar Aramaic 
words designating measurement, which interrupts the thoughtless pleasures of the 
King and his cronies, but which none of them are able to make sense of. Until, that 
is, Daniel is called, who reads, interprets and delivers the warning: you are weighed 
in the balance and found wanting, the days of your kingdom are numbered, your 
future is written, it is already finished. A couple of things to say about this story, at 
least where thinking is concerned: firstly, thinking has more than one face here, or at 
least it must turn its face between the stunned incomprehension of the feasting 
Babylonians and the fluency of Daniel the interpreter, who makes of what has been 
given what will happen next (the King will die that night and his kingdom be over-
run). Except, maybe it is not interpretation that is at stake so much as 
acknowledgement.56 What the message says – and shows – is something that the 
receivers of the message should, it is implied, already know, something manifest, 
something apparent to all, but not as it were taken in by all. It can be like that in the 
theatre too, where everything is visible, but not everything is noticed, or not all at 
once, the sort of place where what is not supposed to be seen – or heard, or smelt, 
or stepped in – comes obscenely into view, more relentless than our attempts to hide 
it away. The mechanics of theatrical representation for instance; or the unbearable 
understanding on the face of the son of God; or the physical collapse we will have to 
live with and suffer and care for, our own and others; or indeed thinking itself. And 
where, if there is a message, what it might have to say is: look to yourself, your 
kingdom is divided, remember what you are, you are comprehending flesh, this is 
how you go, this is how you smell, this is how it will end for you, and in this you are 
no more nor less than those you thought, as a thinking speaking being, to distinguish 
yourself from. In the ear of the King that can sound like a curse, although we don’t 
have to hear like a king does. In the words of the theatre maker: ‘The Mene Tekel 
Peres is what renders me human, it is what brings my soul close to the animal. It is 
everything that reduces me that renders me human and frees me.’ 
 
Whatever else is to be made of it, the intruder word ‘not’ strikes me as a renewal of 
intention in the received and repeated phrase. Like a voice in the writing, a still small 
voice amidst the noise and ignorance and confusion that is going on around it, a 
voice of doubt in the face of illusion, of insistence in the face of what is indifferent 
even to being addressed, of uncertainty and refusal in the face of the inefficacy or 
efficacy of our performed actions, and of perplexity in the face of all our sufferings. 
An articulate silence that is categorical enough, but which remains also with 
provisionality, with aporia.  A negation, obviously (you are not my shepherd), but the 
sort of negation that stops to think, as if to register what the texts and images can’t, 
or can no longer say; or else that halts along the way to bring wandering thought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 I allude to the argument of Stanley Cavell’s essay ‘The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear’. 
See Cavell 2002. 
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back to where the performances, the texts, the images and everything else have 
stopped in front of us, and stop us in our places. Not unlike the way beauty might 
stop us. Or the writing on the wall might stop us. As such, the sort of thinking that 
belongs to the theatre. 
 
II. 
 
I speak about stopping, or at least stopping at the theatre. I should be careful, 
perhaps, to emphasise that I am speaking about theatre rather than performance 
more generally, but one thing we can take from theatrical performance – I think – is 
that it does stop, that it involves a time limit. And here I am including theatrical 
performances that seem to go beyond the limit, all sorts of limits (a great example 
that I experienced recently was Vegard Vinge’s John Gabriel Borkman at the 
Volksbühne Prater in Berlin, a show that is sometimes twelve hours long, but not 
always, it just depends, although here too, I believe there was a negotiation early in 
the run among the several collaborators – the theatre management, the actors, 
unionised technicians and so on, let alone spectators – that there would be some 
limit to the performance, which may or may not coincide with the point where Vinge 
himself finishes smashing up the set of his own show along with the general decor of 
the theatre with a sledgehammer). Simply put, it is possible to arrive late at the 
theatre, even to be there early, anyway to be unpunctual. (In Berlin I happened to 
catch a four hour version of Vinge’s sold-out show, about which, by the way, not in 
any of the publicity is there any indication that it will take any longer than it takes to 
deliver a performance of Ibsen’s play, although when we were coming out at the end 
of the performance at 11.30pm there were disappointed punters coming the other 
way, arriving on time as they thought for a theatrical all-nighter, being told it was 
already all over). We can also, however, miss the show when for whatever reason 
we do not notice everything there is to notice on stage, or when – again for whatever 
reason – we fail to recognise or acknowledge or understand whatever it is we did 
see. This, I would say, is a basic condition of being spectators. The spectators are 
the only ones in positions to see the whole play, as Hannah Arendt says in a 
passage on spectatorship from a book about thinking; but even then, we would add, 
not all the spectators see all of it. Or, as Arendt flips the thought over, ‘even if the 
spectacle were always the same and therefore tiresome, the audiences would 
change from generation to generation; nor would a fresh audience be likely to arrive 
at the conclusions handed down by tradition as to what an unchanging play has to 
tell it.’ (Arendt 1978: 96) Either way, what is fixed about the play – in particular, what 
is fixed about it, so to speak, temporally – rubs up against our capability to think it 
through, all the way, and have done with it. Except... this fixedness would also 
appear to be one of the things the play is proposing that we think about. Take the 
performance we have been discussing: whatever Castellucci’s show has to tell us, it 
has something to do with the terminal nature of the human condition, and is told in a 
form – borrowed from classical tragedy – that is itself terminally inclined: projected 
towards a point – as Arendt’s predecessor Walter Benjamin reminded us, 
remembering in turn the thought of his predecessor Franz Rosenzweig – at which 
the heroes are brought to a final, thoughbeit recalcitrant, speechlessness. Whatever 
the ‘inexhaustible topicality’ (Benjamin 1985: 109) of such a story, renewed in each 
effective retelling, each performance is terminal, and terminally silent, as if somehow 
its thinking – the thinking of the performance – were calculated to resist the thinking 
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– including the sort of productive consumption I am attempting here – that feeds 
upon it for its speech. But this is not how it is supposed to be with thinking. 
Take Arendt again, who writes in The Life of the Mind of ‘the relentlessness inherent 
in sheer thinking, whose need can never be assuaged’, but who will have things to 
say also about thinking’s self-destructiveness, and, as she traces the course of what 
she calls ‘common sense reasoning’ (by which she means post-enlightenment 
scientific reasoning) through trials of illusion and disillusion, something to say also 
about an attendant ‘illusion of a never-ending process – the process of progress’. 
(Arendt 1978: 55) This idea of progress is not what Arendt understands by thinking 
and its historical function, which, for her, has a much more ambivalent relation to the 
‘world of appearances’.  
 
Or consider how such issues are discussed in the places where many of us here – 
scholars of performance, and also performers – do a lot of our thinking, indeed are 
trained to think, are professionalised as thinkers, in seminar rooms and lecture halls 
and exam halls and rehearsal rooms and committee rooms and conference venues, 
wherever we are inaugurated into the thinking factories we call universities. Where, 
we might add, no less in these days of paperless meetings and virtual learning 
environments, so much of the writing still appears on the screen or on the wall. And 
where, not to stretch the metaphor one iota, more and more we are subjected to the 
shining external hand of audit, of measurement.  
 
There is a certain shape that the argument about all this sometimes takes, where it 
will be pointed out that the terms of the argument have already been established – 
often around the measurable usefulness or uselessness of thinking – and that these 
terms are to be resisted, not so much in the name of thinking ‘for its own sake’, but a 
re-valuing of thinking as a limitless or interminable performance. So, for instance, 
here in the UK, most popularly and most recently, we have Stefan Collini’s polemic 
on how ‘the drive towards understanding can never accept an arbitrary stopping-
point’, and how ‘human understanding, when not chained to a particular instrumental 
task, is restless, always pushing onwards’, and how the mark of an academic 
discipline is not how ‘useful’ or ‘useless’ it may be, but rather ‘whether enquiry into 
that subject is being undertaken under the sign of limitlessness.’ (Collini 2012: 55) 
Or consider an earlier, more transatlantic, more explicitly ‘postmodern’ take on the 
same issues, focused, as it happens, less on academic research and more on the 
addressive, inter-relational practices of thinking that are performed in the classroom. 
As we get closer to the university the language does take a more academic turn. Bill 
Readings, in his 1996 book The University in Ruins, writes of how the sort of thinking 
that goes on in ‘the scene of teaching’ can open another experience of time, another 
relation to time than the ‘accountable time’ by which our labours tend these days to 
be measured. (Readings 1996: 150-65) Readings would have us understand 
teaching as something other than the transmission of knowledge and ‘the self-
reproduction of an autonomous subject’, i.e. an ‘independent’ person whose 
independence, or self-sufficiency, is measured by their no longer being obligated to 
others. The pedagogic relation, he insists, is interminable; and the task of thinking is 
an inexhaustible obligation from which ‘no knowledge can save us’. Let us perform 
the scene of teaching, he argues, in such a way that we might instead ‘listen to 
Thought’, might listen to the thinking going on beside us, and participate thereby not 
in the measured time of the transmission of knowledge (and its commodification) but 
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an ongoing, ethical obligation to those around us, where even one’s sense of justice 
– the sense of justice, let’s say, that one brought to the scene in the first place, one’s 
vocation we might call it  – is overturned, extended. ‘Doing justice to Thought,’ he 
writes, ‘listening to our interlocutors, means trying to hear that which cannot be said 
but that which tries to make itself heard. And this is a process incompatible with the 
production of (even relatively) stable and exchangeable knowledge’. (Readings 165) 
We register aporia in the teaching scene as we take account of the fact that we do 
not know in advance who we are talking with (which is not to say that it does not 
matter who we are talking with), and also as we attempt to answer, as best we can, 
the question as to what sort of content might be given – or found in – the ‘empty 
name of thought’ that drives our endeavours. Answers, Reading insists, that can only 
ever be political, at least in a minimal sense, given there is always a basic conflict 
involved; and, in a major sense for Readings, ethical, given that the relations of 
power and obligation in the pedagogic scene are likely to be unequal. It is for this 
reason, he says, that teaching is much more to do with justice than it is about truth. 
Thinking, then, is an interminable, or constantly-to-be-renewed process that throws 
us back on the ungroundedness of our positions, on our obligations to each other, 
and our accountability to the work of thinking, in a way that ‘exceeds’ the ‘logic of 
accounting’ that we are becoming ever more familiar with in institutions of higher 
learning. None of which is to say the work is not enterprising. The performance of 
thinking, or the ‘event’ of thinking, as Readings characterises it, is one in which we 
aim to make an audience ‘happen’, rather than assuming there is one there already. 
It is, for Readings, a rhetorical performance57 that will take account of context, of 
institutional contexts that include not only teachers and students and administrators 
but also employers, representatives of industry, auditors and assessors, funding 
bodies, taxpayers and the like. And a performance that takes account of contexts of 
space and place and mode of address and so on, as well as the different interests 
and experiences (‘ages, classes, genders, sexualities, ethnicities and so on’, as 
Readings puts it) that will be represented in that audience to come. It is not, though, 
a rhetoric with an agenda of terminal persuasion. ‘Neither convincing students nor 
fusing with them,’ Readings says, ‘teaching, like psychoanalysis, is an interminable 
process.’ (Readings 159) 
 
III. 
 
I have a sense, though, that a different sort of thinking – a different sort of 
accounting, and a different conception of justice – is at work in the theatre, at least 
the theatre we have been discussing. Maybe it is something in the rhetoric. I don’t 
find any attempt to persuade me or fuse with me in the theatre either, but nor do I 
find any particular consideration of the ages, classes, genders, sexualities, 
ethnicities and so on that are agglomerated in its audience. I do, still, find something 
terminal going on. Let’s try to follow it. Let’s read the appearances. The father is 
ashamed. So is the son perhaps, but let’s stick with the father. Evidently he is 
ashamed. He weeps, he apologises. What is he ashamed of? Of what is shown? Of 
what can be seen? Seen by whom? There is only himself, his son, and perhaps 
Jesus there. Is this already too much? Or is it perhaps the too much as such he is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Shannon Jackson has developed these ideas in the specific context of Performance Studies. See 
Jackson 2009. 
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ashamed of? Feeling out of measure, ashamed of being out of proportion with one’s 
space in the world, producing too much shit for one’s loved ones to deal with, being 
too slight to merit the care, not worth the attention, being in the way, being too much 
in view all the time. Ashamed too of exceeding the merely visual (that smell 
everywhere), ashamed of obscuring one’s human function (whatever that might be) 
with too much affect, with too much claim, with too much imposition, of loading the 
present with too much future (this will go on and on) and loading the future with too 
much past (those family ties, those obligations and dependencies that must weigh on 
the son as they weigh on the father). Or is it the shame of not being capable, of not 
being able to be just so, for example to be as he was at the start of the play, the 
dignified white-haired and bearded old man, self-absorbed, eating his meal, listening 
to his TV, wishing his son well with his affairs in the world, concerned only with what 
concerns him? Is this what he is ashamed of, his inability, due to circumstances 
beyond his control, to sustain this particular appearance? Except, we recall, there 
will be that plastic screw-top container, which belongs not to this world but the world 
of theatrical representation, and which he will use. As if making, or projecting, the 
image of what shames him, and which binds the other to his shame: as if the image 
as it stands is not enough, or, again, too much. Out of measure anyway, but out of 
measure with what? How does his shame tally with that? 
 
One thing we can take the prop container to indicate is that the actors are not fools. I 
am thinking of Hannah Arendt’s discussion of thinking as a sort of withdrawal from 
active life and the world of appearances, something like the withdrawal into solitude 
of the spectator at the theatre, so as to cultivate understanding of such appearances 
and the spectacle that is revealed there. A spectacle which, according to a sentence 
that Arendt cites from Kant ‘may be moving for a while; but the curtain must 
eventually descend. For in the long run it becomes a farce. And even if the actors do 
not tire of it – for they are fools – the spectator does, for any single action will be 
enough for him if he can reasonably conclude from it that the never-ending play will 
be of eternal sameness.’ (Arendt 1978: 95) To which Arendt adds the proposal that if 
we share the notion of the course of humanity being a natural progress, then maybe 
the spectacle may as well be performed by fools.  
 
To which we ourselves add the comment that when the old man pours the liquid from 
the container he knows what he is doing. He is immolating himself perhaps, but he is 
also taking care of the action. And it’s not just the characters that do this, who take 
care of what will happen, the actors do so too, as do the stage technicians and 
everyone else involved in the production, director, producers, theatre management. 
They take care in each moment of the future of the work, so that things will be 
illuminated and amplified, so that they will stay within budget, so that they will start 
and finish on time, and be repeatable. Because, if the theatre is terminal in the sense 
I have been pursuing – if it is a representational means of bringing the interminable 
‘to term’ (a phrase that implies, of course, a birth as well as an ending) – then it also 
very often has to repeat, either to put itself on again in the same place, or drag itself 
around to other places, so that more people can see it and attach their thinking and 
their interests to it, as well as making the production economically viable. And this 
situation of care, of caring for the production and the business of representation is 
shown, repeated, doubled up, in what is depicted on stage in this play, in the son’s 
role as his father’s carer, caring for the other’s appearance as he cares for his own, 
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cleaning up what needs cleaning, simply preparing the scene, making ready to make 
himself absent from the scene and return to the world of affairs – although he never 
does that.  
 
The father is ashamed. He also suffers. I am thinking of philosopher Adi Ophir’s 
account of suffering, in which the sufferer becomes ‘a living communicative act’. 
(Ophir 2005: 261) What the sufferer suffers is intensity, and an unrelieved duration, 
something affecting the body that ‘goes on’, that seems interminable, from which he 
or she – the sufferer – is unable to disengage. As suffering continues, something is 
transmitted by the sufferer, not the suffering itself – nobody can share another’s 
suffering – but a representation of the fact that something is going on from which the 
sufferer is unable to disengage. A transmission of sorts, a verbal appeal, or a 
wordless cry, or the self-withdrawal of one who suffers in silence, but anyway 
something that goes out, consciously or unconsciously, to someone else, the 
receiver, the destiny of that appeal, the witness, real or imagined, of ‘a craving to 
disengage’. It is not a request for compassion.58 If there is a demand made upon 
others it is not a demand to do so much as a demand to stop doing, to disengage, to 
not be there, or be there in some other way. As if the theatre were capable of saying 
to us ‘Don’t look’.59 In this structure, I suggest, the thinking spectator and foolish 
actor opposition is turned around somewhat. Or say at least an image is put into play 
between us, which on our side, the spectators’ side, suffers our engagement with it, 
our aporetic engagement, our indecision as to whether we do project our 
compassion or cover our eyes or look away. What we see if we don’t look away is 
the character, the actor, the figure – or whatever we want to call him – involved in the 
conscious projection of that image, a thinking image, I want to say, of his own – and 
our – catastrophe, our inexhaustibly terminal condition.  
And the writing on the wall? Well, maybe we can understand this after all as a 
gesture of disengagement, or an attempt at such a gesture, encapsulated in a 
message, a return transmission to those out there – on the stage or in the audience 
– who suffer the spectacle of thoughtless living, an antiphrastic gesture, cruel to be 
kind. You are not my shepherd. You have been measured and found wanting. I, we 
abandon you to what you are, your creaturely being. Or else... You are not my 
shepherd, nor am I yours. I am abandoned. I, we abandon ourselves in your 
thoughtless sight. Something of that sort; nothing too demanding. Short enough for a 
graffito, or a tweet, or to be written on a piece of paper and stuffed in a bottle, or else 
broadcast from the rooftops and back alleys in a peculiar code known only to some, 
semaphore perhaps, or prayer, or weeping, or barking. Or the sort of crying that 
sounds like barking; the sort of barking that sounds like a cry. 
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An Actor Never Thinks with Elements Smaller Than a World  
 
Esa Kirkkopelto 
Theatre Academy Helsinski 
 
How does performance think? How does performer think? In this presentation, I will 
argue that the answer we give to the former question is highly dependent on our 
understanding concerning the latter. I would like to share with you an actor 
pedagogical model according to which in contemporary performance practice a 
performer can think 1) during creative processes; 2) during performance itself. 
 
The model is based on a long term research project on actor training that I have run 
at the Theatre Academy Helsinki since 2008, named “Actor´s Art in Modern Times”. 
The project would deserve its own presentation. Here I will only concentrate in its 
most theoretical and potential outcome.  
 
I will proceed in two parts. First, I will first outline the ethical, pedagogical and artistic 
challenges we have faced in our project and to which our model tends to offer one 
possible answer. Then I enter the model itself. 
 
1.  
 
Theoretical knowledge is most powerful knowledge. Following Aristotle, its generality 
implies its potentiality. This potentiality is directly related to its capacity to get 
articulated. It is not “tacit”. It can be turned into a command – a mot d´ordre – based 
on rational argumentation, i.e. the most elaborated and convincing form of rhetoric. 
In collective creative processes, there is always some distribution of work. Some 
people direct, lead, animate, supervise, facilitate, command; others follow, execute, 
perform, obey. Even though a creative process is never directly based on rational 
reasoning, a performance, each performance, insofar it constitutes a certain whole, a 
totality with a certain economy, assumes its own rationality, a certain mode of 
thinking. Thinking is a rational activity which is based on or in search for a certain 
logic, a certain set or network of rules concerning its mode of construction. Likewise, 
thinking in performance concerns the mode of construction of performance itself, its 
composition. To ask who thinks in performance is equal to the question “Who 
composes”? And the one who composes has the power. Since power cannot be 
escaped, not even in artistic contexts, composing is hence a matter of distributing, 
using of sharing, power. Any performance can be watched and assessed as a 
display of this power play, which most concretely takes place between directors and 
actors, choreographers and dancers. 
 
As artists and as spectators, we have during last decades become increasingly 
sensible to these kind of issues and there are also lots of tendencies for 
redistributing responsibility in artistic processes, for creating new kind of collective 
working models, like devising in its various forms.  Yet, these tendencies, even if 
they manage to unravel traditional hierarchies of work, run soon out of their 
inspiration if they are not simultaneously able to put into question the principles of 
composing itself. Otherwise they only accomplish together the same business that 
formerly was reserved to individual masters, directors or choreographers. 
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Concerning those principles: in contemporary performance contexts we usually think 
on the one hand that all the elements of a scenic composition are equal and deserve 
their liberty. On the other hand, performers themselves want to break out of their 
traditional role as mere “interpreters” and claim for more artistic liberty and respect. 
We are tempted to think and work as if these two modes of  emancipation were one 
and the same. However this is not the case. Instead, we face here a dilemma that 
resides between artistic agency and artistic element, the dilemma I would like to 
consider now with you: what happens to human body when it is considered as just 
another scenic element among others? And, to put it other way around, what 
happens to our general understanding of what a compositional or dramaturgical 
element is, and how it is, if a human being, namely a speaking, acting and plural 
body, can be considered as one of them?  
 
I would like draw attention to the usual way of speaking about compositional 
elements as “material”. For instance in devising processes, as we have as our 
starting point some “material”: persons, stories, pictures or concrete objects, for 
instance. As I would argue, to think in terms of materials returns us easily to a 
productive model of creation, where the power and the responsibility of the 
productive process remains in the hands of an exterior agent, producer, author, the 
one who directs the process towards its presumed goal and who, in this way, 
accomplishes his or her idea or vision. In this model, the material falls into the role of 
the “raw material”, of plastic and formless entity ready-at-hand, susceptible to 
receive its form and meaning from outside of itself. As performing artists talk about 
“materials” they are not necessarily thinking like this. By stating, especially at the 
beginning of process, that everything is “just material” artists rather want to sustain 
the idea that all the elements of the creative process are of equal importance and 
value; that every element in performance situation should be taken into account; and 
finally: that every participant of the process has a liberty and a responsibility of her 
own. The final result, what will be done and how, depends on common agreement 
between the elements, whether they be human or not. Yet, this kind of reasoning 
falls easily back to the productive model, if it does not take into account a simple 
fact: namely that equality between elements can never constitute a starting point for 
any process; it does not suffice that we simply suppose it; but it is in itself already a 
constructed state of affair, a matter of composition, of using force. In general, I would 
sustain an idea of composition (of dramaturgy) as a process of establishing, creating 
an equality between its components, not of any kind but of certain kind, namely 
artistic kind, which least of all implies a harmony. Composition is always based on 
some kind equalisation. But how does it take place? In the case of performer the 
problem is the following: how to become a component, a lesser being, a minor being, 
without loosing one´s liberty and dignity? How to be able to get connected without 
becoming dependent? “How to connect freely?” is the basic question of every scenic 
composition. This time, however, it is presented from the point of view of the 
compositional element itself. The question is worth asking since finally, as I think, a 
scenic composition is not stronger, i.e. no more powerful, than its weakest points or 
links, which in performing arts and without exception are its human components or 
lie between them.  
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2.  
 
According to the model we have come up with, actor´s  work is divided in two 
domains that in performance are intertwined and that support each other: 
 
1) actor´s technique 
2) actor´s dramaturgy 
 
The relation between the two is left open. Constructing that relation is precisely a 
matter of invention, creative task of a performer. 
 
It is normally here, between these two levels, that director takes the lead and does 
her intervention. She defines the manner how these two domains are linked in case 
of each actor and how there are linked to the whole performance. 
 
If an actor builds this relation from the very start by herself, then we can state with 
good reason that an actor directs herself.  
 
Our model is meant to give actors means for this. We are not necessarily suggesting 
that we should get rid of directors but, perhaps, from now on we could work with 
them differently.   
 
A. About actor´s technique.  
 
Our model is not a method:  
 
1) It is meant to be a tool for an actor to study her work, to become conscious 
of her already existing techniques and possibly change them. 
2) It helps her to work more independently in different kind of creative 
processes, in different kind of work situations. It does not necessarily create 
an aesthetic of its own, even though it can also be used as a creative 
medium. 
3) It helps us to build a continuity between pedagogical and creative 
processes, rehearsing and performing. To analyse, understand and regulate 
their relation.  
4) Finally, it gives performers a vocabulary, simple technical terms according 
to which they can communicate and negotiate about their technique and 
technical solutions with each other and with director in rehearsal situation.   
 
The basic element of actor´s technique, as we have understood it, is an exercise. 
Reahearsing = exercising = making exercises.  
 
Exercise consists always of three successive parts or phases:  
 
attuning > in-between > state of being 
 
i) Attuning is physical or mental, extensive or intensive movement that attunes a 
person who performs it: it raises her level of energy and focuses her experience in a 
specific way. It removes her away from her supposedly “normal” or everyday state of 
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mind or attitude and fills her experience with a specific contents that she has called 
forth by herself. The attuning movement creates a specific sensory feeling or affect, 
opens a sensory field. Everyone who has done the same attuning feels 
approximately the same. The attuned performers are moving on and share a same 
type of sensory field. There are no pre-given or canonized set of attunings, but 
attuning is already a creative process. Performers are encouraged to invent 
attunings by themselves and share them with each other. There are no warm-ups, 
but rehearsing is creative from the very start. The attunings are designed and agreed 
according to the needs of the performance rehearsed as well as to the personal 
needs of performers. Technically, attuning is not so much a matter of stimulating 
oneself than learning to get affected, to open and call forth different kind of sensory 
fields. This can happen extensively or intensively: what it essential is that it really 
happens and that an attuning carries a performer along.  
 
ii) Attuning leads a rehearsing body somewhere, in an intermediary state, a state of 
in-between (in Finnish: “välinen”). It is an attuned state, exceptional and literally 
ecstatic state dominated by some specific sensory feeling without any determinate 
contents. That is also why it is intermediary. It is a state of ignorance, an undecided 
state. Since you do not know exactly where you are, you cannot stay “there”; you 
can only linger there for a short while. You have to move on, and it is now even easy 
to do it, since that is what our mind tends to do in such situations: it tends to give a 
meaning, an interpretation to the states it finds itself within. The transition to a new 
state happens almost spontaneously.  
 
iii) This state where the exercise ends, we have decided to call a “state of being” (in 
Finnish: “olotila”, the space of lingering, staying, hanging around, living). Whatever 
we call it, we can nevertheless agree what we aim by it: a state of being is a smallest 
meaningful unit of acting, a tiny world, a “monad” with a specific personal contents. It 
can combine various bodily elements: mental or sensory images (invented or 
rememorized), emotions, voice, breathing, physical reactions, words – of some these 
or all of them together. What is important is that a state of being is discovered by 
performer herself: that it is meaningful and interesting to her and that she can 
maintain its coherence and totality, “live” with or within it and finally expose it to 
others. 
 
In sum: an exercise leads always to some interpreted states, to states of being. Out 
of one in-between state a performer can create so many different states of being as 
she wills. Even though everyone would have done the same attuning and entered 
the same kind of intermediary state, after that paths normally depart and each 
performer enters her own state of being, gives to her attuned state a more definite 
meaning. The different states of being can encounter anew and start to negotiate 
with each other, to collide with each other, to fusion, to reinforce or destabilize each 
other. What is essential is nevertheless that the scenic encounter, or a “scene”, 
takes place now with different states of being carried and sustained by performers, 
not between themselves or their supposed state characters.  
 
This situation leads us to the question of actor´s dramaturgy. As I already mentioned 
in passing, a state of being can be considered as the smallest unit of acting, a unit of 
scenic composition or dramaturgy. Despite its meaningfulness and virtual 
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endlessness, it does not mean much yet, not at least scenically. A state of being can 
become a meaningful compositional element, but only when it is confronted and 
juxtaposed with another state and then with still another and so on, i.e. when 
between different states of being there happens transitions. A  transition is 
simultaneously a bodily and intellectual movement, that takes place between two 
states of beings. It can be spatial, temporal or both at once. It can take place 
between successive states of being of one performer or between different states of 
being carried by several performers. Acting in its most general and schematic sense 
means hence: creating states of being, maintaining them and effectuating transitions 
between them, i.e. creating a bodily composition. If a performer creates both the 
elements of her acting, i.e. states of being, and then connects them in a specific way 
by effectuating transitions between them, we can state that she takes the fullest 
possible responsibility of her creative process: she directs herself.  
 
The way actor moves from one state to another needs its special technique that I 
cannot explain here. I only notice that the transition from one state to another cannot 
take place immediately, a performer cannot “jump” from one state of being to 
another, but the previous state of being has to be unravelled in order to give way to a 
new one. Between successive states of being, performer´s body has to return to or 
fall back in-between state and attune itself again. Anyway, and that is important, a 
state of being is always built or rebuilt on some sensory and bodily basis. The 
dramaturgical line of acting, its score, is at every moment supported by 
corresponding technique.   
 
To conclude, I want to stress three things: 
 
1) A performer does not expose herself only in her states of being but also in 
transitions, while coming out of the previous state and entering a new one and while 
lingering between them. Mimetically, that is often the most attractive and literally 
most “interesting” phase (inter-esse). It is also a moment when performer´s body 
becomes manifested in a particular way. The question remains to which extent a 
performer is ready or allowed to show herself in this state. As I suggested earlier, the 
question is related to the archi-ethics of performance. Whether a scenic composition 
is conceived as a before hand designed intellectual figure, or whether it is 
understood more actively, according to its taking place and as a mode of being 
together. 
 
2) If we ask ourselves the simple question what keeps the components of a 
composition together, which connects one state of being with another, the answer is 
obvious: nothing but the free creative will of the performer, her scenic thinking.  The 
transition, as I already mentioned, is simultaneously physical and intellectual, not 
psychological. As I have state in my title, an actor never deals with elements smaller 
than a world. Her way of thinking is essentially compositional. A state of being, as it 
is here defined, means: a relative totality or a “provisory absolute”. An actor states: 
these things or experiences are interrelated in this and this ways. Even if those 
connections were strictly personal, in scenic exposition they become shared as a 
model for a possible experience or order of things. Rest depends on the originality 
and skilfulness of performer herself as well as on the receptiveness of the spectator. 
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Their mutual agreement or disagreement is once again a matter of thinking, since 
they are not considering here different things.  
 
3) Each state of being, insofar it is considered as a compositional element, can be 
replaced metaphorically with some other element: a single gesture, a sound, a 
pause, a sign, an object, a different modality of being exposed. Yet, as we suggest, a 
state of being gives a measure or a rule for all these metaphorical replacements. The 
elements are equalized according to some common feature and it may be that only 
performer herself knows it or deliberately ignores it. What is essential is that the 
metaphorical replacement is done and decided by performer herself, which means 
that it has to have its starting point in her, in some of her states of being. This 
guarantees that each element is considered as a compositional and artistic one, as a 
component: i.e. as a world of its own, and not as “just material” or as an instrument 
for something else. 
 
As a performer shows here relation to a world, by her way of entering it and leaving 
it, she manifests her and our liberty in relation to that world and, by the same token, 
to any world whatsoever.  
 
 
© 2012, Esa Kirkkopelto  
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Secrecy vs. Revelation. Reflections on the Dramatics of the Hidden  
 
Alice Lagaay 
Universität Bremen 
 
What I’m presenting is a tentative enquiry, a preliminary and still quite sketchy 
attempt to identify a line of investigation the main work of which lies ahead. Work in 
progress in other words. A quick word about the context: The ideas I’m toying with 
here are the result of two main branches of research which have defined my work in 
recent years. My talk is an attempt to connect them. 
 
The first theme has to do with the very fundamental relationship between theatre and 
philosophy. It has to do with the question of how to describe, how to grasp, to 
become aware of and explain the multiple dimensions and the transformatory 
dynamics of this relationship. One initial impulse – by no means uncontroversial, I’m 
sure – is to say that theatre and philosophy share a relation to theoria, to 
contemplation, that is, or to the act by which something is brought to light, or 
revealed in its truth by being looked at or studied, by spectatorship, in other words, 
or in the act of being witnessed. So the first very general question that I would like to 
put to you is this: Is it true – or nothing more than trivial – to say that theatre or 
drama or performance REVEAL? Is it a relevant characteristic of the theatrical that it 
brings something to light? For if so, this would imply that that which is revealed is 
otherwise not quite so visible, but concealed or hidden or simply unnoticed in the 
world: a sort of secret in other words. To what extent does theatre bring to light the 
otherwise invisible, to what extent does it reveal a secret? And how can this act or 
event of revelation, implying a certain tension between two epistemological states 
(being in on the secret so to speak as opposed to not being so) be described within 
immanence, i.e. without necessarily evoking a two-world metaphysical structure 
whereby a sort of hidden or divine truth is conceived as lying behind the surface of 
appearance? What various dimensions of secrecy vs. revelation may be relevant 
here? For instance, it might be one thing to recognise that – on a pragmatic, 
narrative level – secrecy and the process of revelation of secrets have long (perhaps 
even always) been an essential and familiar motor or strategy shaping the plots in 
traditional staged drama. No doubt very many different dimensions and functions of 
secrecy have been identified in this context – in fact I wouldn’t be surprised if on the 
level of the narrative, the revelation of something kept secret or unknown is precisely 
the place where the theatrical meets the philosophical: just think of the play between 
ignorance and knowledge in Oedipus for instance.  
 
But what about in the world of (to take a short cut) “postdramatic” theatre?60 To what 
extent does a certain tension or oscillation between secrecy and revelation apply not 
just to the narrative level but also to the very materiality of a performance? What kind 
of knowledge is concealed, for instance, in the body of the performer? And, how may 
that knowledge at times be consciously withheld, and at other times either 
intentionally or involuntarily secreted?  
 
The same or similar questions can be put to philosophy: is philosophy the art (or an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Cf. Hans-Thiel Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby, Routledge 2006. 
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art) of bringing to perception, of aistheticising, the otherwise concealed or intangible? 
As for example in Martin Heidegger’s Der Satz vom Grund – translated 
disappointingly I find as The Principle of Reason (Heidegger 1957/1996). In this 
series of lectures – and there is certainly something dramatic about them – 
Heidegger gradually brings to light what he describes as the forgotten – or secret – 
meaning of Leibniz’s phrase nihil est sine ratione (nichts ist ohne Grund: nothing is 
without reason). When we hear this phrase, he begins by explaining, we immediately 
understand it as intuitively meaningful. But a hidden meaning, or rather different 
layers of secret meaning are revealed in the process of Heidegger’s gradual and 
dramatic – I think one could fairly call deconstructive – discursive procedure. Indeed, 
it is Heidegger’s voice and philosophic discourse that gradually guide the reader 
towards hearing the phrase differently, until ultimately it no longer simply says that 
things have reasons (nothing is without reason), but a shift of emphasis occurs and it 
begins to speak the very ground (or groundlessness or residue) of being (nothing IS 
without REASON). Not only that: the phrase contains the leap from the ground 
needed to recognise the ground and residue of being (the word ‘Satz’ in German 
means sentence, but it also means leap. It means sentence and leap but it also 
means residue or leftover as in coffee or tea residue). And not only that: it also 
evokes the musical material sounding nature of the voice – or movement – of being 
that speaks the very Satz vom Grund (“Satz” means sentence and leap and residue, 
but it also means musical movement). All these meanings are thus gradually 
revealed as having been there all along although unheard – like a kind of open 
secret, like Edgar Allen Poe’s purloined letter – on the semantic surface of the 
sentence.  
 
So this issue of the intricate and complex relationship between theatre – or the 
dramatic – and philosophy is one context from which my questioning arises. The 
second thematic cluster is a little more difficult to name (but no less problematically 
ambitious and hard to get a clear grasp on because of its ubiquity). It has to do with 
the task I’ve been pursuing of drawing a sort of landscape or map of what might be 
called ‘negative performance’.61 Amongst the many points on this imaginary map is 
the topic I want to focus on today: the question of the dramatic logic of SECRECY. 
Stated very bluntly, I’m interested in secrecy and in the place or role of secrecy vs. 
transparency and/or revelation in contemporary culture – and how it (or perhaps the 
absence thereof) is reflected in the arts. My hunch is that in secrecy the two or 
indeed many sides of the performative coin come together: the active and the 
passive, the positive and the negative, the productive or world/reality-constituting, 
knowledge-creating machine, on the one hand, and the dramatic or 
staged/embodied human practice on the other. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The background or original context of this interest in negative performance goes back to my time at 
the Collaborative Research Centre “Performing Cultures” at Freie Universität Berlin where to begin 
with there was a strong emphasis on performativity understood in terms of the embodied, exposed, 
i.e. aisthetic, material eventness of human actions and rituals, a strong attentiveness to concepts of 
materiality, constructivity and mediality – all somehow ‘positive’ terms. My angle became to home in 
on the other side as it were: to investigate the power not of speech acts but of silence and the 
taciturn, to focus not only on vocality and action but on in-action and passivity, to reflect on a certain 
economy of restraint, of withdrawal or withholding, as well as on the destructive aspects of 
performativity…). Cf. e.g. Barbara Gronau and Alice Lagaay (eds.). Performanzen des Nichttuns 
(Vienna, Passagen Verlag, 2008) and Ökonomien der Zurückhaltung, (Bielefeld: transcript 2010).  
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But what exactly do I mean here by secrecy? Unfortunately it’s not that simple. There 
are in fact many different angles or perspectives from which to approach secrecy. I 
can name at least four that are different yet also interrelated:62 
 
i) From an epistemological perspective: secrecy as the great – albeit 
constantly shifting realm of the unknown. Arcana mundi: the secrets of the 
world, the realm of that which, despite the progress of science, remains 
intangible. Here there need not be a strategic agent withholding this 
knowledge on purpose, but a kind of natural boundary would seem to define 
the limit of the humanly knowable: secrets of the soul and of the body, of love, 
of death, time, ultimate secrets of the cosmos, of the origin and end of the 
universe, not to mention all the forgotten, untraceable mysteries of the world. 
This realm of secrecy cannot – by definition – be revealed, and yet something 
of it is suggested in that which can be disclosed and it is dramatically relevant, 
no doubt to theatre and philosophy alike, in that it drives the curiosity of 
human beings to explore the unknown. The drive, for instance, to find out 
what happened in a plot and thereby to push back the boundary of the 
un/known.63  
 
ii) Then there are the mysteries of religion, arcana dei, by which a connection 
is drawn between the secret and the sacred: the secret that protects the 
sacred, the play of concealment and revelation that defines the paradoxical 
logic of both: for the sacred must in a sense remain secret to be sacred, but it 
must also reveal itself – at least occasionally. As Paul Christopher Johnson 
once aptly put it: “Secrets are to religion what lingerie is to the body; they 
enhance what is imagined to be present” (Johnson 2001, 4). 
 
iii) There are then the secrets of the state, arcana imperii: The important 
function of strategies of concealment in politics and war – and the ambivalent 
status thereof in modern democracies. Not to mention the right of citizens to 
hold secrets from the state by which the complex problem of data protection in 
digital information societies may be glimpsed.64 
 
iv) And fourthy, arcana cordis, perhaps the most personal dimension of all: the 
secrets of the heart. The subjectively significant ones that each of us carries 
with us and is inclined not to disclose all too easily. These secrets tend to play 
an important role in human relationships: Jacques Derrida speaks of the 
seductive – and exciting character of secrets. In a chapter on “knowing not to 
know” in the Gift of Death, he says:  
 
A secret always makes you tremble. Not simply quiver or shiver, which also happens 
sometimes, but tremble. A quiver can of course manifest fear, anguish, 
apprehension of death; as when one quivers in advance, in anticipation of what is to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Cf. Groundwork on the cultural dimensions of secrecy in Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann. 
Schleier und Schwelle, especially Vol. 1 (Geheimnis und Öffentlichkeit), (Munich 1997). 
63 It is often curiosity that determines what is considered secret. This point is explored in Aleida 
Assmann and Jan Assmann (eds.). Schleier und Schwelle. Vol. 3 (Geheimnis und Neugierde). 
Munich: Fink 1998, 7 ff. 
64 For more on this see the fascinating study by Eva Horn 2011. 
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come. But it can be slight, on the surface of the skin, like a quiver that announces the 
arrival of pleasure. It is a moment in passing, the suspended time of seduction. A 
quiver is not always very serious, it is sometimes discreet, barely discernible, 
somewhat epiphenomenal. It prepares for, rather than follows the event. One could 
say that water quivers before it boils, that is the idea I was referring to as seduction: 
a superficial pre-boil, a preliminary and visible agitation (Derrida 1996, 53).  
The opposite in other words to indifference: secrets of the heart cause one to 
tremble. It may be interesting to note the transformation that has occurred historically 
with regard to the places and/or people that one takes one’s secrets to. The 
therapist’s couch has to a large extent replaced the priest’s confessional. But the 
productive creativity spawned by secrecy no doubt remains; creative strategies of 
concealment, disguise, masking and veiling, silencing and denying, the dynamics of 
human relationships bound by shared or broken by betrayed secrecy – and the 
constant play between secretiveness and gossip (not just in the British media). 
 
Secrecy as such is neither necessarily positive nor necessarily negative. A particular 
secret may acquire destructive potency – just think of the devastating personal 
consequences of many a family secret. But when motivated by shame or maintained 
by discretion such secrets can also be a source of some of the finest and most 
intimate of human behaviours and experience. I am thinking here of the strong bind 
and the positive quality of trust and discretion that a shared secret may establish 
between friends. Yet personal secrets and particularly secrets of the heart rarely 
remain with the people they most concern. For it seems to belong to the very logic of 
secrecy that a secret be shared with someone, and thereby disclosed to be perhaps 
later on betrayed. And even secrets that are not shared tend to find their way out 
eventually, either as a result of the intentional research of a curious seeker or 
unconsciously through trans-generational communication.65   
 
These four named realms of secrecy (and I don’t of course claim they are the only 
ones, the secret of embodied knowledge might, for instance, be yet another 
category) are different and yet interlinked: whilst the mysteries of religion may touch 
the boundaries of the knowable, secrets of the heart will almost always reflect a 
person’s beliefs or religious practices and personal secrets are shaped by the 
structures of society, by the Zeitgeist of a generation which together define what can 
be said or is considered taboo. What the various dimensions share moreover is a 
common structure – and it is this structure that I propose to explore a little now – first 
with recourse to the sociology of Georg Simmel (who some have referred to as being 
postmodern avant la lettre) and then with reference again to Jacques Derrida.66 
 
One thing to note is that the ability to withhold information conditions in a sense the 
very possibility of individuality and thus can be shown to have played an important 
role in the formation of the modern (although not necessarily postmodern) concept of 
human subjectivity and personhood: in the early 20th century the German 
philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel described secrecy as “one of the greatest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Cf. Anne Ancellin Schützenberger. The Ancestor Syndrome: Transgenerational Psychotherapy and 
the Hidden Links in the Family Tree. London/ New York, Routledge, 1998. 
66 “Simmel as bricoleur is a practitioner of a demystified savage mind, a post-structuralist before the 
advent of structuralism”, Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein. “Georg Simmel. Sociological 
Flaneur/Bricoleur”, in: Theory, Culture and Society Vol. 8, book 3, 1991, 151-168, 162. 
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accomplishments of humanity” (Simmel 1906, 462). Hyperbolic as it is, this 
statement is worth pondering for a moment. Simmel considered the ability to 
withhold information as constituting an essential dimension of all interpersonal 
relationships as well as allowing for groups within a larger society to emerge and 
distinguish themselves: secret societies, in other words, bound together by implicit or 
sometimes explicit regulations regarding the exclusiveness of certain types of shared 
information.  
 
His analysis of secrecy emphasises the sociological productivity of concealed 
information as well as the dynamic process active wherever secrecy is at work. 
Simmel was interested in the triadic tension that occurs when two parties share a 
secret. A segregation occurs when A and B share something that C is excluded 
from. Whilst strategies of what he calls “aggressive defense” may be deployed to 
keep the secret (lying, denying, hiding, masking, talking in order to say nothing etc.), 
he also notes the paradoxical power that a person holding a secret acquires, a 
power which somehow – in an analogous way to jewellery, he says – makes that 
person stand out. “Secrecy magnifies reality” is how he puts it. Moreover, to quote 
from Stefan Zweig’s “Burning Secret”:  
 
“Nothing whets the intelligence more than a passionate suspicion, nothing 
develops all the faculties of an immature mind more than a trail running away 
into the dark.” (Zweig 2008) 
 
Once C, who is left out of the secret, ‘smells a rat’ or realises his/her exclusion, s/he 
will tend to enter into a mode of “aggressive offensive” to find out that s/he is being 
left out of. The triadic structure is thus vulnerable on all sides: there is the danger 
that it will be found out, but also the temptation – on the part of those who share in 
the secret – to divulge it, a danger which Simmel interestingly equates with the 
ecstasy of the moment in which money is spent: once spent, the money is gone. 
Once betrayed, the power of the secret is lost.  
 
I cannot elaborate here much further. Except perhaps to underscore that Simmel’s 
analyses of the sociological power of secrecy are of course historically situated and 
bound to the concept and experience of individuality that was emerging at the time 
(i.e. in the early 20th century). Thus Simmel’s emphasis of the power of secrecy is 
connected to the sociological recognition that the modern subject is not just one 
persona but that it consists of a collection of roles (you are one person at home with 
your family but a different person at work, one person in the country, another in the 
city etc.). These different personae open a realm of dramatic possibilities – fruitful 
not only but also within the realm of theatre. One might think for instance of Oscar 
Wilde’s Importance of Being Earnest, a comedy of the same period that plays with 
the psychological complexity required to maintain multiple ‘Bunburys’ in one body – 
different faces of a person kept separate by various dimensions of withheld, 
unshared, secret knowledge.  
 
Simmel’s concept of secrecy has thus been associated with a quantitative aspect of 
individualisation: more than one person contained within a subject (represented by a 
cake with many pieces or an orange with many segments – see Nedelmann 1994). 
But it can also be related to a different model of individuality which sociologists have 
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called qualitative (see idem): represented by a series of concentric circles with the 
ego at the heart. On this model, a person’s relationships are defined by the distance 
they maintain to his/her inner ego. Managing one’s different relationships requires 
the skill of demarcation, the ability to recognise and to draw limits, and skill in the art 
of discretion by which to maintain and change these limits through sociological 
movement, as well as by which to recognise and respect those boundaries in others.  
 
In the little time I have left, I will jump to the one who might best be described as the 
Sherlock Holmes of philosophy; one who not only wrote at length about the nature of 
secrets and professed to being obsessed by secrecy and the art of decryption and 
decoding, but who also, upon being asked towards the end of his life what he would 
still like to know, stated (and it remains unclear how serious he was) that what he 
would really like to know is about the sex lives of philosophers.  
 
Jacques Derrida’s thoughts on secrecy would appear – at least initially – to reside on 
a whole different plane to those of Georg Simmel. They are not primarily motivated 
by an attempt to define human relationships, the dynamics of individuality, or 
sociological movement. They are situated rather on the fundamental level of the 
structure or the experience of the structure of language itself. He is interested in the 
possibility of a secret or of a dimension of secrecy that resides both in, and in a 
certain sense before any word is uttered or withheld. He is thus not only interested in 
revealing secrets (like the ultimate secret that there is no secret behind the word, no 
ultimately fixed or tangible signifié), but his writings often express a strong belief in 
the necessary existence of a constant secret: gestured towards as that which one 
can only ever speak about but never really manage to say.  
 
“Fundamentally, everything I attempt to do, think, teach and write has its 
raison d’être, spur, calling and appeal in this secret, which interminably 
disqualifies any effort one can make to determine it.” (Derrida 2001, 58). 
 
Thus Derrida’s work can be seen as the attempt to bring these two seemingly 
contradictory figures of thought together: the recognition on the one hand that there 
is no secret (nothing hidden behind the surface structure), and on the other hand the 
belief in the necessity of the secret, a recognition of its meaningful effect and 
significant productivity. But perhaps there is in fact no contradiction here.  
 
For what appears to be a contradiction is perhaps in fact nothing but the inherent 
paradox of the secret which can be best described with reference to the etymology of 
the term. The term secret or secrecy owes its meaning to the Latin secretum: to that 
which is separated and set apart. Secret information is thus information that is 
separated from the rest of the openly accessible non-secret information. One might 
add with Simmel that it is not just the secret that is separated from the rest, but also 
the people who hold or share a secret who are separated from those who don’t. But 
precisely this separatedness defines the paradox. For one might wonder: doesn’t 
something remain truly secret so long as it is not separated, and therefore not 
visible? Isn’t the secret really only secret as long as it is assimilated with the rest, 
mixed up with the whole? As soon as it is separated, secreted from the whole, a 
piece of Gold dust picked out from the sand, only then does it cease to be a secret! 
The true enigma of the secret thus consists in the fact that structurally speaking a 
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secret is constituted in the very moment that it disappears, and disappears in the 
moment that it is constituted.67 
 
Recognition of this paradox drives Derrida to seek a concept of the secret that can 
no longer in principle be revealed, a secret that remains unreadable, undeciferable 
even although it is neither hidden nor coded. “There is something secret. But it does 
not conceal itself” (Derrida 1992, 21).  
 
The secret according to Derrida shares the structure of death in that each stands for 
something that cannot be said – although (and in fact because) we can only ever 
speak of it. Perhaps it can be said however that this something that is barely 
communicable because it withdraws itself points towards an ethical dimension, one 
that begins with both a necessary and impossible responsibility. For it becomes a 
question of responding to that which cannot be said, of sharing what cannot be 
shared, that is commun-icated, and thus of doing justice to the mutual recognition 
that on a fundamentally human level we have little or nothing in common.68 And so I 
close my talk with the famous line by Walter Benjamin taken from The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama, 
 
“Truth is not a matter of exposure which destroys the secret, but a revelation 
which does justice to it.” (Benjamin 2009, 25) 
 
Could this, I wonder, be an apt description of the way performance might think? 
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68 But how can I explain, how can I explain to you? 
You will understand less after I have explained it. 
All that I can hope to make you understand  
Is only events: not what has happened. 
And people to whom nothing has ever happened 
Cannot understand the unimportance of events.“ 
T.S.Eliot. The Family Reunion, 1939. 
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Choreographieoper? Dispersing Operatic Performance 
 
David J. Levin 
University of Chicago 
 
Let me begin with a sheepish admission.  I am becoming a bit bored with Regieoper 
(director’s opera).  Not for the predictable reasons – it is not that I am dispositionally 
opposed to inventive or even “deconstructive” readings.  On the contrary!  The 
problem with Regieoper, as I see it, is a byproduct of the imperative of 
unpredictability: productions (in this, not unlike teenagers) that have to be 
unpredictable too often end up looking pretty much the same.  Thus results what 
Hans-Thies Lehman has aptly termed avant-garde conformism.69 
 
Of course, there are some notable exceptions, some productions that astonish and 
surprise despite the generic imperative to astonish and surprise.70  In this paper, I 
won’t be fishing out those individual exceptions (whether or not they prove the rule); 
instead, I want to draw our attention to a phenomenon that constitutes something of 
an alternative practice.  (Note the hedge in that formulation: my argument is not that 
we are dealing with a fully fledged alternative, but one with potential.)  I propose to 
consider a form of stage production that deserves more attention than it has 
received: it bears directly upon director’s opera, and certainly shares many practices 
with it, so, at the risk of doing a disservice to its historical specificity, let’s 
provisionally term it choreographer’s opera.   
 
Of course, I am not the first to think about the relationship of opera to dance.  To cite 
but one recent example, Daniel Albright’s essay “Golden Calves: The Role of Dance 
in Opera” offers a wonderfully informative and characteristically irreverent account of 
the myriad tensions that have animated the relationship between opera and dance.71  
Albright’s orientation is historical and his primary focus is on compositions: thus, he 
traces Wagner’s anxiety of balletic influence (which is also, inevitably, his anxiety of 
Meyerbeerian influence) through to a discussion of the over determined manner in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69  Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatisches Theater (Frankfurt/M: Verlag der Autoren, 1999), 35.  
Sadly, the section on “Mainstream and Experiment” in which this argument appears and which forms 
one of the last secions in the Prologue to Lehmann’s book was not translated into English for the 
(abridged!) English edition.  See Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby (NY/London: 
Routledge, 2006).  
70 The Paris/Parma co-production of Rossini’s La Pietra del Paragone directed and conceived by 
Giorgio Barberio Corsetti and Pierrick Sorin, conducted by Jean-Christophe Spinosi with the 
Ensemble Matheus, which was released on DVD in 2007 (and about which Emanuele Senici has 
written wonderfully) comes to mind –a production in which the singers occupy a more or less bare 
stage, while a set is superimposed upon their bodies via live audio-visual technologies, and the 
singers and the set into which they are interpolated are projected onto screens suspended above the 
stage to often hilarious effect.  (See Emanuele Senici, “Porn Style?: Space and Time in Live Opera 
Videos” The Opera Quarterly, 26.1 (Winter 2010): 63-80.   Or, in a very different (which is to say, a 
more Teutonically ernst idiom), there is Martin Kus ̌ej’s Zurich production of Strauss and 
Hofmannstahl’s Elektra, released on DVD in 2006, which offered a confoundingly claustrophobic 
account of the piece, set in an interior that could be variously understood as the interior of an asylum 
or the interior of Elektra’s mind.   
71 Daniel Albright, “Golden Calves: The Role of Dance in Opera,” Opera Quarterly (Winter 2006) 
22(1): 22-37.  Albright subsequently republished the piece in Music Speaks: On the Language of 
Opera, Dance, and Song (Rochester, NY: U Rochester P, 2009).  
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which opera and opera composers have sought to respond to the perceived threat of 
dancing bodies.  The focus of the project I am introducing here is related but distinct, 
involving an account of interpretive practices on stage rather than a given 
composer’s proclivities.  Put otherwise, rather than focusing upon the historical and 
generic tensions between opera and dance I am keen to consider how 
choreographers, dancers, and singers jointly shape and reshape opera in 
performance.  The two are obviously related, but just as obviously not the same 
thing.  
 
Let’s begin with the weird status of choreographer’s opera as a kind of exotic outpost 
in the culture of opera production.  That outpost has to be easily recognized as an 
outpost in order to function as one.   And so, just as Virginia is for Lovers (at least, 
according to that state’s tourism board), so too have Dido and Aeneas or Orpheus 
and Euridice (Gluck and Monteverdi) been for choreographers.  And why is that?  In 
part, surely, because these pieces have extended passages of dance music, which 
is to say, they rely upon dance as an interpolated and recurring expressive form.  But 
also, these pieces have become familiar as the place where choreographers go 
when they come to opera (and, as a corollary to that point: it is where audiences 
have come to expect to find choreographers when they go to those operas).  And 
familiarity, as Henry Ford reminds us, is the best form of branding.  There are other 
explanations: when I posed this question to an audience last year, one colleague 
suggested that these are dramatically tedious works with lovely music, and as such, 
they benefit from lithe bodies to distract us from the long stretches in which, absent 
those bodies, very little would be happening.  On this account, the lithe bodies don’t 
just occupy a space otherwise marked by absence (in this case understood as the 
absence of action), but they tend to occupy the space otherwise marked by presence 
too (in this case, the presence of the singer’s body).  Putting singing bodies into a 
context of dancing bodies has the effect of resituating or even displacing the singing 
and the singer.  Such a resituation can be productive by challenging a 
conventionalized sense of how and what opera signifies.  
 
Of course, a lot depends on the particular dancers and the particular singers and the 
particular choreographer and the particular piece and the particular house 
commissioning the production.  For our purposes today, I’d like to consider a few of 
the ways in which resituation (or what I’ll call ‘dispersal’) is at stake in Pina Bausch’s 
production of Gluck’s Orfeo ed Euridice, or indeed, Orpheus und Eurydike, which is 
how the piece was titled when it premiered in Wuppertal in 1975 and was remounted 
in Paris in 1993.72  The German title has a bit to do with the piece’s weird history, but 
it has more to do with the expressive provenance of the production: since Wuppertal 
is a regional opera house, it tended, in the 1970s, when the piece was first mounted 
(which is also to say: in an era prior to super-titles), to present foreign works in the 
vernacular.  So: Orpheus und Eurydike, sung in German.  And it was danced in what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Christoph W. Gluck, Orpheus und Eurydike, eine Tanz-Oper von Pina Bausch. Choreography and 
stage direction by Pina Bausch (1975), sets, constume, and lighting by Rolf Borzik.  Orpheus danced 
by Yann Bridard, sung by Maria Riccarda Wesseling; Eurydike danced by Marie-Agnès Gillot, sung by 
Julia Kleiter; Amor danced by Miteki Kudo, sung by Sunhae Im.  Ballet de l’Opéra national de Paris, 
with the Balthasar-Neumann Ensemble and chorus, conducted by Thomas Hengelbrock.  Film by 
Vincent Bataillon, recorded at the Opéra national de Paris at the Palais Garnier in February 2008. 
Released on DVD by Belair Media, 2009.  
 139	  
	  
linguists would term a nascent dialect, that is, in the expressive vocabulary of 
Tanztheater, or dance theater, a language that Bausch was introducing and refining 
in Wuppertal at the time.  (She only assumed the directorship of the ballet in 
Wuppertal in 1973, two years prior to this production.)  This is not the place to detail 
the expressive aspirations of Tanztheater, and its relationship to the norms of 
classical ballet.73  I hope it will suffice to say that Bausch sought to present work that 
would engage viewers by invoking, among other things, German history, 
contemporary power relations, as well as the lived experiences and expressive 
proclivities of her dancers.  Her practice, we might say, sought to displace the 
hegemony of an expressive form that she perceived to be unduly rarefied and 
aestheticized, replacing it with forms that were more direct because less 
ornamented, more compelling because less conventionalized.  The analogy to 
Gluck’s reform agenda, on this admittedly superficial account, should be clear. 
Bausch’s practice intervenes in and displaces a prevailing discourse of opera 
production – not just on the level of character dramaturgy, but also formally, in terms 
of stagecraft.  Much the same is true at the level of the camerawork of the 
production’s appearance on DVD.  Let’s consider the camerawork.  At a very basic 
level, the camerawork, for recordings of dance, tends to situate the viewer as a 
spectator, in relation to dancing bodies.  Whereas in opera, the camera tends to 
situate the viewer as an auditor, in relation to voices.  In choreographer’s opera, the 
rhetoric of camera movement is confronted with a question: where to go and what to 
do.  For those schooled in the rhetoric of opera recordings, the results are 
noteworthy.  A corollary to the notion that in opera, the money is in the voices, is the 
sense that in operas on DVD, the money shot tends to center on the singer, and not 
just the singer, but the singer’s face, the source of vocal production.74  
 
In Regie-theater, of course, the singing voice tends to be programmatically displaced 
into a relationship with an environment, and not just any environment, but usually 
and most recognizably, a de-naturalized environment, one designed to surprise and, 
to use the Brechtian buzzword, to defamiliarize.  Thus, to cite some familiar 
examples, we find Susanna and Figaro in a penthouse suite of Trump Towers or we 
find Don Giovanni and Leporello in Spanish Harlem (in the famous Peter Sellars 
productions from the 1980s), or we find the Rheinmaidens and Alberich slip-sliding 
on an industrial dam in Patrice Chereau’s centennial Ring at Bayreuth in 1976.  
Choreographer’s opera, in my experience, engages in a different kind of 
displacement – less topical and geographic than representational, where the singers, 
rather than being displaced in diegetic terms from, say, a mythic to a contemporary 
place, are literally displaced, from the center of signification to its margins.  Related 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Among the introductory works on Bausch, see “An Artistic and Contextual History,” the first chapter 
in Royd Climenhaga, Pina Bausch (London & NY: Routledge, 2009), 1-38. 
74 The observation recalls Wayne Koestenbaum’s comical account of “Looking Into the Voice Box” 
and his recollection of looking into Jessye Norman’s mouth in “Mouth,” both in his The Queen’s 
Throat: Opera, Homosexuality, and the Mystery of Desire (NY: Poseidon Press, 1993), 159-61 and 
163-4. The camera-work of the Met Opera hi-definition broadcasts—especially the track mounted and 
hyper-mobile mini-cams running along the base of the stage, just above the orchestra, has given a 
new provenance to the notion that the singer’s voice is not just of paramount importance in opera, but 
that an audience in the cinema should first and foremost be given to see that vocal production.  The 
stage production, on this account, assumes the status of background information, pixilated window-
dressing for the digital age.  The Met, we might say, has redrawn the proscenium of its hi-def stage to 
capture and display the singer’s upper body. 
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to this displacement of the singers is a sense that the rhetoric by which the piece is 
rendered is displaced too.  On the one hand, this is entirely predictable: after all, a 
danced opera signifies differently than an opera that is merely (merely?) staged.  But 
this difference on the level of signification is noteworthy for anyone interested in 
exploring the full range of opera’s signifying practices, and in particular, the ways in 
which it can be made (and understood) to signify differently.  
 
An example may help to explain what I have in mind.   
 
In a conventional history of opera, the tale of Orpheus and Eurydice occupies pride 
of place not just because the piece has tended to occupy the pole position when it 
comes to operatic history, but that privileged position, in turn, has produced a kind of 
go-to allegory, by which opera inaugurates itself by figuring its own claim: Orpheus, 
as the ur-crooner, is able to defy death and retrieve his lost love via the power of 
song.  (Of course, his victory is short-lived indeed: he turns around, and in his 
recourse to an expression of visual desire, loses her forever.)  But the point is clear 
enough: here, voice takes up a privileged position in the economy of mortality.   
Historically, this material hasn’t just attracted opera composers, it has also famously 
attracted important choreographers, for reasons that merit an exploration that I won’t 
undertake here: thus, in 1936 George Balanchine scandalized audiences at the Met 
with his production of Gluck’s Orfeo ed Euridice (the production was withdrawn after 
only two performances75), and almost 40 years later, Pina Bausch staged Gluck’s 
piece in Wuppertal; remounting it in 2008 for Paris; in 2000, the Robert Wilson 
production of Berlioz’s edition of Gluck’s Orphee et Eurydice which had premiered at 
the Chatelet in Paris a year earlier, was released on DVD.  And although Wilson is 
not a ballet choreographer, the prototypcal stylization of his production locates it in 
the realm of choreography.  
 
In her production, Pina Bausch stages many things: in one sense, (and in this, her 
heritage as a central figure in Tanztheater, is clear) she certainly stages the drama, 
although she does so via a series of dispersions that render the piece in multiplied 
and oblique form.  Among these are forms that would strike a regular opera-goer as 
fundamentally unfamiliar, including scenes that render musical forms – groupings 
that figure rhythmic configurations, for instance, or the disposition of phrases.  One 
important effect of this dispersion is a marginalization of the singer – which is also to 
say: the singer’s body.   
 
Let’s take a look at a characteristic example.  Here, Orpheus beseeches the furies to 
let him into the underworld, and the furies, true to their name, tell him to scram.  
You’ll hear Maria Riccarda Wesseling singing Orpheus, and you’ll see the role 
danced by Yann Bridard; for that matter, you’ll hear the Balthasar-Neumann chorus, 
but you won’t see them at all, since Bausch relegated them to the pit along with the 
orchestra.  In their place, you’ll see the ensemble of the Ballet de l’Opéra national de 
Paris.  (The DVD was filmed by Vincent Bataillon, recorded at the Palais Garnier in 
February 2008, and released on DVD in 2009.)  And a final tip regarding where to 
find Maria Riccarda Wesseling singing Orpheus in the following: you’ll catch a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 James Steichen, a graduate student in Musicology at Princeton, has recently undertaken extensive 
archival research on Balanchine’s production, and describes Balanchine’s production as “arguably the 
first instance of what critics will later dismiss as ‘Eurotrash’.”  
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glimpse of her towards the end of this clip, dressed all in black, beneath the 
oversized bar stools lining the right side of the stage.  
 
Screen the scene 
 
Mimesis is differently at stake here: the locus of meaning production is decentered in 
and by the production on DVD.  It is decentered between genders (Orpheus, danced 
by a man, is sung by a woman); between languages (Gluck’s piece is sung here in 
German with subtitles that translate it intermittently at best), and most interesting, 
between signifying modalities and genres, that is, between Tanztheater and the 
conventions of operatic stagecraft, between the singer’s body as a primary source of 
sung expression and the dancer’s body as a primary source of gestural expression.  
This is a different, interstitial form of signification, a signification through dispersal 
and multiplication rather than consolidation.  As a result, there is a general sense 
that meaning-production takes place elsewhere and otherwise here, and the locus of 
expression here is not so much in a specific place as it is on the move, both literally 
and more figuratively, variously finding expression and moving through it. 
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Reassessing the Thinking Body in Soundpainting  
 
Helen Julia Minors 
Kingston University 
Walter Thompson (interviewee) 
Independant Artist 
 
This presentation showed a videoed live performance of a Soundpainting 
performance in which I, Helen Julia Minors, performed, led by the creator of the 
Soundpainting language Walter Thompson. The discussion explored the definitions 
of Soundpainting, and utilised primary source evidence drawn from a recent filmed 
interview with Thompson and from a questionnaire I conducted with Thompson in 
2011. Below I present selected questions and answers from this questionnaire in 
order to outline the issues that were explored in the video footage presented. I 
constructed the questionnaire in December 2010 with the intention of challenging the 
creator of the Soundpainting language, Walter Thompson, on the role of gesture in 
Soundpainting, in order to find out how Thompson conceived some of the gestures 
he use and their use across music and dance, to inform my own analysis of this 
music and dance dialogue.   
 
 
 
 
Walter Thompson and Helen Julia Minors. 
Screen Shot, Soundpainting Interview (25 July 2011) 
Union des Musiciens de Jazz, Rue des Frigos, Paris. 
 
In writing this questionnaire I make a claim that Soundpainting uses culturally based 
physical gestures to communicate and compose in real time, assuming a cross- or 
inter-disciplinary exchange between music and dance. This exchange relies to some 
extent on metaphor. Music is perceived both spatially and temporally, and likewise 
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so are dance and the other artistic components. If an exchange occurs, is it a 
dialogue? Does that dialogue rely solely or partially on meaning bearing gestures? 
The questionnaire had eight sections to it. Below I present four extract from four 
sections in order to define the language, set out the aims, and significantly to explore 
the intercession between improvisation and composition, before outlining the 
development fo the language. The full questionnaire will be made available at 
http://www.soundpainting.com  
   
Questionnaire 
It is necessary to define what Soundpainting is: how can we compose and 
choreograph in the moment, how does the language work? 
 
1.  Background – Creative Context  
  
How would you define Soundpainting for a musician?  
 
‘Soundpainting is the multidisciplinary live composing sign language I created in 
1974. Soundpainting comprises more than 1200 gestures that are signed by the live 
composer – known as the Soundpainter – indicating specific material and chance 
material to be performed. The Soundpainter, standing in front of the group (usually), 
signs a phrase to the group then composes with the responses. The imposing of 
phrase and composing with results is the basis for Soundpainting.’ 
  
What were the main factors which led you to create the Soundpainting gestural sign 
language?  
  
‘I moved to Woodstock, NY from Boston in 1974 and formed my first orchestra – 
comprising musicians and dancers – about 25 in total. I organized rehearsals and 
performances during the summer and composed, using traditional notation, several 
compositions incorporating sections of improvisation. The players, when improvising, 
were to relate their improvisation to my notation – thematic improvisation. During the 
first concert I became frustrated with how a soloist was improvising – their 
improvisation had nothing to do with my notation – so, instead of speaking loudly to 
the group, reminding them to develop their improvisation thematically, I decided (in 
the moment) to try and sign them instead. I signed several performers (musicians) to 
play a long tone – I pointed at a few people, made an iconic gesture for a long tone 
and signaled them to play it, and they did. A few minutes later I created a gesture for 
pointillism, tried it, and it work wonderfully. After the concert I went home and 
decided to continue developing this direction.’ 
  
2. Aims and Experiences  
  
In using a gestural sign language to create music and dance in real time what do you 
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aim to achieve which goes beyond, or is different, to traditional genres and forms of 
creativity?  
  
Note: From this point on Thompson uses the word Soundpainting to signify live 
composing with the language and Soundpainter instead of live composer. 
“Composing” refers also to choreographing, playwriting or any other discipline-
specific form of creativity. 
 
‘One of the most important aspects of Soundpainting is to compose with what 
happens in the moment whether it is intended or not. When the group is fluent and 
can comfortably respond to the gestures many expected and unexpected results will 
occur – specificity and chance is at the root of Soundpainting.’ 
  
What freedom does Soundpainting offer the creative artist which other creative 
processes do not?  
 
‘The opportunity to work with what happens in the moment whether you are 
participating in a Soundpainting group as the Soundpainter or performer. 
 
A very important part of Soundpainting language is the basic rule that there is no 
such thing as a mistake. No matter what happens, the performer must continue 
performing their material. For example: If the Soundpainter signs the group to 
perform a Long Tone and one musician or dancer accidently performs Pointillism, 
then they must continue with the Pointillism and not change to the Long Tone. The 
“no such thing as a mistake” concept opens up an environment where creativity is 
never stifled.’ 
  
What restrictions does the Soundpainter have to contend with which a conductor and 
composer would not?  
  
‘The Soundpainter when composing a multidisciplinary piece must, at all times, be 
aware of the forward motion of the composition. It is the Soundpainter’s responsibility 
to realize the piece. Conductors and composer’s collaborate to make the work – a 
road map is created by the composer’s notation and the conductor follows it in order 
to realize the piece. On the contrary, the Soundpainter does the same but in the 
moment. I wouldn’t define the difference between the two as a restriction but as 
another point of clarification on how the two forms of composition, Soundpainting 
and traditional composing are related and how they differ.’ 
 
3. Composition or Improvisation…?  
  
In thinking a performance, and creating in the moment, there is a cross over between 
these two dimensions. As a performer there are various similarities between the two 
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but how have these dimensions affected this creative language? 
 
What were the main problems you encountered when directing a jazz band?  
  
‘Jazz is rich in improvisation and jazz musicians spend a great deal of time 
perfecting their ability to perform a solo improvisation as well as collective 
improvisation. When I teach Soundpainting to a Jazz group, sometimes I meet a little 
resistance from a few players who do not like being signed. The resistance usually 
last only a few minutes - I have never had anyone get up and leave the room.’ 
  
Soundpainting could be said to utilize the individual choices of the performers, as 
such is it appropriate to refer to Soundpainting as a form of improvisation?   
  
‘You could say Soundpainting is a form of improvising but then I would add that any 
form of composition, be it traditional or not, is a form of improvising and improvising a 
form of composition. However the Soundpainter composes with material offered by 
the group; it is not free improvisation.’ 
 
Drawing an analogy with a conductor, the Soundpainter is a silent gestural role, 
guiding the interpretation of the piece. As such, to what extent is the Soundpainter 
guiding improvisation? And to what extent is the Soundpainter constructing and 
leading a creative act?  
 
‘The Soundpainting language can be used in multiple ways. It can be used to guide 
material or it can be used in a way where the Soundpainter is hands-on with every 
aspect of the piece. 
  
The fluent Soundpainter has a very large vocabulary of gestures that can both guide 
the development of material and/or ask for very specific material such as a C major 7 
chord from a pianist or signing a dancer to jump around the stage on their right foot. 
The Soundpainter may also use gestures to indicate less specific material and/or 
chance responses from the performers. The Soundpainter is responsible for every 
aspect of the creation of the piece. It is their choice as to how active they are with the 
gestures and the frequency, simplicity, and complexity of the phrases they choose to 
sign the group.’ 
 
As a Soundpainter, in what way would you say you act as a composer? In other 
words, to what extent are you creating the sounds you hear from the ensemble and 
managing the sounds across the piece?  
 
‘The Soundpainter uses very specific hand and body gestures (each gesture 
incorporating specific performance parameters) in order to compose the piece, 
whereas the traditional composer uses standard and/or non-standard notation to 
compose their work. The Soundpainter, like the traditional composer, makes all the 
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choices as to how their composition progresses. I don’t see any real difference 
between the two worlds of composing except certain editing possibilities and ease of 
composing certain structures depending on whether you are Soundpainting or 
composing traditionally.’ 
 
As Soundpainting utilizes the responses of the performers, offering therefore some 
level of personal choice, and arguably improvisation, what is the fundamental 
difference expected from the “improvise” gesture?   
  
‘The Improvise gesture means to perform a solo. It is the only gesture in 
Soundpainting that indicates the performer has the liberty to do what they desire. 
Certain other gestures incorporate varying degrees of choice regarding their material 
though nowhere near the same level as the Improvise gesture.’ 
   
Does this “Improvise” gesture invite the ensemble member(s) to take over from the 
Soundpainter by taking over control of the creative process, or is it predicated on the 
expectation in jazz?  
  
‘No. The Soundpainter is the composer of the piece at all times and it is their choice 
as to how to work with the Improvise gesture. Some Soundpainter’s will modify the 
performance of the improvising player whereas others may wish the performer 
completes their solo improvisation at their own rate. Either way, it is the 
Soundpainter who decides and indicates where and how the Improvise gesture is 
incorporated into piece.’ 
  
4. The Development of the ‘Language’  
  
Your syntax offers a consistent approach for all Soundpainters, and therefore is 
predicated on an understanding that all language has grammar. How did you 
develop your syntax?  
   
‘The Soundpainting Syntax existed early on though I was not fully aware I was using 
it. It wasn’t until 1997 during a Soundpainting residence in Woodstock, NY that I and 
Soundpainter Sarah Weaver formalized the syntax.’   
  
Sculpting gestures: this object, visually dependant term connotes shaping of an 
object. How do you use these gestures?  
 
‘Sculpting gestures indicate What content to perform and How to perform it. For 
example: Whole Group (Who), Long Tone (What), Volume Fader (pianissimo) (How), 
Play (When).  All the gestures are positioned in the phrase according to their syntax 
function. There are hundreds of Sculpting gestures. All content and modification of 
material is generated using Sculpting gestures.’   
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Function gestures: suggestive of a culturally determined visual direction, order or 
illustrative or an action, such as a point or wave. How do you use functional 
gestures?   
 
‘Function gestures indicate Who is going to perform and When to begin performing. 
Whole Group, Woodwinds, Dancers, Group 1, Group 2, etc. these are Function 
gestures indicating who is to perform and gestures such as Play, Off, Enter/Exit 
Slowly, Organic Development, are Function gestures indicating When to perform.’ 
  
To what extent are sculpting and functional gestures independent from one another? 
Or do they always have to be co-dependant?  
  
‘They are always co-dependent. They need each other in order to create a complete 
phrase. It is not possible to sign two Function gestures and receive a response from 
the group and the same can be said of signing two Sculpting gestures. For example: 
Whole Group (Function), Play (Function) doesn’t elicit a response from the group 
though, it would seem to make sense but the word Play in Soundpainting does not 
indicate content is to be performed.  Play is a Go gesture and only states when to 
enter the composition.’    
 
Why are there no mistakes in Soundpainting?   
  
‘It is much more interesting and challenging to Soundpaint with the so-called mistake 
than to acknowledge one has been made. My experience has been that composing 
with the mistake is quite often a more interesting direction to take the composition 
than any I could think of. Picasso, Miles Davis, Anthony Braxton, among many other 
composer’s acknowledge the so-called “mistake” as an opportunity to discover new 
material and not as a road block. I share this belief and have made it an important 
part of the basic philosophy of Soundpainting.’ 
 
Some Conclusions 
The language, and/or creative process, is based on a premise that both musicians 
and dancers, and both choreographers and composers, share a gestural 
understanding, and therefore they are able to share the Soundpainting language. In 
asking where they meet and how they communicate I am essentially enquiring how 
this language functions and how it meaningfully cross the audio-visual divide with an 
assumption that thought occurs and is projected through, in and during performance. 
How we perceive, process and respond to the gestures, such as Relate to 
demonstrates our reliance on metaphor and analogy.  
 
I questioned Thompson on his experience as regards how performer’s respond to his 
‘dance’ in Shapeline – body as graphic score, thinking body to be read. We 
established that musicians usually respond in a way in which is complementary 
(reading height with pitch and space with volume, movement speeds with tempi). It 
became clear that although the Soundpainting language is multidisciplinary, intended 
to be read by any art form, the artists’ disciplines effect their responses, as actors 
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were much more likely to offer a dissonant response, musicians a complementary 
response, and dancers a variety of responses. Dancers and actors were more likely 
to offer a response which contradicts those of the Soundpainter – though a 
significant relationship exists all the same. 
 
Leman and Godøy, in their recent volume analyzing music and gesture, note that: 
‘gesture can be defined as a pattern through which we structure our environment 
from the viewpoint of action... [it] is both a mental and a corporeal phenomenon.’76 
This definition bears close affinity to the somatic (in its broadest sense) philosophy of 
Soundpainting, which though dictating some material and requesting others, relies 
on performer’s own responses, own interpretations situated within their realm of 
experience and understanding. 
 
Notes 
Thanks are due to Walter Thompson for allowing me to interview him both in this 
written questionnaire and on film. The full recording and written questionnaire willb e 
made available via his website.  
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Life in Bytom: neoliberal contamination, mess and performance 
 
Tero Nauha 
Theatre Academy in Helsinki 
 
Powiedz mi, jakie masz urządzenia? Do czego ty je wykorzystujesz? 
 
A specific location for my practice-based work is a Silesian mining town, Bytom, in 
South-Poland. In past twenty years this area has been transformed from 
industrialism to neoliberal capitalism. As a one result six out of eight mines are now 
closed. Nevertheless the mining channels are still having a tremendous effect on the 
city. Even whole blockhouses are collapsing due to the fact, that these abandoned 
underground tunnels are not filled, but left as they are. Buildings and factory 
compartments are left unhabited, since there is no money or will to renovate them, 
but owners of the buildings rather wait for them to collapse, in order to build new 
constructions. Pawn shops, second hand stores and 24-hour shops with licence are 
frequent; the signs of debt and despair. The curator of Kronika Contemporary Art 
Centre in Bytom, Stanisław Ruksza calls Bytom the "Detroit” of Poland. In this 
context, what can a performance do?  
 
In this project which I have just started in Bytom I will be preparing workshops and 
collaboration with a group of people size from 5 to 15, whom are invited by Kronika. 
They are people from different backgrounds, ages and social classes living in Bytom. 
There will be four workshops before the opening of the project in the mid November 
2012. In between the workshops participants are given a notebook, with instructions 
to document their daily life in relation to machines, devices, common and groups. 
This material is treated anonymously to produce exhibition and performances. Initial 
idea is that the performance will be a solo, where the workshop material and notes 
are reflected on the work. They will substantially effect what form the performance 
and the exhibition will take.  
 
Each historical period produces certain devices in relation to labor, production and 
life. As such, these devices require certain performances from the users, as well. 
Bytom is a interesting place in this respect, since it has gone through three major 
transformations which have effected the city heavily: first it was a german/jewish 
town, then heavily industrialized soviet city surrounded by other Katowice area cities 
and recently neoliberal transformation. In my argument contamination and mess are 
exercised by neoliberal capitalism with a wide diversity of devices. Aside from these 
devices there are always dominant refrains taking place, as well. Janell Watson 
describes the idea of refrain by Félix Guattari:  
 
“refrain is a repeated semiotic element which functions as a component of 
passage among behavioural and other assemblages. The refrain can be 
verbal, melodic, or gestural, and is made familiar through repetition; it 
ritualizes and normalizes basic temporal refrains. […] The refrain can also 
mark territories […]refrain can serve as a sort of safety net for dealing with 
sudden deterritorializations. […] Like catalysts or enzymes, refrains may 
orient an interaction or behavioural assemblage without participating in it 
directly.” (Watson 2009, 79) 
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The task of my proposal is to work with dominant and minor refrains, in order to 
probe into the potentiality, which may be passive, obstructed or latent in repetition of 
everyday life. These refrains may by songs, narratives, stories, beliefs, images, 
dreams, antagonisms, affects, embodied refrains, illnesses, excitement, etc. My 
intention is to produce agency and even transformation for the participants of this 
process. 
 
Schizoanalysis  
 
Almost instantly, when talking with people in Bytom, I am faced with a kind of fog and 
confusion, a mess. In my argument a mess is a device in neoliberal, post-industrial 
capitalism. Such a mess is the question of political, without a direct solution, ideology 
or roadmap. It is a mess of collapsing buildings, infrastructures and life itself, without 
a sense of the duration. It is in the precariousness of this mess, where my endeavour 
takes place.  
 
For approaching this mess produced by transformation period in Poland and the new 
devices I am using methods of schizoanalysis and metamodelization. What is the 
potentiality, which is unseen, yet, present? What kind of refrains can be produced 
emerging from the constraining mess? Constraints and agency present themselves 
side by side in a mess. Schizoanalysis does not aim to search for ontological ’truths’ 
but on the contrary asks what kind of strategies, tactics and models are used to 
manage life in specific, temporal and social context.  
 
Schizoanalysis and metamodelization as developed by Guattari approaches not only 
the signifying semiotics (language) or symbolic (gestures, rituals, games, songs), but 
more importantly the emphasis is on the asignifying semiotics, which for Guattari is 
the realm of art, music and science. This is the affective aspect of art practices, 
towards the new,  where this particular new is conjoined with the incorporeal and 
virtual intensities. New is not articulated by symbolic or signifying, but a-signified 
semiotics. This particular new is not commercialized repetition, but rather unknown 
and thus potential. (O’Sullivan 2008) 
 
Another approach that I am using in the process in Bytom, is to use Guattari’s four 
domains of unconsciousness. 1) The existential territory of subjectivity is not the 
Real, but a realm of dominant and minor refrains: “life as it seems”. 2) Second 
quadrate is the realm of material fluxes and intensities, of play, joy, sadness and 
semiotics. Both of these realms are reterritorializing. Last two have a 
deterritorializing nature. 3) The third is a phylum of abstract machines, blueprints, 
plans, rules and regulations. 4) The last and fourth is the realm of incorporeal 
universes, virtual content, unformed matter and the realm of a-signified potentiality. 
As such, the question of non-discursive matter is essential, aside from the discursive 
signification. Artistic processes, which deal with semiotic signification, deal with 
power and language, but for Guattari this cannot produce anything but more 
signification. It ought to use both the symbolic and the a-signified aside from the 
signification, in order to produce transformation. 
 
In my particular case, schizoanalysis explores the particular mess of neoliberal 
 151	  
	  
capitalism in Poland. Life is not restored in this process, but it nevertheless produces 
“more mutations, more lines of flight, and more alternative temporalities” as Simon 
O’Sullivan describes schizoanalysis in his article “Academy: ’The Production of 
Subjectivity’”. (O’Sullivan 2007, 5) 
 
This particular affective production in the “Life in Bytom” project gives support and 
produces unknown encounters. It is not a recombination of discourses, but a 
production of new, i.e. support for minor refrains of subjectivities and probing of the 
potential. (O’Sullivan 2007, 5)  
 
On the contrary to “major” politics, my practice proposes a production of minor 
refrains of the political. If neoliberal capitalism functions on the level of signification 
and representation, yet probing the potential of a-signified, then artistic practice of a 
type of schizoanalysis functions on the affective and virtual level, transforming the 
existential territory.  
 
Schizoanalysis, contamination and mess of capitalism 
 
Contamination or contagion are terms, which are already used by Freud (1921) and 
Gustave Le Bon (1895) to describe the affective nature of a mass or multitude. 
Contamination is easy to detect, but not easy to explain, and being affective and 
following my argument, it is a-signified matter. Contamination is considered negative 
or corrupting process, which transforms the subjectivity, without necessarily 
changing the attributes. As such it is not colonization, repression or suppression. 
Contagious affect is sticky and a-signified. It produces transformation and events, 
without being cognized. However, a-signified contamination takes it’s form in 
symbolic and signified, for instance in narratives from Bytom. It is not so, that 
pawnshops or 24-hour stores are a direct indicator of collapsing social environment, 
but how these are interpreted as contaminating or signs of decay. Contamination as 
such is a desire. However, I must have caution for interpreting or “understanding” 
narratives as coherent systems or produce the end-result of an exhibition as a 
representation of a problem.  
 
In neoliberal capitalism affective relationships are produced between subjectivities, 
devices and machines. Contaminative as such, they are a-signified refrains, which 
function on the existential territory, for instance producing a desire for nostalgia, 
order, change, utopia, etc. Such economic device as neo-liberalism builds dominant 
and affective refrains to produce, maintain and regulate. (O’Sullivan 2008, 91-96) On 
the signifying level, it is presented as pragmatic, sensible and effective, but on the 
affective a-signified side, these refrains produce a mess. The result is confusion and 
inability to approach other potentials, the minor refrains in the ’existential’ realm. 
What seems to be in equilibrium or homeostasis in the dominant refrain, may only 
seem so. Neoliberal capitalism in Bytom and elsewhere presents life as a complex, 
but organized and regulated system, whereas proposed schizoanalytic approach is 
far from equilibrium. Dominant refrain is presented as controlled homeostasis, 
whereas minor refrains are deterritorializing to the potential new. 
 
Signs of depression or disinterestedness may be only part of homeostasis, because 
of the way they are presented or signified, as indicators in a closed system. This 
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representation of controlled system is one intention of my practice, but only to move 
from the dominant to the singular, minor refrains of the open and more precarious 
systems. Minor refrains lie beyond a map, thus it will be a question how to approach 
this matter, in order it to keep its a-signified nature in the process? 
 
In the neoliberal control society a liminal is the norm, where a potential seems 
impossibility. It is what partially produces the confusion, which was clearly articulated 
in my meetings in Bytom, as well: a sense of undisclosed continuity of economic, 
social and environmental transformations. Undisclosed continuity of a liminal is the 
existential territory in neo-liberalism. As such this “pseudo-liminality” is the realm for 
artistic practices.  
 
In this mess, I find a practice based research of performance a device to produce 
probing into the potentiality and production of new. Such a device is not only 
functioning in the signifying realm, but is in contact with the matter of a-signified. 
Needles to say, that such a probing has problems in the discursive signification. As 
such, it is a blind war-machine or black hole, which may function as disempowering, 
inhibited and destructive or induce creativity, emerging potentiality or catalysing. 
(Watson 2009, 94-96)  
 
My intention is to map out the real, signified, symbolic and a-signified territory of a 
life in Bytom. My probing with this affective matter in collaboration intents to consider 
signifying, symbolic and a-signifying levels. 
 
Artistic practice is “a particle accelerator capable of producing and actualizing new 
energized particles which had previously only been theorized.” (Watson 2009, 96) 
These particles Guattari is finding in the writing process of Proust. Yet, it leaves my 
particular approach still partially incapable of approaching a life in Bytom. I would 
say, that in a performance practice different abstract machines are at work, than in 
writing. Site-specific performance practice has particular possibilities of catalyzing 
affects, which have a link with the intensity of the Real in a different way than writing, 
but often lacking a signification. What combines both, to my understanding, is the 
concept of refrain. 
 
In my particular case in “Life in Bytom” project, the a-signified level of matter aims to 
function not only in the embodied realm, but trying to locate other minor refrains. The 
assumption is, that such probing is able to produce agency, nevertheless, that these 
refrains do not take representative or signified forms.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The artistic practice of schizoanalysis is a type, which does not produce clearing 
(aletheia). It dwells on the mess, probing the potentiality and producing leaking 
deterritorializations. In Bytom, it appears not as a tool of producing truth, but as a 
sensibility to minor refrains within a mess of dominant ones, and producing a 
’expressive support’ for such refrains, and their relation with fluxes, rules, and 
unformed potentialities. Such an a-structural logic is the logic of a mess and affective 
contamination, as well. As such both mess and the artistic articulations are material 
and real; they both produce refrains and contagions. For me this is a fundamental 
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issue in artistic production, since the matter of the real is never fully signified in 
language, but it nevertheless does not escape into meaninglessness, being a-
signified matter. It is only that the representative apparatus is not able to approach 
this matter, yet in my argument artistic practices can, since they are not only 
representative or symbolic. 
 
However, the process of probing must not take place only aiming towards the a-
signified matter, but towards symbolic games, gestures, grunts and representative 
signification of language, as well — to produce new refrains instead of representative 
recombinations. In my argument, these realms are coexistent, where artistic practice 
is a tool for the probing and production of mutation, as O´Sullivan puts it. All refrains 
of signification, symbolic and a-signification work alongside each other. (Watson, 
2009, 75) The process in Bytom aims to articulate something ’new’ and potential, 
and produce agency among participants and people living in Bytom. In this way, it is 
the micropolitical task resisting the present hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. 
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The state of images 
 
Theron Schmidt 
King’s College London 
 
Note: This text is written to be performed on an otherwise empty stage.  A 
soundtrack accompanies the reading of the text as indicated.  Part 1 is delivered 
from far downstage.  Part 2 is delivered from far upstage.  Part 3 is delivered from 
the centre of the stage. 
 
1. 
 
Let us start at the beginning, if it is still possible to imagine such a thing. 
 
A man comes before us.  He is one of us, an ordinary man, but in this act he is unlike 
us, because, this time around, he is speaking and we are listening. 
 
He has a job.   
 
He may claim to have another job.  He may claim to be a watchman.A shepherd.  A 
yeoman. A farmer.  He may spread his hands before you to show you that they have 
laboured.  He may show you his brow, how it has grown furrowed with his cares.  He 
may claim to wish he was somewhere else, in another time, in the company of some 
others for whom he cares more, a job he would rather be doing. 
 
But this is not his job.  His job is to make something appear.  His job is to make 
something appear which will not appear before you, but which you will swear you will 
have seen.  You will swear you have seen it because it made you tremble, or look 
down at your hands, or hold your breath, and sometime later you will still feel some 
echo of that trembling. 
 
But for now, we are waiting.  Somewhere beyond this room, something is beginning.  
A small spark in dry wood; the smell of petrol in the air; a murmured rumour on the 
spring breeze.  Or maybe something is ending.  A city wall collapses; a tyrant 
concedes his throne; an ocean runs through the streets.   
 
But not here.  Smell the air; it hasn’t changed.   
 
Listen for a moment. 
 
[…]  
 
Nothing but the sound of the room, buzzing. 
 
[music: Unwound, ‘We Invent You’] 
 
We are all antennae.  We are all at attention.  We quiver in anticipation. 
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We are safe, here.  We are comfortable.  We are not afraid to be this close to each 
other.  And somewhere out there, a line of sight is joined together.  A signal passes 
from hilltop to hilltop.  We wait for it to reach us here. 
 
The real world, just in the room next door.  Just outside the building.  Just in another 
country.  Just in another place whose revolutionary moment is slipping by between 
its fingers, or is yet to come, on the tip of the tongue.  This space is saturated with 
the past, permeated by stray thoughts, radio waves, lines of power, invisible 
transactions from the outside. 
 
How can we make it so that it can be seen, here, where we are? What form will it 
take in this closed-off world?  The house itself, could it take voice, might speak aloud 
and plain.  I open my mouth so that you can see. 
 
I draw a world in the dust, and figures spring forth fully armed from the soil.  I draw 
blood, gently, with my tongue: a lazy alexandrine that takes its time, slowly building a 
metaphor until it can walk all on its own.  A soldier returns from war.  A brother and 
sister recognise each other by their description.  Justice takes shape, is given a 
rhythm, a metre, a sensibility.  You know that story.  This is a scene you recognise. 
 
I speak to those who understand.  This is a fire which started before we were born, 
and our bodies are the fuel. 
 
2. 
 
[music: James Blackshaw, ‘Running to the Ghost’. Crossfade with sound of buzzing 
at end of text] 
 
A large, attractively furnished drawing room, decorated in dark colours.  In the back, 
a wide doorway with curtains drawn back.  The doorway opens into a smaller room 
in the same style as the drawing room.  In the right-hand wall of the front room, a 
folding door that leads to the hall.  In the opposite wall, a glass door, with curtains 
similarly drawn back.  Through the panes can be seen part of an overhanging 
veranda and trees in autumn colours.  In the foreground is an oval table with 
tablecloth and chairs around it.  […] 
 
Morning light.  The sun shines in through the glass door. 
 
Where does the light come from?  What is it that illuminates this scene? 
 
It has no depth. It is only surface; description; words hanging between us; dots of 
colour on a screen; scratchings on a temporary canvas; the self-vanishing, luminous 
trace of [a] firework.   
 
By the wall on the right, a wide, dark porcelain stove, a high-backed armchair, a 
cushioned footstool, and two taborets. In the right-hand corner, a settee with a small 
round table in front.  Nearer, on the left and slightly out from the wall, a piano.  On 
either side of the doorway in back, étagères with terra-cotta and majolica ornaments.  
Against the back wall of the inner room, a sofa, a table, and one or two chairs.   
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What can you see?  What is it that lets you see? 
 
Here, a dressing table, a hairbrush, a single golden strand of hair caught in the 
morning light.  Further away, something shadowy, the quality of its presence such 
that it is there but it cannot be seen clearly – maybe a chair, or a coatstand, or a 
dressing gown.   
 
What are these shadows?  Where is the obstruction that keeps you from seeing 
clearly?  What shape does your imagination give to darkness? 
 
Over the sofa hangs a portrait of a handsome elderly man in a general's uniform.  
Over the table, a hanging lamp with an opalescent glass shade.  A number of 
bouquets of flowers are arranged about the drawing room in vases and glasses.  
Others lie on the tables.  The floors in both rooms are covered with thick carpets.   
 
The image makes seen that which is visible but not present, and also that which is 
invisible but present.  The room is empty, but no human bodies need to present 
themselves for it to be alive.  This hat is alive.  This bouquet.  This opalescent glass 
shade.  This table.  This chair is alive.  This floor.  This drawing room.   
 
Can you see it?   
 
This dust in the morning light.  This thought that has just eluded you.  This memory.  
This buzzing in your ear.   
 
3. 
 
[music:  Tom Petty & The Heartbreakers, ‘American Girl’, first few seconds looped 
endlessly] 
 
In the background, an early spring day.  An empty field, sloping downhill toward a 
pond.  Insects in the tall grass.  The pond catches the sunlight and glimmers in the 
distance. 
 
In the middle of the image, a dark shadow looms.  Something passes between the 
earth and the sun.  A storm is gathering. 
 
In the foreground, a man falls toward the earth, his arm outstretched, hurtling 
backward into his own shadow, his rifle as black as night. 
 
In the background, this photo is framed on a wall, pixelated and grainy, black and 
white in a room full of colour.  Fluorescent light washes away the detail. 
 
In the middle of the image, a crowd is gathered.  They are different heights and 
wearing different coloured clothing; some moving past, and others lingering to look 
more closely.  They can be seen behind full-height glass windows that face out onto 
the street. 
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In the foreground, a discarded pile of clothing, heaped against the side of the 
building.  A torn coat, a crumpled hat, a scattering of shredded newspaper.  It is 
beginning to rain.  A stray dog pauses to sniff the clothes. 
 
In the background, waters, rolling from their mountain springs/ With a sweet inland 
murmur.  Lofty cliffs, bounded valleys, steep woods: a vision of never-ending sky. 
 
In the middle of the image, a middle-aged man, married, white, able to walk less far 
than he used to, looking back on his life. 
 
In the foreground, a bluebottle, carrying the pollen of a goldenrod as it darts between 
the hazels. 
 
In the background, a dark smear that might be the buzzing of flies, or the swarming 
of carrion birds, streaked low over the treeline.  Or maybe it is just a smear on the 
photographic plate. 
 
In the middle of the image, a dirt track running off into the distance.  Two parallel 
lines have been worn down by the wheels of carts.  Parallel to the track is a rough 
wooden fence, built to keep in the livestock, or to keep them out.  I’ve driven down a 
road like this.  The southern heat was just fading into the evening, and I had the 
windows down.  I was listening to music.  I wanted the road to go on forever. 
 
In the foreground, amongst the piled bodies, is one without a foot, blown clear off by 
the ordnance. 
 
In the background, a flag waves against the sunset, the sky streaked with colour, 
and an amber wave of grain. 
 
In the middle of the image, an eagle, swooping.  It is Photoshopped here from some 
other image in which it is landing or carrying a fish; here, it appears to be in mid-air, 
majestic with its outstretched wings almost blocking out the sun. 
 
In the foreground are the words blazoned across the screen: LIVE FREE OR DIE. 
 
In the background, a line of tin-roofed buildings.  An intersection.  A blue car with its 
bonnet open.  Men dressed in orange robes. 
 
In the middle of the image, an act of sacrifice. 
 
In the foreground, a petrol can, white, plastic, ordinary. 
 
In the background, the Jockey Boy Restaurant sign furnished by Coca-Cola.  The 
door to the café opens onto the intersection, and the shades are pulled up.  It’s cool 
and dark inside compared with the heat outside. 
 
In the middle of the image, a man in a felt hat turns around to look over his shoulder. 
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In the foreground, a police dog leaps against its lead, snapping, snarling. It is 
chewing its way into history. 
 
[music fading up over loop: Rock Plaza Central, ‘My Children, Be Joyful’] 
 
Let us start at the beginning, if it is still possible to imagine such a thing. 
 
Who not will else let slip, a fist raised afore a fire?  A dim shape, an in-between light, 
a tongue too heavy to lift.   
 
In the foreground, a threshold, where we teeter on the verge of the visible and the 
invisible.   In the background, open space on the south and west, where the contour 
of the ground is far from level, and goose and bramble bushes flourishinstead of tall 
trees planted with regular precision. 
 
A heave of bodies, urgent, fragile, pressed together flesh against flesh until they can 
fit on a single page.  A flashbulb memory trinket, flashcards for sleepless nights.  In 
other algorithms the pixels are quantized step-wise with error correction after each 
step. 
 
In the background, a field hospital.  A site of field work.  An application of field theory.  
The limits of a field of vision.  In the middle of the image, an open field.  An open fire.  
A home fire.  Homeland.  Heartland.  Grassland. 
 
In the foreground, a dog sleeps.  The sun passes over it.  A fly lands on its ear.  A 
still life.  A still birth.  A birthday.  A daybreak. A daytrip.  A road trip.  A roadwork.  A 
firework. 
 
A graph that shows the hidden numbers.  In the background, a key to the icons.  A 
map of the stars and their secret meanings.  A call sign.  A birdcall.  A bird dog.  The 
dogstar.  A starfield.  An open field. An open fire.  A house fire. 
 
The house itself, could it take voice, might speak aloud and plain. 
 
In the foreground, Mrs S. E. Hammer, advocate of electrical labour-saving devices in 
the home, and first woman to become chairman of a municipal electricity committee. 
 
Housework.  A clean house.  A clean break.  The day break.  A field day.  An open 
field.  An open fire.  A grass fire.  The grass land.  Heartland.  Homeland. 
 
I speak to those who understand, but if they fail, I have forgotten everything. 
 
A clear view.  A lake view.  A lake house.  Farm house.  Field house.  Fight house.  
Fire house.  Firelight.  Moonlight.  Pilot light.  House light.  House fire. House call.  
Bird call. 
 
Morning light.  The sun shines in through the glass door. 
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Thinking through salt, thinking through bark, thinking through cables 
 
Rajni Shah 
Birkbeck College 
 
Note: This text was written to be included in delegate packs as Rajni could not 
be present at the symposium 
 
"I was attempting to make a bird alighting on a field. And it may have 
been bound up in some way to the three forms that had gone before, 
but suddenly the lines that I'd drawn suggested something totally 
different, and out of this suggestion arose this picture. I had no 
intention to do this picture; I never thought of it in that way. It was like 
one continuous accident mounting on top of another." Francis Bacon 
 
I have sometimes pretended that my artistic career is built on solid foundations: 
foundations of talent, or experience, or intuition. But now I’m thinking of it more as 
one long series of continuous accidents mounting on top of one another. That’s 
much more like it.  
 
Randomness and Laziness 
 
Mr Quiver (2004-8) 
 
What actually happened is that I mis-heard someone say the name of the film Mystic 
River.  
 
It’s incredibly revealing to me that I’ve never told anyone this before. Somewhere in 
me, I was so ashamed of the randomness of this act of naming that I dared not utter 
a word to anyone for almost ten years. Because of a fear, I suppose, that the truly 
shambolic nature of my creative decision-making process would be unveiled. 
Because people often asked me about Mr Quiver: who he was, what that title meant, 
how it related to issues of sexuality and cultural heritage that were raised in the 
performance. And in the backwards way that I work, I slowly found answers to these 
questions.  
 
In fact, the further away I was from the performance, the more I seemed to know 
about it. And it sometimes felt like I was living a lie - because I hadn't already known 
what I wanted to tell the audience before they came into the room. It seemed so 
unprofessional that it was only in hindsight having stumbled through the process of 
making and touring that I could say: well, actually, a year after the last show, I think I 
know what that performance was about.77 
 
And it is, I think, somewhat unusual to work in this way. But I now understand that 
starting from a place of not knowing, a place of making seemingly random decisions, 
a place of glimpses rather than full vision, is a key part of my process.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 If you’d like to see the first attempt at this, you might read “On the making of Mr Quiver” in Graham 
Ley and Sarah Dadwell, eds.  British South Asian Theatre: Critical Essays. Exeter: University of 
Exeter Press, 2012. 
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You do not conduct proper research before making a show. 
 
The research is in the presentation, in the desire paths that are 
formed when we inhabit this space together. The research is in 
how you enter the space, in how our concentrations ebb and 
flow, and in how we say goodbye. 
 
To forge a space of not knowing within the machine of the cultural industries is to 
create a space for genuine learning - not a learning that comes from a place of 
knowing, but a learning that comes from a place of not knowing and uncertainty. I 
believe that theatre can do this for us - that within its very solid walls and its very 
solid class structures and etiquettes, we can find room for a new kind of learning 
which arises from being with each other.  
 
Show Statistics One 
 
Title: Mr Quiver 
Duration: 4 hours 
Songs: God Save the Queen + 18-track CD x 2, sometimes played simultaneously 
Performers: Lucille Acevedo-Jones (costume), Cis O’Boyle (lighting), Rajni Shah 
(director) 
Audience: Free to come and go as they please and to sit, stand, lie around or within 
the performance space as they wish 
Stuff: towels, cushions (for audience), tapers, tea light candles, lightbulbs, ribbons, 
guest book, dustpan and brush x 2, sweeping brush x 2, bride costume – double veil, 
top, skirt, bun, jewel, nose ring, wig, Elizabeth costume – skirt, underskirt, bodice, 
wig, train, make up: white, lips, eyeliner, powder, hair mousse, baby wipes, bowl, 
squirty thing, CD x 2, hairbrush (for wig), hair clips, pulleys, Rajni’s clothes, grey 
pants, scissors, fishing wire, gaffa tape, list of tracks for audience to choose from, 
clock, sticks for skirts, water to drink, salt to pour, mic plus stand and long lead, 2 x 
CD players 
Structure: Three performative loops, of light, costume and ‘performance’ weave in 
and out of synchronisation over the four hours. The space is layered and 
increasingly cluttered, and the performances are improvised within an overall 
structure. 
Ending: During the final hour, all props and lights are packed into three suitcases, 
and all three performers leave the performance space. The audience who are 
present at the end are left in a dim room, looking at a textured salt map of England 
which covers the floor. Tea lights represent cities on this map. The soundtrack that is 
playing is of an interview that has been played many times before in various versions 
earlier in the performance. 
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The last time we performed Mr Quiver we knew exactly what we were doing. The 
get-in was tight, the show was tight. We were a well-oiled machine. And that was 
exactly when it was time to stop. A division would have occurred past this point - we 
would have been serving you something. And this is how we knew it was time to put 
that show to bed. 
 
2. Salt, bark, cables, bodies: how many voices are here tonight? 
 
Dinner with America (2006-9) 
 
In this show I begin dressed as a busty, blue-eyed blonde, centre-stage, wearing 
pseudo-glamorous attention-seeking clothes that are slowly shed in layers. I work 
hard: I sing, I strip, I show you my body and I look straight into your eyes and 
sometimes I cry at you. You, the audience, walk or sit or stand around me over the 
2.5 hours of our time together. 
 
But this central performance is an excuse for something else.  
 
This central performance allows you to be in the room, looking one way, while the 
space slowly folds in around you. You, me, the audience, the performers, whoever 
we are, we all bring our own trajectories into this space. And they need somewhere 
to meet. The central performance, this uncertain landmark, allows the peripheries to 
be present.  
 
What really counts, I believe, are the peripheries.  
 
What really counts is what is being folded in: your body, the show’s mulch and film 
and fluorescents, and all those other bodies that are also in the room.  
 
Each piece in the trilogy contains ‘stuff’. And the stuff allows the audience to drift in 
and out of their own chosen narrative. In Mr Quiver and Dinner with America the 
objects and the costumes allude to places outside the theatre: maps are drawn in 
salt around Queen Elizabeth I and an Indian Bride in Mr Quiver; dark mulch, red, 
white and blue fluorescents, and the flickering of a film encroach upon the central 
figure in Dinner with America.  
 
In each of these cases, over the duration of the performance, those objects become 
more and less present - they are allowed to seep into our imaginations and then out 
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again repeatedly. They inhabit a world of signs and they return to the theatrical 
space, pointing absurdly at the walls. They allow us to leave the theatre for a while 
and then stubbornly remind us that they and we exist within its boundaries: the 
workers are switched on, the salt is swept up in cheap dustpans, the linkable 
fluorescent lights fail to turn on and need some technical adjustments. This is all part 
of the show. The story we are telling is the story of how we fictionalise together. And 
the stuff demonstrates this beautifully. 
 
Every performance project has two languages. Firstly, there is the language that is 
used to convey its narrative to the world outside the performance - the language that 
bridges audience, funders and other interested parties into the space and enables 
the project to be in the world. Secondly, there is the glimpsing, half-focused, internal 
language of its own enquiry.  
 
This project has described itself as ‘a trilogy of performances questioning cultural 
identity’. In Mr Quiver this manifested itself as an enquiry into notions of the female 
body and British-ness; and in Dinner with America the word “America” became a 
kind of prism for dialogue around ideas of ownership and voice.  
 
But whilst these issues have felt like valid starting points, I’d argue that the more 
important work is in the theatrical encounter that has taken place within the 
framework of these questions. In both of these pieces, this encounter both 
underlines and overbears the fiction that has been set up. So that the narrative that 
brought an audience into the space topples over into that other narrative of what it 
means to be in the room. And that narrative of being in the room in turn adds 
something new to the questions that an audience brought in.  
 
The ebb and the flow. 
 
Show Statistics Two 
 
Title: Dinner with America 
Duration: 2.5 hours 
Songs: Amazing Grace (first verse, repeatedly, live) + You Need A Magician in Your 
Life by The Mountain Goats (once, recorded) 
Performers: Lucille Acevedo-Jones (costume), Lucy Cash (film), Rajni Shah 
(director) 
Audience: Invited to be there for the start of the show, and to stay till the end, but 
free to walk around the performance space and come and go during the 
performance 
Stuff: 2 x Squeegees, 9 x extension cables, 26 power cables, 14 connector 
cables, 34 x linkable fluorescent lights, 22 x red white and blue gel sleeves, gobo, 
fabric doilies, shiny white fabric for table, sequinned costume + pants + white shiny 
pants, fake boobs, Lucy costume + shoes, Lucille costume + shoes, white belt and 
gloves, white dress plus tent, wig, boots, Rajni dress and shirt for feast, 2 x small 
black shovels, 2 x DVDs of light/film, 2 x DVDs of soundtrack front and back, 3 x 
large round silver trays, tape player, 1 x tape of Mountain Goats song, US flag 
sweets, Mountain Goats CD for feast, 3 x tagging guns, 3 x bags of red, white, blue 
tags, nutcrackers, white clock, brush for wig, paint brushes for get-out, baby wipes, 
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small mirror, cotton buds, adhesive and latex for face mask, silver eye shadow, 
mascara, eyelash glue, diamante eyelashes, blue contact lenses, contact lens 
solution, baby powder, baby oil, mask remover, face powder , liquid eyeliner, make 
up brush and eye brush, lip gloss, sponge for make up, foundation, hairspray, 
conversation starters in tiny envelopes, blackout machine, comments book, 9 bags 
large bark chippings, vegan fairtrade chocolate, fairtrade fresh dates, amaretti 
biscuits, seasonal fresh fruit, one bunch flowers, organic walnuts 
 
 
 
Structure: The following lines of development take place in parallel during the first 2 
hours of the show: Rajni sings until her voice wears thin, standing in one spot; Lucy 
and Lucille shift the mulch from a maze that covers the performance space into 
smaller and smaller versions of landscape; the fluorescent tubes move from shades 
of red and blue to white; Rajni strips layers of Hollywood-inspired costume until she 
reaches her own naked body; the film seeps from plain colours to moving black and 
white images; the soundtrack of U.S. citizens speaking becomes more dense. The 
only line of development that is improvised is that of the audience. 
Ending: Naked, Rajni steps out of her image for the first time. The red, white and 
blue lights that have been shining on her turn into a black and white film showing 
images of all three performers against classic ‘American’ backdrops, performing 
actions from the show we have just seen. All the objects from the show are gathered 
in one place: the fluorescent lights are covered in mulch as the film plays on top of 
them. The audience is gathered around. Finally, Lucille, Lucy and Rajni bring out 
large platters of food and conversation starters that they invite the audience to share. 
We all consume this ending. 
 
3. Can we agree to pass time differently? 
 
Over the past eight years, I’ve been making a trilogy: Mr Quiver, Dinner with 
America, Glorious. Each piece has lived for around three years and then been put to 
bed. Next year, we’ll lay the final one down.  
 
The first two pieces were installation-based. Glorious is being presented in theatres 
with seats and orchestra pits and curtains. This changes the dynamic between 
audience and performers in so many ways. And yet, at the same time, I feel that 
many of the questions are the same. The set up changes, but each time we are a 
group of individuals shuffling around a shifting series of theatrical landmarks.  
 
These landmarks mean something to us, we hold that meaning, and that meaning 
changes over time.  
 
We hold the passing time between us. 
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So as I leave you I’m thinking about time passing, and how time passes, and why a 
fairly impatient person like me makes shows that are long and slow and which critics 
sometimes struggle with (“the endless repetitions”, “it's a long time coming”).  
 
And I’m thinking about how twice recently, once in relation to my own work and once 
in relation to another slow piece of work, I’ve heard audience members say 
“Watching that show felt like spending time at a spa.”  
 
And I wonder whether, when watching certain types of shows, as if we were taking 
ourselves to the spa, we maybe allow some kind of internal sense hierarchy to relax. 
And with our eyes a little out of focus, we can see the details better. And with our 
minds a little less narrative-driven, we can inhabit a wider landscape.  
 
Maybe the peripheries enable time to pass differently. 
 
Show Statistics Three 
 
Title: Glorious 
Duration: 2 hours 
Songs, Performers, Audience, Stuff: still to be counted 
Structure: still to be summarised 
Ending:  
 
4. How we say goodbye 
 
Hello. I'm Rajni. I've not done this before, exactly. So, some of 
you will be pleased about this, and some of you won't, but I'm 
going to sing. It's a musical. There are some incredible 
performers, you'll meet them soon. They'll carry the show. But 
us, you, me, we have to hold it together. We have to create this 
space together. It's like laying the table for dinner. Here we are. 
I'm unfolding the tablecloth, laying out the plates, the knives, the 
forks, the glasses etc. We'll be here together for the evening. 
Thanks for coming.78 
 
From the moment we walk into the theatre, we know we will have to say goodbye. 
The knowledge and denial of this fact haunts every live performance. Applause is 
one way of severing the connection. But I’m really interested in what other options 
there are.  
 
What might it mean to leave a theatre without complete closure? To return to our 
other lives more slowly and carefully. To carry something from the theatrical event as 
a rupture back into the rest of the world.  
 
And what are the responsibilities of a theatre-maker in leaving an audience this way?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 As yet unused opening speech for Glorious 
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After the very last performance of Mr Quiver in Exeter, we offered the audience the 
cushions that some of them had been sitting on during the performance. These 
cushions had golden tassels at each corner. We had bought them very cheaply in a 
small shop in Glasgow. Some years later, Simon Persighetti told me a story about 
his cushion. He said that he had used it outside in his garden and some of the 
tassels had fallen off during this time. And later he had noticed that a bird had taken 
the tassels and used them for nest-building. This bird now had a very luxurious-
looking nest. 
 
 
© 2012, Rajni Shah 
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Where Performance Thinks:  A Response 
 
Stephen Bottoms 
University of Leeds 
 
An instant contribution for the final plenary of How Performance Thinks, April 2012. 
 
I’ve been avoiding reading papers at conferences since 2001.”Thus spake Elena 
Cologni, during her non-paper this very morning.but I am not so brave as she.  I’m 
reading this response from the screen, in a bid to sidestep those awkwardnesses, 
stumbles, and slips of intention to which Joe Kelleher referred yesterday, so 
beautifully.  
 
And I’m writing it to the screen during my lunch hour, sequestered in Kings Cross 
Station eating a wrap and drinking lemonade. So my apologies in advance that I am 
not responding to anyone speaking this afternoon.Because their papers have not 
happened yet. 
 
Mmm. This wrap is kind of tasteless.  
 
I would like to title this tenminutes of talking, “Where Performance Thinks”.  Because 
while Nik Wakefield may well be right that “How Performance Thinks” is durationally 
(thought being a temporal process), WHERE the thinking occurs is just as important. 
 
1. Thinking in Relation 
 
Performance, and indeed thinking, are relational procedures. One thing is juxtaposed 
with another, or placed in proximity with another, in order to compel or propel 
thought. Is that dialectic? Is it becoming? 
 
I’m thinking now of Broderick Chow and his colleague Tom Wells. A wrestler on his 
own is not a wrestler. He needs another wrestler to wrestle with. In wrestling with 
each other they do not only ‘take care’ of each other. Through their ‘work’ they 
become each other -- an assemblage of limbs, with more than one face, and more 
than one heel.  
 
I’m thinking now of Bertolt Brecht and Walter Benjamin, in Freddie Rokem’s plenary. 
Of the Arcades Project and the Messingkauf Dialogues as relational texts, 
determined through their authors’ relationality in mutual exile. 
 
I’m thinking now of the father and the son in the Castellucci performance described 
by Joe.  Relations in relation.A father and son defined purely in their relationality to 
each other – and by the utter dependence of one, the father, on the other, the son – 
an old-age reversal of parental responsibility.  If the father is dependent on the son, 
then one would think that placed the son in a position of power. But the son is, like 
Endgame’s Clov, imprisoned by responsibility to his father. He can only make a 
response. As his father shits all over the stage. 
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Interesting that Joe read the scene primarily in terms of the father’s position – so that 
the deliberate pouring of liquid stage-shit from a plastic bottle reads to him as an 
image of shame and self-immolation. I remember reading it, from the son’s position, 
as an act of aggressive hostility. “Yes, I will continue to shit all over the shop, and 
you must clear it up, because you are responsibility.” I meant to type responsible 
then, but the wrong word occurred. I’ll leave it, and say it again: “you are 
responsibility.” 
 
For me, the desecration of the image of Christ at the end of the performance – the 
desecration of an image of unspeakable gentleness – was an image of the son’s 
desire to desecrate the self-sacrifice that Christ represents. I have given and given 
and given and given and given. I can give no more. There is a limit to humility, and 
this is it. You are not my shepherd.  
 
2. Thinking in London 
 
Here I am in Kings Cross station. I came here because I couldn’t think in the Lincoln 
Lounge.79 Yesterday I sat there listening to a group of patrons – all male but one – 
conducting an extended disquisition on the precise connotations of the term 
“pussywhipped.”  
 
What can that conjunction of words possibly mean?  
 
To fall between two chairs. 
To stand on an angle.80 
 
On Thursday afternoon, after arriving in London prior to this conference, I stood at 
various angles in Tate Britain. I was listening to the new downloadable audio 
performance by the activist art collective PLATFORM. Platform and their colleagues 
at Liberate Tate and Art Not Oil are engaged in an ongoing campaign to get Tate 
Galleries to stop taking money from BP. As part of this campaign, we now have a 
guerrilla tour – an audio installation that Tate cannot remove unless it bans us from 
walking in with headphones.  
 
The Tate Britain leg of Tate à Tate takes me first to a cubicle of the downstairs 
toilets, to lock myself in. The Gallery, I am informed, is built on the site of Millbank 
Penitentiary – the first large scale prison ever built in the UK, and the only one ever 
to be explicitly modelled on Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon.  The performative 
proposition now, however, is that I am in the Panaudicon. As I am guided round the 
gallery,  I am asked to position my body in particular directions – sit on particular 
seats and look at particular pictures.  If I look through this or that painting, and keep 
looking for x-hundred or thousand miles, I will see the despoliated oil fields of the 
Caspian Sea, or the site of the Deepwater Horizon spill, or the capital of the now-
obsolescent whale oil trade.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 The Lincoln Lounge is the café-bar next to the symposium venue, where participants went for 
coffee breaks. It was simultaneously being used by other members of the general public. 
80 These lines refer to phrases queried and literalised in performance by Every House Has a Door, 
during the work-in-progress presentation that formed part of the symposium. 
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It’s a perfect example of what TeroNauha was referring to when he discussed site-
specific performance and its potential to de- and re-territorialize space. 
Or:It’s a perfect example of what Freddie Rokem was talking about this morning. A 
dialectic between history and philosophy, or in this case between art and geography: 
as I look at this gorgeous Turner landscape, I can hear the mechanical scream as oil 
is scraped and dredged from the Canadian tar sands.  
 
“The main thing is to learn to think crudely.”  
 
Thankyou Freddie. Crude thinking .Crude oil thinking. The gangsters have become 
the bankers.  Get BP out of Tate. Crumpesdenken is produced by a dialectic which is 
its own antithesis. A thought must be crude to find its way into action.  
 
This week I came up with the final edit on an interview article I’ve been preparing for 
Performance Research. An interview with Platform’s James Marriott, discussing 
another walking performance last year – that led its audience around the City of 
London and across the Millennium Bridge to Tate Modern, while telling us the tale of 
the banks and corporations that had helped BP survive after the calamity of 
Deepwater Horizon: 
 
JAMES: Somebody, maybe it was you, said, “Gosh, there’s a lot of art in  
the City.” 
STEVE: Yeah, that was my blog.  I was struck by all the corporate art in 
office buildings, the public art in walkways and squares, and 
then of course you led us across the river to the Tate.  
JAMES: And I find that thought very helpful, actually – to look at that 
space, literally the urban space from the RBS building to the 
Tate, as one zone, one space, with art spread throughout it. 
Because the danger might be that we just work within the bit 
that’s called the art bit – around the Tate – and say, “Right, 
we’re going to try to change things in here.” And then very soon 
you’re inside an echo chamber – you’re in this insulated space 
where the only thing you can do is play with the rules of the 
game that apply in that zone. Which means basically that you’re 
involved in the politics of the history of art.  Do you see what I 
mean? 
STEVE: Oh God, yeah. Ever-decreasing circles of self-referentiality. 
JAMES: I mean, that’s interesting. But for me it’s as interesting as 
rebelling against the rules within pigeon fancying or dentistry.  
Someone’s got to do it.  And I’m sure there are some very 
rebellious pigeon fanciers. I just don’t see that as part of the 
work that I need to spend my time on.  
 
3. Thinking in the theatre 
 
And now I’m sitting here at Kings Cross wondering about those echo chambers 
James mentioned. Where Performance Thinks.The galleries, the studios, the theatre 
spaces.Performance as, in JosefineWikstrom’s words, “the privileged site for 
experimentation between disciplines.” If the thinking doesn’t stretch beyond – or look 
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through – the walls of these spaces, these disciplines, then are we merely the 
privileged? Narcissistically playing around with “a never-ending enigma machine” – 
as Helmar Schramm put it? Or: have we beendisciplined? Are we just the machine’s 
cogs? And are we pushing off stage, into that dark no-place that Shimon Levy 
described, many of the things that really matter in this world? 
 
Is this beginning to sound like a Brechtianlehrstuck?81 I need a band: here come the 
drums here come the drums.  
 
Because while I agree with myself about all this, I am also in disagreement. Thought 
needs to be crude to find its way into action, but perhaps my skill set and my 
instincts orient me towards that interminable pedagogic relation to which Joe 
referred. Infinite thought. Perhaps I am not inclined toward the infinite self-sacrifice 
that Christ and Brecht require of me, for the greater good. 
 
Where is humility’s ethical limit? 
 
Perhaps I want Peter Boenisch to be right that the theatre is – or can be – an 
autonomous zone, free of social stratification, a space of play and liberation.  
Perhaps I want Joe Kelleher to be right that there is a different sense of justice in the 
theatre. 
 
And I’m thinking now of Oscar Wilde. All art, he wrote, is perfectly useless. (It’s not a 
thought that would play well on a REF impact statement.) And of course Oscar 
discovered the hard way that the theatre was not an autonomous zone. That if you 
think too far and too fast on stage – and in court – you can end up in Reading Gaol. 
That’s the implacability of the law’s saw blade.82 
 
But Oscar kept thinking, and he kept performing. Where does performance think? 
From his prison cell, after almost two years hard labour, Oscar wrote in De 
Profundisof the humility that suffering had brought to him. Buthe wrote of this humility 
with immense pride. And he wrote of his newfound interest in Christ – Christ as an 
aestheticist, and as “the supreme individualist”, and thus as someone very much like 
himself.  
 
You are not my shepherd.  
You are my brother.  
Let’s wrestle. 
 
  2012 Steven Bottoms 
 
Biography 
 
Steven Bottoms is Wole Soyinka Professor of Drama and Theatre Studies at Leeds 
University.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81A reference to one participant’s description of the Every House Has a Door presentation, which 
included a 3-piece rock band on drums, bass and guitar. 
82Another oblique reference to the Every House Has a Door presentation. 
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Friday 13th April, morning 
 
9.15 – 9.45  Registration 
 
9.45 – 10.00 Welcome:  
Laura Cull, Helen Julia Minors and  
John Mullarkey 
 
10.00 – 11.00 Keynote 1: Vida Midgelow 
   Chair, Helen Julia Minors 
 
11.00 – 11.15 Coffee 
 
11.15 – 12.45  Parallel Sessions A  
 
Track 1    
The Know-How of practice-led research 
 Chair, John Mullarkey 
 
Duffy / The International Theatre/Performance Festival: Gaps, Interruptions 
and Unpredictable Crossovers. 
Walker / Total Practice: putting the professional into practice-led performance 
research 
May / Mental Predicates and Intelligent Performance: The Ontological 
Primacy of Know-How and its Implications  
 
Track 2 
Labouring, working, living 
 Chair, Laura Cull 
 
Chow / Work and Shoot: professional wrestling and embodied politics 
Wikstrom / Performance as Labour: Where thought and action meet   
Nauha / Life in Bytom: neoliberal contamination, mess and performance 
 
12.45 – 1.45 Lunch [not provided by the conference] 
 
Plus Michelle Graves will be showing documentation of her performance 
DEATH -> HEART -> BREATH. 
 
Friday 13th April, afternoon-evening 
 
1.45 – 3.15  Parallel Sessions B 
 
Track 1 
Dancing Thinking 
Chair, Laura Cull 
 
Hug / Disturbing Thoughts. On the Relationship between Sensory Perception 
and Reflection in Performance  
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Irvine / Performing processes: thinking worlds into being 
Sachsenmaier / On ‘thinking’ and ‘not-thinking’ in performance-making: a 
cross-cultural philosophical investigation 
 
Track 2 
Directing Thinking 
Chair, Freddie Roken 
 
Boenisch / Directing & Dialectics: Re-thinking Regietheater 
Gansen and Schilling / Thinking Performance: René Pollesch’s Interpassive 
Theatre and Beyond  
Levy / Chaos, Offstage and Self-Reference: Notes towards a (new) 
Methodology of Performance 
 
 
3.15 – 3.30  Coffee 
 
3.30 – 5.00  Parallels Sessions C 
 
Track 1 
Making it together: Rehearsal and collaboration  
Chair, Helen Julia Minors 
 
Husel / Watching the(m) play. Re-Thinking rehearsing practices 
Hillman / Acting on Behalf of Thought: Thinking On How Performative 
Expression Acts, In Rehearsal, Performance, And Non-Theatrical Contexts 
Jones / Impossible Collaboration: Performances Thinking Inbetween 
 
 
 
Track 2 
Thinking performance with contemporary philosophy 
Chair, John Mullarkey 
 
Gotman / L’objet singulier/Singular object: The trials of Clément Rosset’s 
philosophy of the “Real” 
Richards / Non-performance of philosophy, non-philosophy of performance: 
what is François Laruelle’s non-philosophy and what does it have to offer 
performance studies?   
Florencio / “Staging the World: Performance, Object-Oriented Ontology, and 
that thing called Knowing” 
 
 
5.00 – 6.00  Keynote 2: Joe Kelleher 
   Chair, John Mullarkey 
 
 
6.00 – 6.30  Drinks / Reception 
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6.30 – 8.00  Evening Performance 
 
Every House Has a Door work in progress  
    
Followed by post-show discussion 
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Saturday 14th April, morning 
 
9.30 – 10.30am  Keynote 3: Freddie Rokem  
    Chair, Laura Cull 
 
10.30 – 10.45  Coffee 
 
10.45 – 12.45   Parallel Sessions D 
 
Track 1 
Spaces and durations 
Chair, John Mullarkey 
 
Wakefield / Time-specificity or How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think 
duration 
Cologni / SPA(E)CIOUS PRESENT  
Hilevaara / Idle fancies, lucid dreams and startling memories: remembering 
as a form of active spectatorship 
Schramm / Houses, Towers, Islands: On Notable Spaces in Philosophy and 
Performance 
 
Track 2 
Theatre-making as thinking 
Chair, Helen Julia Minors 
 
Denman-Cleaver / I Can See Better From Here 
Bowes / Kings of England: On Staging The Parrot That Thinks 
New & Zacharias / thinking together – invasive hospitality  
Corrieri / In Place of a Show 
 
 
12.45 – 1.45  Lunch 
 
During lunch there will be a screening of: How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to 
think duration in practice – a slow-motion performance by Nik Wakefield 
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Saturday 14th April, afternoon 
 
1.45 – 3.15   Parallel Sessions E 
 
Track 1 
Choreography, dramaturgy 
Chair, Freddie Rokem 
 
Groves /  "Dramaturgies of Thinking: In/Of Performance" 
Levin / Choreographing Opera: How Ballet ReThinks Operatic Performance 
Colin / Choreographic Presence: Thinking in Time 
 
Track 2 
The body politic 
Chair, Laura Cull 
 
Calchi-Novati / Performance in the Age of Biopolitical Ideology: Testing the 
Factuality of ‘Post-abyssal Thinking’ 
Saffrey / Thinking in the stand-up comedy club: deindividuation or the 
leadership of anarchy? 
Greenwood / Punk Performance: Sid, Nancy, Kylie and Mark Greenwood 
 
 
3.15  – 3.30  Coffee 
 
 
3.30 – 5.00   Parallel Sessions F 
 
Track 1 
Speaking, listening, writing 
Chair, Helen Julia Minors 
 
Anzengruber / "ENACT: speaking nearby your tongue"  
Schroeder / Network[ed] Listening – towards a de-centering of beings  
Soloyeva / RSVP Editions – Paper and Virtual Performance Project  
Minors / Reassessing the thinking body in Soundpainting 
 
 
 
Track 2 
Hiding and appearing 
Chair, Laura Cull 
 
Kirkkopelto / An actor never deals with elements smaller than a world 
Lagaay / Secrecy vs. Revelation: Reflections on the Dramatics of the Hidden 
in Performance and Philosophy 
Schmidt / The state of images  
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5.00 – 6.00   Roundtable / Closing remarks  
    with response from Stephen Bottoms 
    Chair, John Mullarkey 
 
6.00 – 7.30   Drinks 
 
 
Additional contributions to the conference are made by: 
 
Craig Smith will be providing delegates with a CD of:  
THE PARASITE: A SOUND AND TEXT COMPOSITION 
 
Rajni Shah will be offering delegates the text of:  
Thinking through salt, thinking through bark, thinking through cables - an exploration 
of the ‘stuff’ of performance in relation to a trilogy of Shah’s own works (Mr Quiver, 
Dinner with America and Glorious) 
 
 
Close 
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Keynote Addresses 
 
Keynote 1: Vida Midgelow, Northampton University, UK 
 
Some Fleshy Thinking: Improvisation as philosophy in motion 
 
Through a playful conversation between a dancer and her practice Prof Vida L 
Midgelow explores how somatically based improvisation practices might be said to 
be a way of ‘thinking’ and questions how this ‘thought’ is perceived by audience 
member’s.  In doing so, this presentation tussles with the ways that deeply 
internalised experiential movement practices enter the perceptual field and how this 
field can be understood as a critically embodied form by dancer and viewer.  
Drawing up Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, and research emerging 
from cognitive sciences, the presentation extends notions of embodied knowing to 
articulate improvisation as a distinctive mode of thinking in which knowledge is both 
produced and explored. 
 
Keynote 2: Joe Kelleher, Roehampton University, UK 
 
The Writing on the Wall: on aporia, and the scene of thought 
 
The very question ‘how does performance think?’ can put a block on thinking. At 
least it is a question to persuade us to interrupt ourselves, to register and respect the 
block, before we set about translating our perplexity again into conversation, into 
argument and rhetoric, into scripture and image, into further performances of 
thought. This is odd perhaps because we are used enough to thinking about 
performance, all sorts of performance, and elaborating between us what we think 
through all sorts of discursive and performative fluencies, which we acquire with 
practice; there would indeed be no such thing as society to speak of if we did not do 
this. We are used, then, to thinking about and also using performance as a medium 
of thinking, not only in the ‘practice-based’ teaching and research that concern those 
of with a professional interest in these things, but really wherever and however 
performance might be a way of working something through, of having something 
happen, of making something felt, for oneself, for others. Performance thinks; we 
know it. Performance helps, to borrow Lois Weaver’s phrase. It matters to our 
thought; we know that too. Nor is thoughtfulness only still and silent, it also moves 
and makes noise, and performance covers all these bases; this is all stuff we know, 
and think about, and speak of. So, wherefore the block? I wish to explore this 
question through consideration of scenes where a seeming incapacity to act – that 
is, an incapacity to speak, to show, to do, or to do anymore in a particular situation – 
is as it were spoken, shown, done. I am interested, let’s say, in specifically theatrical 
ways of thinking about, and of transmitting, perplexity, indecision – aporia, in short – 
in situations where we come up against our limits, not least those limits we take as 
determining who – or what, creatures and creators, human, animal, thing – ‘we’ take 
ourselves to be.  There is something interminable about all this, brought to term in 
each particular performance. There is also, every term, something to learn, 
doubtless; but then again – or so it can seem when we think it through – nothing to 
learn that we do not already know. Example: Bill Readings writes of the scene of 
teaching in the ruins of the modern university as one in which we might ‘de-centre’ 
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our subjective takes on the matter (as students, as teachers, as administrators) and 
listen instead to the thinking being performed beside us, attempting to account each 
time for what that thinking contains, and in so doing recognise the ways we are 
profoundly (ethically, politically) accountable to each other – accountable, he says, 
beyond accounting. If, in the university classroom, much of the writing that registers 
the thinking going on is – both literally and metaphorically – on the wall, that is no 
less the case in the theatre, for instance the theatre of Romeo Castellucci’s recent 
show On the Concept of the Face, Regarding the Son of God. Here the terminal 
condition that we all share – being human, in sum – is put on stage. This condition is 
shown, spoken of, acted out and suffered, under a sort of Mene Tekel Peres, itself a 
sort of unaccountable accounting that interrupts thoughtless living (and which will 
have provoked all sorts of exemplary interpretive thought). The scene reproduces 
the sign of a thinking that looks and looks and sees and sees but which has, 
ultimately, nothing to say, of itself or for itself, offering  to attention – and perhaps to 
compassion also – the articulate silence of a creature without name, that struggles to 
produce an image of itself, that struggles in the meantime to reduce itself to that. 
 
Keynote 3: Freddie Rokem, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel 
 
Crude and Sublime Thinking: 
Additional Encounters between Bertolt Brecht and Walter Benjamin 
 
The friendship between Bertolt Brecht and Walter Benjamin led to numerous 
encounters between them, culminating in Benjamin’s visits to Brecht’s ‘exilic home’ 
in Svendborg, Denmark during the summers of 1934, 1936 and 1938. This paper 
examines Benjamin’s reaction to the expression “plumpes Denken (crude thinking) 
which Brecht had used in his Threepenny Novel, published in 1934. The paper 
contextualizes the performative nature of this expression on the basis of the six 
years earlier Brecht/Hauptmann/Weill Threepenny Opera, as well as on Pabst’s film 
adaptation, which in turn had led to Brecht’s writing the Threepenny Lawsuit, where 
he claims that “To have sublime thoughts is not the same as to have culture.” 
Benjamin interprets the notion of “plumpes Denken” in dialectical terms which are 
further developed in The Arcades Project, and later also in Brecht’s own 
Messingkauf-materials. 
 
Every House Has A Door 
 
Lin Hixson and Matthew Goulish, after a twenty-year collaboration as co-founders of 
Goat Island, have formed Every house has a door to create project-specific 
collaborative performances with invited guests. This company seeks to retain Goat 
Island’s narrow thematic focus and rigorous presentation, but to broaden the canvas 
to include careful intercultural collaboration, and its unfamiliar, even awkward, 
spectrum. 
 
 
http://www.everyhousehasadoor.org/about.html 
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Abstracts 
 
Anzengruber, Bernadette / "ENACT: speaking nearby your tongue"  
 
speaking nearby your tongue is a performance by Bernadette Anzengruber, staged 
at Stonborough/Wittgenstein House, Vienna in 2011 and a re-enactment of Ludwig 
Wittgensteins Lecture on Ethics, which he held in Cambridge in 1929. At the core of 
the performance is the question, where speaking leaves the territory of language and 
becomes an invasion of space and bodies. The thesis is, that speaking is not 
abstract and intangible. It can be understood as a process of appropriation and 
therefore even internalized modes of speaking stay porous, vulnerable and to a 
certain degree mark the speaking of the Other within one’s own speaking, be it the 
direct quote in a scientific text or the phenomenon of glossolalia.  
 
ENACT: speaking nearby your tongue is translating the performance back into a 
lecture. By flattening and deleting the bodies from the original piece, important 
information as sound and noise, that is not considered language, will be spared out 
as well as all effects, which are produced through light/darkness, transformation of or 
movement in space. The viewers are challenged by their own perception as they will 
be noticing, that there are acts, that can only be uttered by bodies they are missing 
out on them. 
 
Boenisch, Peter / Directing & Dialectics: Re-thinking Regietheater 
 
Theatre directing is commonly conceived of as a practice of ‘translation’ between 
media (playtext and performance), or as adaptation ‘from page to stage’. Such an 
approach proffers expectations and value criteria such as the ominous ‘truthfulness 
to the text’, which often functions as a principal charge (especially) against so-called 
“directors’ theatre”; it also informs our acts of spectating as a theatre audience, as 
well as the training and education of future theatre directors within our institutions 
and academies. The lack of a sustained theoretical reflection of directorial mise en 
scène is therefore a rather striking lacuna in theatre theory, especially given the 
efforts of scholarly thought recently bestowed upon elucidating practices of 
performing. It seems as our own discipline hence lacks in articulate methodology to 
fully engage with philosophical assertions such Alain Badiou’s reflections on the 
theatre director as a ‘thinker of representation’, who in the name of theatre as a 
(Badiouian) event of thought ‘carries out a very complex investigation into the 
relationships between text, acting, space and public.’ (Badiou 2007, 40).  
 
With my paper, I shall attempt to outline preliminary contours of a more refined and 
historically informed understanding of ‘directing’. I will start from a historical outlook 
on theatre directing, which as German Regie and French mise en scène emerged 
from the early nineteenth century. I therefore propose to situate the practice within 
the cultural context of what Jacques Rancière has termed the ‘aesthetic regime of 
art’, turning, in particular, to Friedrich Schiller (also one of Rancière’s favourite 
informants in matters aesthetic) and his notion of ‘aesthetic play’. Read in 
conjunction with the remarkable appearance of a Chorus in his late play The Bride of 
Messina, we will be able to situate the practice of directing within the structure of 
thought embodied by Hegelian dialectics, functioning as Vermittlung and concrete 
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Anschauung – a term which directly refers us back to the thea (the ‘Schau’, gaze, or 
show) that directly connects theatre and theory. 
 
In consequence, the tangible dissensus frequently caused by “directors’ theatre” will 
from this perspective appear not as accident, but as prime cause and principal 
purpose of mise en scène. Understanding directing, hence, as a figure of thought 
and as a structural relation will point us to the principal importance of how rather than 
what “directors’ theatre” thinks – hence a ‘relational aesthetics’, in a sense very 
different of Bourriaud’s: as a ‘play’ of and with thinking, where theatre opens 
perspectives and relations, to traditions (such as the dramatic), ideologies, and the 
world. 
 
Bowes, Simon / Kings of England: On Staging The Parrot That Thinks 
 
In 2011, Kings of England convened “In Eldersfield” a ten-chapter, decade-long cycle 
of works all for the Twentieth Century. The performances will inform the writing of a 
series of books, slight but substantial new volumes of history. Each chapter invokes 
a moment from a past that is quickly receding, slipping from view. We use 
performance as an intervention in historiographical method – loosing sources from 
contexts – invoking the past in the present – asserting liveness as a primary mode of 
historical understanding.  
 
Our first chapter, “Elegy for Paul Dirac”, stages a few scenes from the life of the 
Nobel prize-winning physicist. Our fondness for Dirac comes from a description in 
Farmelo’s 2009 Biography: Niels Bohr said to Ernest Rutherford: “This Dirac…he 
seems to know a lot about physics, but he never says anything”. Rutherford replied 
that Bohr could either have the Parrot that Talks, or the Parrot that Thinks (Graham 
Farmelo, The Strangest Man, 2009: 158-9).The performance itself centres on a 
second, rather more difficult anecdote: Dirac is working in a laboratory at St. John’s 
College, Cambridge, 1927. A colleague asks him “where are you going on your 
holidays”? Twenty minutes later (twenty minutes later) he replies with the question: 
“why do you want to know”? “Elegy” plays this outin real time.  
 
At the premiere at the Barbican in April ’11, an initial attentiveness from our audience 
gave way a creak of chairs, a chorus of footsteps down the raked seating, and, at 
one point, a distressed scream. Fourperformers remained onstage, silent. But a 
significant section of our audience had ascended from something like quietude to 
something like restlessness to something like uproar (Diana Damian, Matt Trueman 
and Dr. Theron Schmidt have all given accounts of the ‘silence’. Telling as these are, 
a verbal response from Marty Langthorne, the lead technician for the Festival, most 
insightful: “I didn’t know whether the performance was going to continue”).  
 
Months later, the performance has come to feel like an attempt to stage the un-
stage-able. To invoke Dirac, in all his strange reticence and hesitancy, is to invoke 
his double, The Parrot, whose presence on stage suggests a field of thought (in a 
notable case, internalised by the performers – externalized by the audience)that 
remains unknowable, impossible to resolve. Dirac, and the Parrot are alike in their 
unlikeness to anyone at all, and between them we sense an undiscerned, marginal 
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absence, which flourishes in the gap between thought and the impossibility of its 
translation. 
 
The Call for Papers asks, “Can performance be understood as a kind of thinking” 
and, if so “what are the benefits and risks of doing so, for performance and/or for 
philosophy”? Contrary as we are, we re-state: “Can thinking be considered a kind of 
performance” and, if so, “what are the risks and benefits &c”: a productive 
misunderstanding between disciplines – a welcome confusion of the terms 
delineating our fields of enquiry. We might consider points of convergence with De 
Certeau: “historians always create absences” (De Certeau, The Writing of History, 
1992: 288) (yes – and performers do, too!), and with Rancière: “History doesn’t have 
to protect itself from any foreign invasion. It merely needs to reconcile itself to its own 
name” (Jacques Rancière, The Names of History, 1994: 103). This paper (twenty 
minutes in duration) will suggest how thought troubles the event of performance in 
an ethical moment that refuses to foreclose an encounter with historical subject as a 
thinking –performing – body.  
 
Calchi-Novati, Gabriella / Performance in the Age of Biopolitical Ideology: Testing 
the Factuality of ‘Post-abyssal Thinking’ 
 
For Portuguese sociologist and legal scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos modern 
Western thinking operates ‘along abyssal lines’ designed to divide what is human 
from what is sub-human, or to say it à la Agamben, what is legally considered a 
‘form-of-life’ from what is not considered so. The work of Santos is very much 
focused on trying to go beyond what he refers to as Western ‘abyssal thinking’ via 
the development of new ‘ecologies of knowledge’, so as to overcome the still 
commonly unquestioned modus cogitandi for which Western systems, whether 
scientific or legal, are the systems par excellence. In this paper, I will employ Santos’ 
theory of ‘abyssal thinking’ alongside Agamben’s theory of ‘biopolitics’ in order to 
problematise the contemporary hegemonic modus cogitandi, namely that of our 
biopolitical ideology. The work of contemporary Mexican artist Rafael Lozano-
Hemmer instigates a critical engagement with biometric systems and computerised 
tracking systems of identification. I claim that Lozano-Hemmer’s work presents the 
audience with innovative ways of thinking about the means of surveillance that have 
become normalised via the virally intrusive hegemonic ideological apparatuses. By 
revealing the fluid reproducibility of digital fingerprints, and the technological tricks 
hidden behind tracking systems of identification, these works could 
be interpreted as performances that inhabit the ideological terrain of struggle. 
“Performance in the Age of Biopolitical Ideology” might elicit ‘an alternative thinking 
of alternatives’, in relation to our traces, both digital and physical alike. It is by 
displaying these very traces, that works such as Lozano-Hemmer’s perform strategic 
contestations through a ‘radical copresence’ of the visible and invisible processes of 
biopolitical. 
 
Chow, Broderick / Work and Shoot: professional wrestling and embodied politics 
 
This demonstration/talk will contextualise and theorise the in-progress findings of 
Work Songs, a practice-as-research project by Broderick Chow and Tom Wells (the 
dangerologists).  
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Addressing the question of ‘how performance thinks’, I consider the idea of a 
‘thinking between’ bodies and subjects, taking place in the mixed space of 
uncertainty and tacit knowledge that is raised in practices of physical improvisation 
with others (such as Contact Improvisation). I argue that such thinking between can 
have a deeply political dimension, which lies in the relationship between the ‘social 
body’ and its individual bodies. For the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, it is not only 
the unconscious that is structured like a language; the physical body itself is marked 
by the Symbolic Order. As socialisation takes place, the body is over-written by 
signifiers; pleasure, for instance, ‘becomes localised in certain “zones.”’ (Fink 1995: 
24). Approaching the question of the body and the social order from another 
perspective, Michel Foucault famously analysed the ways in which acts of power on 
social body are then enacted in practices by individual bodies. It is affective 
dimension of practice between bodies that potentially disrupts or poses a challenge 
to the zoned, divided body (Lacan) or the governmentalised body (Foucault), and is 
the focus of this practice-as-research project. 
 
This paper will specifically consider our original physical improvisatory practice, 
which is derived from (but deviates from) the techniques of British and American 
professional wrestling. Professional wrestling distinguishes between two forms of 
fighting: ‘work’, and ‘shoot.’ Worked fights emerged in the early 20th century as 
promoters discovered they were able to make more money by determining the 
outcome in advance and presenting ever more spectacular moves. The term refers 
today to the practice by which a series of moves are sold as real, and the 
kinaesthetic response of improvising a ‘chain’ of moves with one’s partner. ‘Shoot’ 
refers to real violence. ‘Working’ in wrestling is unequivocally real — most moves are 
indistinguishable from those used in Greco-Roman (‘amateur’) wrestling or mixed 
martial arts. However, the work itself specifically requires the worker to protect 
his/her partner from actual violence. Within this context, our practice-as-research 
points to the possibility of an embodied political thinking. In this way, performance 
itself can think politics, outside the frames of allegory, narrative or spectatorship. I 
connect this embodied political thinking in this specific example to the principle of 
solidarity, fundamental to the projects of the Left. Physical practice between bodies 
does not represent but simply is a relationship of solidarity. I call this embodied 
political thinking an ‘ethics of rowdy play.’  
 
Colin, Noyale / Choreographic Presence: Thinking in Time 
 
This practice-based presentation examines how the question of memory, relates to 
the way in which the past survives in the present through the emergence of a 
choreographic presence in the event of performance. Using a lecture –performance 
format I aim at exploring the issues around the capacity of a performer’s body to be 
always in adjustment with the real.  
 
Drawing on notions of deconstruction, Lepecki argues for the ephemerality of dance 
to be compared to a disappearance. To that effect he uses the Derridean concept of 
trace to relocate the presence of the dancing body in the realm of absence. In 
Derrida’s words, ‘the trace is the erasure of selfhood, of one’s own presence, and is 
constituted by the threat or anguish of its irremediable disappearance, of the 
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disappearance of its disappearance.’ While this description seems to encapsulate 
the idea of dance’s ephemerality as disappearance, then viewing the unravelling of 
dance movement as a self-erasure would tend to subjugate the field of dance studies 
to a literary register. One might argue that such a discourse might be more 
concerned by writing than by dancing. 
 
While my intention is not to re-construct historical dance pieces, in this solo, I am 
interested to explore questions of presence of a dancer’s body in relationship to time 
and more specifically historical time. If the ephemerality of dance can be compared 
to a disappearance how can dance composition account for traces of process and 
still generate an affective response for the audience members?  
 
From a Bergsonian perspective, thinking in time, assumes that memory is part of 
time and time – defined in terms of duration - is a force, which is constantly at work 
in the compositional plane of a performance as well as in the reception of a live 
piece. Time and memory in live performance are bound to their intrinsic relation to 
the body. Suzanne Guerlac underscores that whereas ‘the body is a centre of action 
that acts in the present’, consciousness - which is here equivalent to memory and 
therefore to the past - operates as a coping mechanism for the body ‘by synthesising 
the heterogeneous rhythms of duration into temporal horizons of past, present, and 
future.’ 
 
I will address the central questions outlined above, through a discussion of the 
choreographic process in my solo ‘They tried to stand [I am still falling]’. While this 
work focuses on exploring how the audience members could be considered as an 
imagined component of composition in becoming, I will focus on examining how 
presence in dance composition contributes to the articulation of a choreographic 
thinking in terms of time. 
 
Cologni, Elena / SPA(E)CIOUS 
PRESENT  
 
Dynamics of collective and individual 
experiences of space and duration 
within specious present, adopting 
technologies for enhancing audience 
engagement, while producing forms of 
documentation (1 Micro-geographies, 
microphies). 
 
The workshop is based on the 
multidisciplinary approach of my current 
project Rockfluid (see below), where 
participatory site specific art practice is 
underpinned by elements of cognitive 
psychology and philosophy. Hence, here the relationship Memory – Time – 
Perception is informed by Bergson's notion of the present within duration and as 
produced by the body in space (Bergson, Matière et Mémoire, ), and by Merleau-
Ponty's reference to  'sensation' as the basis for knowledge (Merleau-Ponty citation 
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of Gestaltd Theory in ‘Association And The Projection Of Memories, Phenomenology 
Of Perception). On the other hand the role of memory in the present is seen from a 
shared perspective (psychology and philosophy of science) including the definition of 
specious present (James, William. 1890. Principles of Psychology 2 vols. New York: 
Henry Holt, p 608, in Anonymous [E. Robert Kelly], The Alternative: A Study in 
Psychology (London: Macmillan and Co.,1882) as well as the nature of retention as 
involving perception of duration (1898. Metaphysic of Experience 4 vols. London: 
Longman, Green, and Co. [reprint (1980), Garland Publishing, New York]). 
 
The workshop format is considered, as a form of peripatetic practice,  where 
produced and shared knowledge informs the artist's creative process. It also creates 
the physical and psychological conditions to enhance an awareness of the 
perception of time and space. 
What: 
Three exercises, within this condition: audiences and participants can see two 
projections, one of the views is from above and the other view is from the remote 
cctv camera on one of the participants. 
1- Memory in the present.                  
8/10 participants will be asked to choose a point in the space and mark the floor. 
From this position they will describe a game they used to do from memory. The 
participants will be asked to form a shape in space by using elastic string. They will 
then move in turn forming a series of changing shapes in space. The final shape will 
be fixed on the floor with masking tape. 
2-  How has digital time disrupted our sense of subjective time? The 
perception of time, subjective time (non measured time) and distance in specious 
present (the time duration wherein a state of consciousness is experienced as being 
in the present). The exercise will test how differently we experience distance within a 
set amount of time, depending on certain conditions. Using the shape on the floor, 
participants will be asked to walk over it and write how long this takes. 
3- How does technology effect our perception and memorization of place? by 
relating memory to our experience of space in time. Starting from the observation 
that there is a time distance between the now of perception and the after of the 
recollection, and a space distance between where we start from and where we 
return:  What does ‘this’ gap tell us?  Is such gap there at all? Starting from a 
memory exercise (participants to draw the walking activity from memory), this will 
highlight similarities and differences between our mnemonic archive and technology 
produced documents of personal space, which I shall call microphies.  
 
Auslander Philip, "The Performativity of Performance Art Documentation," 
Performing Arts Journal, Nov 2006. 
Cologni, E., Mnemonic Present Shifting Meaning, Mnemonic Present, Shifting 
Meaning, texts by Andrighetto, Auslander, Blaker, Bell, Campitelli, Gotman, Jones, 
Lissoni, Suddendorf, Taylor, Mercurio Edizioni, Vercelli, Italy 2009 
Cologni, E., That spot in the ‘moving picture’ is you, (perception in time-based art) in 
Blood, Sweat & Theory: Research through Practice in Performance ed. John 
Freeman, Libri Publishing, London, 2010, pp. 83-107) 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). The phenomenology of Perception (C. Smith, Trans.). 
London: Routledge/Kegan.  
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Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in time: an introduction to Henri Bergson, Cornell 
University Press, 2006 (Cologni, E., review for Consciousness Literature and the 
Arts Journal, Volume 9 Number 1, April 2008, ed Meyer-Dinkgraphe, Lincoln 
University, 
http://blackboard.lincoln.ac.uk/bbcswebdav/users/dmeyerdinkgrafe/archive/guerlac.h
tml ) 
Vicario, B., Il Tempo, il Mulino Ricerca, Roma 2005 
The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation by Robin Le Poidevin 
Oxford University Press, 7 Dec 2007 
E. Robert Kelly, The Alternative: A Study in Psychology. London: Macmillan and Co., 
1882 (specious present) 
A Brief History of Time-Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl, 
Holly Andersen, Rick Grush, Journal of the History of Philosophy,  2007 
James, W. (1893). The principles of psychology N 1. New York: H. Holt and 
Company, p. 609. 
1898. Metaphysic of Experience 4 vols. London: Longman, Green, and Co. [reprint 
(1980), Garland Publishing, New York] 
Nicola Greer, On the Move: Technology, Mobility, and the Mediation of Social Time 
and Space, The Information Society, Volume 18, Issue 4, 2002, Taylor & Francis.  
Examples of previous workshop 
http://www.elenacologni.com/experiential/that_spot.html 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/time-experience/ 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-temporal/specious-present.html 
http://www.manchestertiming.co.uk/ 
 
Corrieri, Augusto / In Place of a Show 
 
What happens inside a theatre when nothing is happening there?  
This presentation revolves around a visit I made to the Teatro Olimpico (Vicenza), 
the first purpose-built indoor theatre in the West. The Olimpico is built to resemble an 
outdoor amphitheatre, replete with illusory street perspectives and a sky-painted 
ceiling. On the occasion of my visit, a swallow flew inside the theatre, performing 
aerial revolutions beneath the painted clouds. Through photographs and text, this 
presentation is the attempt to find a language with which to track the flight of that 
swallow. 
 
Denman-Cleaver, Tess and Chen, Ko-Le / I Can See Better From Here 
 
Alice in Bed is an ongoing theatre production by Tender Buttons 
(tenderbuttons.co.uk). The project actively engages mental health service users, 
health practitioners, academics from multiple disciplines as well as the general public 
in the formation, interpretation and performance of Susan Sontag’s play. In creating 
Alice in Bed we are investigating how a theatre production can feature in an 
academic community such as Culture Lab, or this conference. Working in 
partnership with academics has so far inspired a heightened awareness of and 
reflection upon our creative practice, and as such has enabled a greater 
understanding of philosophical, social and political understanding of questions raised 
by the text.  
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As well as presenting our work-in-progress, we would like to ask: what stake do we 
have, as theatre practitioners, in the dissemination and publication of Humanities 
studies? 
 
Duffy, Jennifer / The International Theatre/Performance Festival: Gaps, 
Interruptions and Unpredictable Crossovers. 
 
“Becoming is a movement from some place, but becoming oneself is a movement at 
that place” (Kierkegaard ‘08 p.66) 
 
A performative presentation which explores and highlights the pedagogical potential 
the model of International Theatre/Performance Festivals (examples which include 
Sibiu International Festival of Theatre (Sibiu, Romania) ACT Festival (Bilbao, Spain); 
Flare International Festival of New Theatre (Manchester, UK); Gateshead 
International Festival of Theatre (GIFT) (Gateshead, UK)), hold as a site for 
experiential learning and for the dissemination of performance and practitioner 
knowledge.  
 
The presentation will explore and utilise as a case study, the findings of practice led 
research undertaken via the delivery of a series of workshops at the international 
student theatre festival: Dionysus Festival, (Osijek, Croatia, 2012). The workshops, 
which explore the development of audience/performer relationships within 
performance practice, through interrogating varying modes and techniques of 
collaboration and participation, will be conducted with a group of international 
students attending the festival.  
 
Through presenting the findings from the case study, the presentation will examine 
the potential of the context of the festival model as methodologically relevant for 
practice led research into the dissemination of practitioner knowledge. It will also 
highlight its potential as a site for the exploration and generation of performance as 
thinking via the exposure of cross cultural performance practice and training 
grounds.  
 
Against a backdrop of research which highlights the space of ‘the festival’ as a “place 
for working out a new mode of interrelationship between individuals” (Bakhtin, ’65 p. 
123) and for providing opportunity for dialogue as a site for: “trans-national 
identifications and democratic debate” (Euro- Project ’10 p.7) and in also 
acknowledging the opportunities created within this space for exposure to “a variety 
of critical interceptions” (Pitches ‘11 p.143) for its audiences, participants and artists; 
I aim to utilise this presentation to provide a working example of the specific model of 
festival examined here and the creative research it allows for, with regard to the 
dissemination and evolution of performance and practitioner produced knowledge. 
 
The presentation will performatively present the findings of the workshops, through 
creatively presenting documentation of the workshops and in demonstrating their 
inherent exploration of the audience/performer relationship through re-presenting this 
within the utilisation of the audience/presenter relationship within the context of the 
conference. It will highlight the potential of the festival model examined for 
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encouraging fluid movement between the differing modes of participation 
encountered within this specific context. 
 
 “To work collaboratively, passing the shuttle of creative vision back and forth, in a 
way that advances or changes the pattern, is to imagine community in terms of 
affiliation, rather than filiation. It is a technique for making sense of the gaps, 
interruptions and unpredictable crossovers.”  
(Carter ’04 p.5) 
 
The presentation aims to highlight the potential the site of the International 
Theatre/Performance Festival holds for “passing the shuttle of creative vision back 
and forth, in a way that advances or changes the pattern” and the potential of this for 
the development of performance as thinking. 
 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1965). Rabelais and His World. Bloomington, Indiana University 
Press. 
Carter, P. (2004). Material Thinking. Melbourne University Press, Victoria.  
Euro-Project (2011). "Euro Project." Retrieved 17th October, 2011, from 
http://www.euro-festival.org/docs/Euro-Festival_D3.pdf. 
Kierkegarrd, S. (2008). Sickness Unto Death. Wilder Publications. 
Pitches, J. (2011). Performer Training: Researching Practice in the Theatre 
Laboratory. Research Methods in Theatre and Performance. B. K. a. H. Nicholson. 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press: 137 - 162. 
 
Florencio, João / “Staging the World: Performance, Object-Oriented Ontology, and 
that thing called Knowing” 
 
Performance Studies, one could argue, has been suffering from what can be seen as 
a certain humanist or anthropocentric malaise since its inception as an academic 
discipline in the early 1980s. With few exceptions (cf. McKenzie 2001), our field of 
enquiry has mostly been focused on the study of performance as a kind of behaviour 
able to transform humans acting as performers and/or audiences (cf. 
Schechner/Appel 1990). However, in recent years, we have been witnessing what 
some have termed the nonhuman turn in academia. From philosophy to sociology, 
from ecology to gender studies, the realm of that which is not human has been given 
centre stage in our attempts to think and make sense of, i.e. to known, the world 
around us. This paper will attempt to exercise a similar change of focus in 
performance studies, by bringing the nonhuman to the centre of the contemporary 
debates on what it means to perform. In a world in which events appear more and 
more often to happen outside our human control and with no traceable human 
agency, our species finds itself increasingly in a position of anxious uncertainty 
towards the future, being forced to unknown what had hitherto been taken for 
granted. The way out of this conundrum can only be one: to abandon old paradigms 
and to start thinking again from scratch without falling in the old mistake of building 
ourselves ontological thrones and crowning ourselves lords of the land of being. 
Either that or being doomed once again by the blindness that comes with the all too 
familiar delusion of entitlement. It is in the urgency of this doomsday context that a 
new and more democratic way of knowing ought to be brought forth. It is also in this 
here-and-now that performance studies will have a decisive say, but not without 
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having first to abandon all the remainders of humanism and anthropocentrism that 
still populate its practice, our discourses. If, in the truly democratic world that we 
envision, being and agency are found equally in all that there is, then performance 
has a lot to teach us. If, as one often hears, the whole world is a stage, then 
performance is the only way through which we, things of this world, are capable of 
encountering each other. If, according to Object-Oriented Philosophy, in this 
increasingly animated world everything – from quarks to mountain ranges, from table 
tops to democratic dreams – is only able to give itself to experience by playing a 
character, a double of itself, then performing is indeed another, more democratic, 
name for letting oneself be known. 
 
Gansen, Moritz and Schilling, Elisabeth / Thinking Performance: René Pollesch’s 
Interpassive Theatre and Beyond  
 
The German director René Pollesch, arguably still one of the most interesting and 
innovative figures in theatre today, has over the past two decades developed a new 
form of discursive theatre, in which he has come to interrogate the role of thought on 
stage. The presentation will, in order to discuss the question of how performance 
thinks, or how thought is brought into performance, take Pollesch’s approach as 
its vantage point and critically examine both its problems and its possible merit. We 
will begin with short introduction to the director’s theatrical work and its various 
modes of staging thought; from there, we will be lead to consider performance as a 
thinking subject in itself, as we can find precisely this implied in the director’s 
relatively recent notion of ‘interpassive theatre’. Accordingly, the paper will conclude 
asking how we can take Pollesch’s method beyond itself to develop from it a better 
understanding of the relation between thought and performance in general. 
 
A hybrid of metatheatre and metatheory, Pollesch’s work performs thought on 
various levels. Perhaps most obviously, fragmentary ideas and quotes taken from 
the writings of contemporary theorists (such as Giorgio Agamben or Jean-Luc 
Nancy) are incorporated into the spoken text and spun further; in fact, primary text in 
Pollesch is usually a discursive performance of thought rather than mere 
dialogue between characters; for Pollesch, ‘theatre is a thinking space’. Yet the 
staging of thought does by no means end here: the ideas related in the actors’ 
speeches are reflected in the general structure of the performance, establishing for 
instance deconstruction, repetition and interpassivity as significant formal features. 
On a further level, it is then precisely the notion of ‘interpassive theatre’ that 
introduces yet another mode of staging thought by rendering the performance itself 
as a thinking subject. 
 
The concept of interpassivity, taken from Robert Pfaller’s elaboration of an idea 
essentially formulated by Jacques Lacan and taken up by Slavoj Žižek, essentially 
refers to the obverse of interactivity. In this sense, Pollesch’s plays Ich schau dir in 
die Augen, gesellschaftlicher Verblendungzusammenhang (I Look You in the Eyes, 
Societal Relation of Blindness) and Was du auch machst, mach es nicht 
selbst (Whatever You Do, Don’t Do It Yourself) suggest that the apparently inevitable 
art of interactive theatre has ‘terrorised’ audiences for decades, forcing them into an 
undesired ideal of activity. Interactive theatre claimed to allow people to ‘break out of 
the role of passive observer following the spectacle staged by others, and to 
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participate actively not only in the spectacle itself, but more and more in establishing 
the very rules of the spectacle’. Interpassive theatre, on the other hand, is supposed 
to permit people to not experience things which they had thought they wanted to 
experience. Interpassive art, Pfaller suggests, relieves audiences even of the burden 
of beholding it, since it includes its own reception. If Pollesch’s discursive theatre is 
thus indeed interpassive (which may still be debated), it must ultimately lead its 
audience to delegate thinking to the performance, hence creating a thinking 
environment, a thinking thing that purports to think for its audience; just like a 
sitcom’s canned laughter laughs for its audience. 
 
All this of course leaves us with the question whether a conception of thinking in 
interpassive theatre has anything fruitful to offer beyond the idiosyncrasies of an 
individual director obsessed with contemporary theory. We will hence, by way of 
conclusion, seek out ways in which Pollesch’s method of bringing thought onto the 
stage, of creating a ‘thinking space’, can enable us to conceive new ways in which to 
think performance and perform thought. 
 
Gotman, Kelina / L’objet singulier/Singular object: The trials of Clément Rosset’s 
philosophy of the “Real” 
 
I was struck, speaking with a student recently, to realise that Clément Rosset’s work 
was of course hardly available in English; but, more significantly, that it probably 
should be made available. This student more recently suggested that it is just 
beginning to be translated. Yet, Rosset’s work remains largely invisible in the 
Anglophone canon and in the new field of theatre and philosophy in particular. In this 
short presentation, I hope to highlight and critique some of the major tenets of 
Rosset’s philosophy of the “real,” as it pertains to cinema, music, history, and 
pleasure. I will suggest a few points of convergence (and divergence) with strands of 
philosophical thinking about theatre (and how theatre “thinks”), and gesture towards 
a Rossetian approach to theatre and performance that takes into account problems 
of doubling, mimicry and historical time. I hope to argue that in Rosset’s work, the 
“tragic” doubles the comic in a return on Nietzsche and Artaud that articulates stasis 
as an eruption in time: one that instantiates neither transcendence nor deliverance, 
but a Benjaminian breath, an aspiration, a hiatus, that looks upon itself with horror. 
And in that, finds joy. 
        
What this will suggest practically is a dramaturgy of constant returns: this is a 
Nietzschean trope, articulated to prove again and again why we need theatre (or 
experience life as such, in the best of times), and why theatre is the stuff of a 
liberated and indeed serene everyday life. Indeed, in Rosset’s work, what I will call 
an immanent theatricality enables us to gain distance from the Real, so that we can 
enjoy it better, and live without care in present time. In Rosset, the doubling of reality 
and its observation (and its immanent, at times purely affective experience if not 
articulation) paradoxically instantiates a greater self-presence (présence à soi) and, 
arguably, présence envers l’autre (or presence-toward-the-other) in the ability it 
grants us to stare in the face of an always tragic (brooding) life. But this to-and-fro 
between the Real and that which observes it comes at a cost: we cannot just stage 
life (mentally) and so see through it (or see through to it) better, and gain freedom. 
The doubling is posed as a constant tenet of the Real, and thus one, as I will argue, 
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that makes this daily theatre (and theatricality) impossible. It is theatre’s quasi 
tautological relationship to the real, however, that, as I will argue, also enables us 
better to arrive at a theatrical conception that is precisely Artaudian: a non-theatre 
collapsed onto itself, refusing both itself and its double. 
 
Clément Rosset has published over 30 books in philosophy over the last fifty years, 
including La philosophie tragique (1961), L’anti-nature : éléments pour une 
philosophie tragique (1973), Le Réel et son Double (1976), Propos sur le cinéma 
(1977), L’objet singulier (1979), Route de nuit : épisodes cliniques (1999), Le réel, 
l’imaginaire et l’illusoire (2000), and L’école du réel (2008). He lives in Paris. 
 
Greenwood, Mark / Punk Performance: Sid, Nancy, Kylie and Mark Greenwood 
 
My practice and research interrogates the body as a site of writing; it identifies this 
site as marked by and capable of inscriptive acts, as both being actively written upon 
by culture and as a necessary event of resistance to cultural commodification. 
 
My enquiry develops the hypotheses that since our society uses words as its primary 
means of social control, marginal groups find their most effective expression through 
the body’s wider resources rather than the restrictions of verbal language, where the 
body becomes a site of resistance through thought, action and ‘doing’.  It is here that 
the act of writing can be considered not only in a traditional sense, but as an 
inscriptive act that leaves an impression on materials and space through repetitive 
gesture, mark-making, stillness and action – a situation where expression asserts 
individual identity and then social identity on the receptive but resistant material of 
the world. I therefore use the term ‘writing’ to refer to a dialogue between the 
performer and a range of images and objects gained through direct contact with 
specific environments and the subsequent physical representation of these 
experiences into action. 
 
This paper proposes that the performance artist reclaims the body, literally inscribed 
and marked within an art form that negates forms of recording and dissemination in a 
reproductive economy. This resistance employs an approach similar to that of 
alternative music networks, where a ‘punk’ ideology is applied, organising events in 
esoteric sites and employing ‘not for profit’ strategies. Paradoxically, this mode of 
thinking encourages aggressive individualism and independence in terms of identity 
and expression, while encouraging community through exchange and the sharing of 
work. 
 
I propose to deliver a paper that explores how individual and collective performance 
art practitioners approach work, emphasising a ‘punk’ ideology and influence in the 
works of Alastair MacLennan, Roddy Hunter and Andre Stitt. ‘Thought’ and ‘thinking’ 
are highly significant in these works that negate the institutional control exercised by 
theatres and galleries. This resistance of the ‘establishment’ allows a larger set of 
networks and performance art organisations such as OUI Performance in York, 
[performance space] in London and Bbeyond in Belfast to perform their own 
autonomy and simultaneously perform and develop a collective political utterance.  
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My paper will explore the possibility of shifting political and social consciousness 
through performance art practice. I intend to demonstrate and develop ways of re-
thinking the perceived space/time templates of performance and writing as modes of 
presencing, while suggesting alternative models for their interpretation and 
dissemination within the contexts of institutional research. In this context I propose 
that performance events operate immediately as methodologies that explore modes 
of communication and participation through the re-claimed, physical, tangible body in 
relations and encounters that provoke aesthetic and political questions around the 
institutional commodification of cultural practices. 
 
Graves, Michelle will be showing documentation of her performance: DEATH -> 
HEART -> BREATH.  
 
DEATH -> HEART -> BREATH is an experimental lecture. It is an analysis of a 
macro-timeline consisting of writing on a dry-erase board and facing the audience to 
“lecture” scientific facts and personal philosophies with an overlay of raw emotion. It 
presents my personal synaptic leaps between these three significant terms. Death, 
the heart or heartbeat, and the breath or breathing have chronologically been focal 
points of my art-making over the past decade. Each topic has naturally guided me 
through a captivating line of research leading to the next topic. Each new topic has 
informed the previous. I have empirically and associatively committed to memory 
intense emotions with each topic, triggering my sympathetic or parasympathetic 
nervous system throughout the analysis. Death and the Heart trigger a deeply 
rooted, grief-stricken and heartbroken emotion. Breath and remembering to breathe 
throughout the analysis is a struggle, calms my emotions enough to continue the 
analysis. At the peak of the analysis, I briefly interact with the audience as a means 
to bring myself, and those witnessing, out of a state of heightened emotion. This 
process transcends the skill base of performance/acting and shifts the performing 
body toward being through synaptic thinking, writing text, and facing the audience 
when the emotions are triggered. I am fully aware of my vulnerable body and mind in 
these moments and permit the struggle to control exactly how I present myself. 
“Operating within the limits of the few words that you chose to write on the board in 
the lecture was crucial to the economy of your philosophy. The words don’t prepare 
us for your tears.” – Bryan Saner. 
 
Groves, Rebecca /  "Dramaturgies of Thinking: In/Of Performance" 
 
tbc 
 
Hilevaara, Katja / Idle fancies, lucid dreams and startling memories: remembering 
as a form of active spectatorship 
 
For Henri Bergson, memory is fundamentally connected with perception and its 
temporal quality is defined by a notion of delay. This delay is produced between the 
object of perception and its response, whilst the present stimulus searches for the 
most appropriate memory in the past to interpret it, and to act upon it. If the search is 
prolonged, Bergson suggests, if a myriad of possible corresponding memories are 
presented, if the choice is multiple, the outcome becomes increasingly 
undeterminable.  
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In this paper I suggest that contemporary theatre makers enable a delay of 
perception for the spectator, where the stimuli offered triggers an elastic breadth of 
memories to come forward, and bring forth interpositions which, in their uniqueness, 
are completely unforeseen. Whilst singling out and examining the strategy of 
distorting time within contemporary theatre performance as an example of extending 
perception, I propose that by striving for unpredictability, theatre makers are tapping 
into radical innovation that is genuinely creating responses that cannot be known in 
advance. By creating conditions for imagining and conscious dreaming in which 
perception is prolonged, theatre makers invite indisputably new thinking. In doing so, 
it can be argued that not only does Bergson’s philosophy on memory and perception 
foreground performance’s ontology as remembering as opposed to its liveness, but 
that ‘remembering through performance’ puts this philosophy firmly in practice and 
expands its use. 
 
Hillman, Rebecca / Acting on Behalf of Thought: Thinking On How Performative 
Expression Acts, In Rehearsal, Performance, And Non-Theatrical Contexts 
 
By focusing on a series of ‘open’ rehearsals and promenade performances that took 
place in a disused pub in Reading, in October 2011, this paper considers how and to 
what effect ontologies of rehearsals, performances and performative acts effect real 
conditions of experience and understanding.The rehearsals, performances and 
events discussed connect to my doctoral research project, which asks what modes 
and combinations of theatrical response are effective in addressing political 
issues for contemporary audiences. By deploying verbatim material mainly sourced 
in Reading and politically driven agitprop theatre with practices developed by non-
politically driven companies such as Punchdrunk, the work asked participants and 
audience to engage viscerally, emotionally and critically with the subject matter. 
  
This paper begins by considering how performance can be understood as a mode of 
expression operating beyond theatrical contexts, by reflecting back to the 2011 
England Riots that happened on the first day of the project’s rehearsals. I will briefly 
consider how and to what extent recent emerging social-political communities have 
been evolved/repressed, and what relationship to performance or other (privileged?) 
discursive modes these positions bear. The rest of the paper asks how the 
conditions of the rehearsal process (i.e. expectations and practices associated with 
performance, rehearsal and experimentation, as well as political efficacy) led to the 
cast performing their own subjective and expressionistic work, and sharing personal 
and sometimes difficult experiences ‘through’ performance. How do abstract, poetic, 
physical, self-conscious and performative expressions create a range of different 
meanings and experiences from those channeled by prevailing conventions of the 
communication of thought? The paper then considers how, by offering the general 
public access to the rehearsal space, unusual ways of interacting and thinking with 
members of local communities was facilitated. Finally, it considers the extension of 
these processes in the performances themselves, focusing on the physical and 
emotional experience of the participating subject, to ask what effects these 
durational processes combined with certain performance styles had, and what 
ramifications for the objectives of the research project. Fundamentally the paper 
inquires into a unique attraction and/or agency of performance, which some senses 
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remain at a ‘safe’ remove from reality, whilst in other ways encounters heightened 
levels intimacy with it. 
 
Hug, Joa / Disturbing Thoughts. On the Relationship between Sensory Perception 
and Reflection in Performance  
 
The topic of my doctoral artistic research is the relationship between sensory 
perception and reflection in the context of contemporary dance performance. 
Approaching the investigation from the perspective of the dancer/performer, the main 
questions are: what effect does consciously altering one’s physical state and 
awareness have on one’s way of thinking, and vice versa: How can conscious 
activity of the mind alter the body’s perception in relation to itself and to others? 
My background as dancer/performer is significantly shaped by Body Weather. The 
practical investigation of my doctoral research builds on one of the core elements of 
Body Weather training practice: the so-called Manipulations. Usually practiced in 
couples, one person manipulates the body of another through a specific application 
of touch, weight and pressure. Currently, I am revisiting a research-score in which I 
imagine to be manipulated (= without an actual giver) while attending to thoughts 
and sensations simultaneously. 
My presentation combines a demonstration of this research-score with reflections on 
the specific modes of thinking that are enacted in its performance. In particular, I will 
relate to Simon O’Sullivan’s ideas about the production of subjectivity. Instead of 
drawing conclusions I will share some observations about how thinking in perform-
ance might differ from other forms of thinking in which sensory perception plays an 
implicit (and neglected) role. I hope to thereby contribute to a more differentiated and 
detailed understanding of what it could mean to think in performance and how 
performance can possibly alter what and how we think in performance. 
 
Keywords: Artistic Research; Change; Contemporary Dance Performance; 
Embodied Reflection; Imagination; Subjectivity.  
 
References: 
O’Sullivan, Simon, 2008. The Production of the New and the Care of the Self. In: 
Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New, ed. Simon O’Sullivan and Stephen 
Zepke, London: Continuum, 2008, pp. 91-103. 
O’Sullivan, Simon, 2006. Academy: ‘The Production of Subjectivity’. In: Academy, 
ed. Irit Rogoff et al., Frankfurt/Main: Revolver, 2006, pp. 238-44.  
 
Husel, Stefanie / Watching the(m) play. Re-Thinking rehearsing practices 
 
My talk suggests two shifts in the view on performance: Firstly, to focus on 
audiences rather than on the activity of performers, and secondly, to take a closer 
look at the rehearsing process of performances. Both queries seem to contradict one 
another at the first glance, but they actually start supporting each other mutually if 
one takes into account that watching is a practice. If we understand watching as a 
practice that needs to be performed skilfully, rehearsing can be understood as 
practicing the gaze of the other. As a “participant observer” I visited rehearsals of 
British performance group Forced Entertainment since 2003, with my focus on the 
relation between playing and watching. My talk wants to share some results of my 
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ongoing research: How does rehearsed practical knowledge diffuse into the 
structure, that is later presented as “the play”? Which points of view are presented to 
an audience? And which kind of audience is accordingly build into the play‘s 
structure? 
 
Irvine, Rosanna / Performing processes: thinking worlds into being 
 
Deleuze asks, What is a thought without the image of a thought? This question 
invites an approach to thinking that is not about something (with the allegiance to 
representation that this entails): rather of thinking as the occurring of the process of 
thinking. 
 
Western dance and choreographic practices since Judson in the 1960s have 
adopted and been influenced by particular practices of non-western cultural origin, 
now commonly found in dance trainings, e.g. Aikido, Tai’chi, Yoga, which cultivate 
particular qualities of/in thinking. What might be understood as ‘in common’ in these 
divergent practices includes a concern with mind body unity, and an approach to 
training perceptual awareness that is grounded in a mutuality of ‘being’ and action. 
Such practices may (potentially at least) train our capacities towards engaging 
in/with the world ‘beyond’ the dualisms at the origin of Western philosophical thinking 
(which Phelan suggests gives rise to representation.) I suggest that the prevalence 
and potency of these practices over the last fifty years, has prepared a milieu for 
performance and choreographic practice that shifts the concerns of practice towards 
the activation of processes of thinking and towards (the development of) capacities 
of and conditions for thinking. The paper discusses this activation from my 
perspective as a performance maker engaged in practice-as-research and with 
references to two projects: what remains and is to come, the ‘collaborative dialogue’ 
with Katrina Brown www.whatremains2.wordpress.com and Project by French 
choreographer Xavier Le Roy.  
 
In what remains and is to come, we work with paper, charcoal, body, breath, 
agreeing that we prefer not to make work about something, and that we will make 
something. There is a growing sense of being-with each other, of being-with the 
materials, and a growing sense of the properties and capacities of/in the different 
materials. Distinct and particular processes continue to emerge. The choreography 
of the performance event comes into being through the activation of these material 
processes - or what might be understood as the activation of the capacities of/in the 
materials: material is in Karen Barad’s terms ‘given its due as an active participant in 
the worlds becoming.’ The paper considers how we might then understand material 
as co-constituted in the thinking of/in the performance event. 
 
Xavier Le Roy created the work Project through extended discussions and 
negotiations with his collaborators to develop rules for games that would be 
‘performed’ in theatre situations. This work exists as much through the decision-
making processes that (continue to) generate it, through their manifestation as 
performance event(s) and through the potential for the work’s reactivation by others 
through the ‘general rules score’ - a set of processual instructions which Le Roy has 
made available for others to use. Through a reflection on my approach to 
reactivating Project, the paper examines how each of these modes generates 
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processes or acts of decision-making as the event(s) of the work. I suggest that two 
projects discussed activate different, and differently, particular processes of thinking 
which, rather than representing pre-existing worlds, bring worlds into being.  
 
Jones, Simon / Impossible Collaboration: Performances Thinking Inbetween 
 
This paper will use examples from recent performance to explore how collaborations 
across media, across expertises and between auditor-spectators and performers 
produce a kind of thinking inbetween which can only be directly experienced in the 
event; and it is this inbetweeness that is performance’s essential contribution to 
philosophy.  Returning to Heidegger’s definition of the artwork as a preserving 
outstanding standing within, by way of both Levinas’ encountering the Other in the 
face-to-face and Deleuze’s description of art as realizing sensation, the paper will 
consider three works, each with a specific collaborative relation across visual media: 
Void Story (2011), Forced Entertainment’s combining of graphic novel and radio 
play; Kellerman (2008), Imitating the Dog’s cine-theatre piece; and Model Love 
(2008), Bodies in Flight’s theatre and installation work focusing on the relation 
between performance and photography.  The paper will suggest that the disclosing 
and realizing of inbetweeness is performance’s unique contribution to thinking, 
occasioned by its setting forth a relation between performer and participant outside 
of the everyday: indeed, the between between performer and auditor-spectator 
participant is posited as standing in for all other betweens, including the 
technological; hence the paper proposes that performance is the art form sine qua 
non – the art form of all art forms. 
 
Kirkkopelto, Esa / An actor never deals with elements smaller than a world 
 
Good acting provokes thoughts. But what kind of thoughts are they? And who 
actually thinks when we, the spectators, watch a performance? Whose thoughts are 
we thinking – those of the actor, those of the playwright, those of the director or, or 
perhaps, those of our own? As I am going to argue in this presentation, in a 
performance the question of thinking is first and foremost a power issue. The one 
who thinks has the power. And changes in power entail changes in performance 
practices, in their aesthetics and ethics. For the same reason, the very procedures of 
thinking, the scenic logic, are highly dependent on the choices made on the practical 
level.  
 
While thinking, we always deal with symbolic elements (representations, images, 
signs, phenomena).  They are connected by means of certain rules in order to 
achieve results, which, in the beginning, are unknown to us. The elements, the rules, 
as well as the results, vary according to the activity and its specific mode of thought. 
The idea of the intellectual content of a theatrical performance stems from Aristotle, 
for whom the primary aim of a tragic poem was to produce “thinking” (mathesis). The 
thoughtful content of a performance was supposed base on the dramaturgical 
composition – “arrangement of facts” (systasis tôn pragmatôn) – graspable to our 
practical intellect (phronesis). At the beginning of the 19th Century, German poet and 
philosopher Friedrich Hölderlin took this Aristotelian conception into serious 
reconsideration. In his Remarks on Antigone, Hölderlin presented a distinction 
between a “philosophical logic” and a “poetic” one. In philosophical constructions, the 
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elements consist of relatively dependent conceptual “organs” (Glieder), which 
together create an organic whole. The elements of a poetical composition, however, 
function as “more independent parts” (selbstständigere Theile) whose “connections” 
(Zusammenhänge) remain necessarily looser, freer and ambiguous: rhythmic. 
Hölderlin applied this idea to the analysis of the Sophoclean tragedy in which these 
parts can be conceived as “struggling bodies”, connected by actions, words and 
orders.  
 
This Hölderlinian insight creates a link between poetic and scenic composition. This 
can be of greater use today, as we try to understand and redefine the role of the 
actor in contemporary performance. The actor forms an obstacle to the idea of the 
equality of all the scenic elements, which is so crucial for the logic of the “post-
dramatic” composition. Human body, with its desires and resistances, does not 
automatically turn into compositional “material” – at the disposal of an external 
author, the theatre director. The recent attempts at “actor dramaturgy” have intended 
to resolve this problem, both ethically and aesthetically. However, what lies at the 
core of the problem, is the question of the logic of acting. It cannot be reduced to a 
mere “stylistic”, “technical” or “cognitive” issue.  Our practical understanding of the 
scenic element–of its behaviour, and how the equalisation between different 
elements takes place in various scenic contexts – depends on our way of thinking 
how the actor thinks. The fact that we usually do not even care about these 
questions only reveals the historical gap that still exists between our ideas and 
practices. This gap is the site of the power struggle, splitting the actor’s body and the 
stage.  
 
The ideas presented in this lecture result from the actor pedagogical research project 
“Actor´s Art in Modern Times”, carried out at the Theatre Academy Helsinki in 2008 – 
2011. 
 
Lagaay, Alice / Secrecy vs. Revelation: Reflections on the Dramatics of the Hidden 
in Performance and Philosophy 
 
“Truth is not a matter of exposure which destroys the secret, but a revelation which 
does justice to it. ” 
W. Benjamin. The Origin of German Tragic Drama 
 
My paper will revisit the relationship between performance and philosophy by means 
of a reflection on the relationship between theatre and theory as implied by their 
shared relation to theoria – the act by which something is brought to light, or 
revealed in its truth, by contemplation. Whilst there is clearly something implicitly 
dramatic about the very notion - and phenomenon - of revelation, my enquiry will 
focus here less on the role of that which is shown or reveals itself, than on the 
hidden or withheld, the untold, unsayable or unshowable both in terms of the 
relevance thereof to philosophic enquiry as well as with regard to the implicitly 
dramatic and performative potential of the ‘secret’. A driving question here is: What - 
or how - does the secret show?  
 
Drawing on explorations of secrecy by Michael Taussig, Pierre Boutang and Jacques 
Derrida, my talk will begin by distinguishing various pragmatic dimensions or modes 
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of secrecy as they apply, albeit in different ways, to both performance and 
philosophy. These include that which is intentionally or strategically – and often 
skilfully – withheld or obscured (e.g. ‘masked’ in order not to spoil the ‘show’ or give 
away an argument) as well as that which implicitly or structurally remains hidden 
(e.g. background knowledge or know-how). Various yet interconnected phenomena 
will be explored ranging from the purely unsaid to the magically mysterious. 
Touching upon a paradoxical logic proper to secrecy, by which the secret must 
reveal itself in order to remain hidden, in sum my talk will outline a certain productive 
– and indeed dramatic – dynamics belonging to the hidden side of theory.  
 
Levin, David / Choreographing Opera: How Ballet ReThinks Operatic Performance 
 
tbc 
 
Levy, Shimon / Chaos, Offstage and Self-Reference: Notes towards a (new) 
Methodology of Performance 
 
In this paper I argue that critical concepts used in the interpretation of theatre 
performances should emanate from the experience of the performance rather than 
be imposed, ready-made, from the (philosophical) outside. Thus, I oppose 
theatricality to theoretical extrapolations on the written as well as the directed stage-
text. Relying on my experience as a stage director, translator and theoretician, I 
propose three determining factors in the constitution of dramatic/theatrical texts: self-
reference, chaos and off-stage. In many, if not most studies of drama and much too 
many performance analyses, "a philosophy" has been superimposed on the event in 
an attempt to prove that the work behaves in accordance with, or at least follows, 
some main notions of "the philosophy".  
 
Whereas some works may gain in clarity by the intervention of an external theory, 
literary or philosophical, theatre, since initially intended for performance, is by its very 
nature less receptive to non-medium oriented notions of interpretation, because 
performance, first and foremost, exposes practical and experiential rather than 
theoretical factors. In the following notes I therefore contend that theatre 
performances are better explored with the help of interpretative notions ensuing from 
the particular performance factors of the piece itself.  
 
I rely, as an example, on what for me at least, but also for many other Samuel 
Beckett directors, proved to be the playwright’s superb sensitivity, originality and 
profound understanding of "theatricality".  
 
Whereas many of Beckett’s philosophical critics prefer to avoid his stage 
instructions, Xerxes Mehta, director and theoretician in the "practical" sense of 
having experienced the subject of his theatrical enquiries, says that in Beckett’s 
plays "stage directions, which solicit the images, are the play."  
 
The reasons for this are both practical and theoretical. My way to understanding 
Beckett’s plays has been paved, first of all, through translating all of them into 
Hebrew, thus forcing myself to touch each and every word while rendering them into 
a language for which I relatively rarely need a dictionary. I still am pleasantly 
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surprised to realize to what degree and how exquisitely Beckett inserted stylistic, 
thematic and "medium-oriented" fractals, dramatic and theatrical seeds that 
developed and transformed in many of his plays. The three main notions I shall 
address are self-reference, chaos-oriented theories and offstage. They ensue from 
the works rather than being imposed on them. I a way, they are “organic” philosophy.  
 
May, Shaun / Mental Predicates and Intelligent Performance: The Ontological 
Primacy of Know-How and its Implications  
 
In this paper, I want to draw on the work of Ryle, Dreyfus and Heidegger in order to 
elucidate what precisely it means for one to ‘perform intelligently’. According to Ryle, 
the ‘prevailing doctrine’ which has riddled the intellectual tradition from Plato 
onwards holds that this entails both action and theorising. I.e. that action on its own 
is never sufficient to be considered ‘intelligent’. Although articulated prior to the birth 
of Practice-as-Research, this resonates with contemporary PaR research 
programmes which specify that practice needs to be accompanied by theoretical 
writing in order to be equivalent to a ‘conventional thesis’. Both Ryle and Heidegger 
positioned themselves against this doctrine and asserted that know-how was more 
fundamental than know-that, a position which I will attempt to defend in this paper. 
 
In my view, whilst the primacy given to know-that in the intellectual tradition was 
tenable as a faith position until fairly recently, the failure of artificial intelligence 
projects attempting to simulate human understanding suggests that Ryle and 
Heidegger were correct. Using 
 
Hubert Dreyfus’ influential critique of AI in his book What Computers Can’t Do, I will 
argue that there is now a strong empirical case for the primacy of know-how. Finally, 
I will conclude this essay by drawing out what I believe the implications of this are for 
both Practice-as-Research and ‘conventional’ research projects. 
 
Minors, Helen Julia / What is Soundpainting and how do we think during 
performance to create a piece in the moment? This audio-visual presentation will 
reassess my own practice. 
 
Nauha, Tero / Life in Bytom: neoliberal contamination, mess and performance 
In a project “Life in Bytom” my starting point is contamination, which in my argument 
is exercised by neoliberal capitalism with a wide diversity of devices. In this context, 
what can a performance do? A specific location for this inquiry is Silesian mining 
town, Bytom, in South-Poland. In past twenty years this area has been transformed 
from industrial labour to neoliberal capitalism. Instead of perceiving capitalism as 
functional or rational, I propose to regard it as a mess: aer instead of air. “Through 
Air everything attains a moderated clarity and normality. […] In contrast, aer "belongs 
to war, the fog of war” writes Reza Negarestani in Cyclonopedia (2008, 103). In such 
a war my aim is to craft a device of practice and theory, which may contest the 
strategies, which have been adopted in transition to neoliberal capitalism. 
 
What is the relationship between a subject and technical device in the neoliberal 
context and particularly in the post-industrial context of Poland? I will be collecting 
material from several workshops organized for a group of people in Bytom. It is a 
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diverse group of unemployed, self-employed, artists, other professionals or skill-less 
people. I will be meeting them in several sessions, which will lead into a performance 
and exhibition in Kronika Centre for Contemporary Art in Bytom, in the mid October. 
What is the relationship between performance and objects and devices, which are 
produced during and after the transition to neoliberal capitalism? This is a question 
which produces material for an event and performance in the gallery. I will use 
schizoanalysis as a tool to approach affectively such material. Schizoanalysis is a 
tool of potentiality: it explores a particular mess of capitalism. Contaminated, as 
such, life is not being restored in this process, but recombined in a way, which 
probes potentiality and produces agency. Schizoanalysis is a process of becoming, 
transformation and not change. 
 
Neoliberal capitalism takes advantage of the life itself, writes Paolo Virno in The 
Grammar of Multitude (2004). Conversely, Jon McKenzie reads this change as a turn 
towards the “society of performance” (McKenzie, Perform or else, 2001). In both 
cases, performance is the key to production, where improvisation and compatibility 
are some of the most decisive skills in this context. In the “fog of war” these skills 
become significant in general practice, i.e. in ways how to endure a mess of 
capitalism. Moreover, it is a particular skill of neoliberalism to represent a mess as 
lucid as air. After crisis, which is being used as a device of reformatting and 
recombination, all devices, machines and performance practices are either 
terminated or recycled to fit a new dispositif. In the project “Life in Bytom”, 
schizoanalysis is adopted as a device to give expressive articulation for a mess and 
crisis: the affective side of them. Neoliberal capitalism recombines and contaminates 
life. This project is probing some potentialities and affective debris, which are left a-
signified in life, and eventually produce articulation in theory format and in 
performance practice.  
 
New, Sophia & Zacharias, Siegmar / thinking together – invasive hospitality 
 
Sophia New and Siegmar Zacharias have been teaching together Performance and 
live art for 3 years. Through being constantly in dialogue whilst teaching they have 
developed a pragmatic method of thinking together as a form of hospitality. We 
understand hospitality as a paradoxical activity of generosity and endangerment 
towards each other. This refers to the Derridean idea of hospitality as a way of 
allowing oneself to become estranged by receiving the stranger into one's own home 
and the problematic power relationships which thereby occur, what we however 
propose is that strategies of performance intrinsically produce these paradoxical 
relations and thus allow the reflection of philosophical theories to simultaneously be 
developed and destabilized. In this way hospitality is a gesture of opening up a 
structure of thought and artistic practice, and letting it be endangered by the 
presence and contribution of the other.  
 
Richards, Tom / Non-performance of philosophy, non-philosophy of performance: 
what is François Laruelle’s non-philosophy and what does it have to offer 
performance studies?   
 
What is non-philosophy? Described by Deleuze and Guattari in a footnote to their 
final work as “one of the most interesting undertakings of contemporary philosophy”, 
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Laruelle’s ‘non-’ suspends philosophy to develop a ‘materialism of the form of 
thought’; a science of what philosophy is that considers it as one among many equal 
kinds of thinking. Laruelle specifically states that philosophers cannot understand 
non-philosophy as they are too committed to the self-sufficiency philosophy aims at. 
Non-philosophy's natural constituency is the performance studies community for 
whom it should be intuitive, familiar as performance scholars are with the idea of 
practice as being of equivalent value to research. Unlike philosophy, non-philosophy 
thinks from an axiomatic real and uses as its basic terms an immanent performativity 
of thought; it is a theory seemingly akin to philosophy but always stemming from the 
concept of performance. Ultimately, Laruelle’s ‘non-philosophy’ represents a 
performative definition of performance in the idiom of philosophy. During the same 
40 years in which performance studies has come to be what it is today, in Laruelle's 
writing the concept of performativity has slowly broken its way out of the language of 
philosophy, twisting this scenario to its own ends to become ‘non-philosophy’; in 
other words, performance. 
 
Non-philosophy sets itself up against (but not really as much against as before) 
“what François Laruelle identifies as the core invariant of Occidental philosophy, the 
coincidentiaoppositorum, or unity of opposites”[Rocco Gangle]. When performance 
studies constructs and debates, for example, an opposition between thinking and 
doing, it is attempting to fit into these structures. However, practice-as-research as a 
formulation radically troubles this ‘core invariant’ and functions as an instance of 
non-philosophy. The second section of this paper draws the link between Laruelle’s 
‘non-philosophy’ and performance studies. I try to move away from the terminology 
of non-philosophy in order to avoid overcoded philosophical language and take the 
concept out of a direct relation to philosophy, in which Laruelle unavoidably situates 
it. Using the language of performance studies and considering the parallel 
development of performance studies and non-philosophy from the same root in 
Austin’s definition of ‘performativity’, I investigate what non-philosophy as an idea 
has to offer performance studies as a discipline, arguing that the agency of this 
newly articulated concept for performance studies is in offering us a new way to think 
our relationship to philosophy; how we use philosophy to talk about performance, 
what happens when we do this, and what happens when we try to embody 
philosophical ideas in our performances. Furthermore, if we take Laruelle’s idea to its 
(non-)logical conclusion; that is, read it in the same way he reads philosophy and 
accept that we proceed from its axiomatic basis rather than trying to push his ideas 
further by  setting up transcendental a priori from which to look back at our work (in 
the manner of the philosophers he criticizes as attempting, for example, to be “more 
Kantian than Kant, more Spinozist than Spinoza”), we find ourselves at the 
immanent reality of his concept; the basis of all thought in an imminent performative 
Real. We need not talk of philosophy of performance or even ‘performance & 
philosophy’; we can simply talk of performance studies and acknowledge that we are 
already doing the work Laruelle predicts, a statement absolutely unproblematic for 
non-philosophy. 
 
Sachsenmaier, Stefanie / On ‘thinking’ and ‘not-thinking’ in performance-making: a 
cross-cultural philosophical investigation 
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This paper will discuss processes of performance-making, with a particular focus on 
the aspects of ‘time’ and ‘duration’ in creative processes that work towards a logic of 
‘discovery’, rather than through a method pre-planning.  
 
The present enquiry establishes the necessity for a process-sensitive approach to a 
theorisation of contemporary ‘devised’, ‘experimental’ or ‘other-than text-based’ 
performance-making. The project specifically engages with the problematics of an 
analytical approach to a theorisation of ‘creative processes’, with the aim of 
identifying ‘points of focus’ that might contribute to an understanding of the creative 
practice of devising in process-specific terms. It draws on theoretical models 
borrowed from both the disciplines of ‘process philosophy’ and ‘practice theory’, in 
order to establish a practice-philosophical model of performance-making.  
 
Process-specific issues such as ‘time’, ‘duration’, ‘creation’, ‘spontaneity’ and 
‘novelty’ will be discussed, drawing both on Western as well as Eastern philosophical 
writing. Philosophers such as Henri Bergson, François Lyotard and Brian Massumi 
are exemplary of the writing drawn from the Western range, whereas Ancient 
Chinese concepts drawn from Taoist writings by figures such as Lao Tse are 
representative of the philosophical concepts applied from Eastern philosophy. 
 
Asking what sort of ‘thinking’ and states of ‘not-thinking’ might be at stake in a 
practice that seeks to actively avoid a pre-planning of performance material, I will 
draw on my experience and observation of a range of performance-making 
processes, such as choreographer Rosemary Butcher’s 2010 reinvention of Allan 
Kaprow’s 18 Happenings in 6 Parts as well as the choreographic residency and 
research project Artscross, in which Taiwanese, Chinese and British choreographers 
worked towards dance pieces with dancers from a range of cultural backgrounds. 
 
As part of the Artscross event I observed a variety of choreography-making 
processes, which seemed to ‘function’ in different terms. While some 
choreographers approached rehearsals with a clear sense of the aesthetics and the 
choreography itself already ‘thought out’ by the choreographer, others worked 
according to a logic of ‘discovery’, in which the actual choreographic material only 
emerged in rehearsals. In the former processes the emphasis of the dancers 
seemed in my view to be on ‘interpretation’, whereas in the latter processes, similarly 
to Butchers reinvention of 18 Happenings in 6 Parts, the dancers were drawn on as 
‘creators’ of actual choreographic material. 
 
Saffrey, Charlie / Thinking in the stand-up comedy club: deindividuation or the 
leadership of anarchy? 
 
How can we best explain the political psychology of a stand-up comedy 
performance? A good stand-up comedian must clearly appear to be at least 'leading' 
the thoughts of the persons present in the room, and the shared laughter of an 
engaged audience would appear to suggest that some kind of intersubjective 
deindividuation is going on amongst audience members: the shared laugh creates 
moments in which (in Schopenhauer’s terms) the principium individuation is broken 
and the audience become an entity which thinks together. However, at the same 
time, stand-up is unique amongst all the performance arts insofar as the extent to 
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which dissent is possible and individual audience members can contribute to the 
directions such thinking takes. A heckle, a response, or even a look from an 
audience member can change the mood of the performance, the material the stand-
up chooses, and even – in some cases – change the thinking of the room to the 
extent that it brings the performance to an end. It appears, then, that the stand-up 
comedy club is an environment where, even though no legalpower-structure exists, a 
constantly shifting power-structure nevertheless emerges which is characterised by 
the potential for sudden swings between collective thought and individualist thought. 
In this paper, therefore, I will make several somewhat heterodox claims. In particular, 
I will draw on the recent work of Jacques Ranciere to argue that stand-up comedy is 
not as individualistic in its form as it may appear. The fact that there is generally only 
a single performer onstage at any given time does not necessarily mean that only 
one person creates the show, and the acts of creative thought involved are in fact 
often a collaboration between the performer and the audience. I will finish with a few 
comments suggesting that if good stand-up comedy is indeed such a collaboration 
then it may provide a model of social psychology that might even be applied 
normatively to wider political life in democratic. 
 
Schmidt, Theron / The state of images  
 
In The Future of the Image (2007), Jacques Rancière asks, ‘Under what conditions 
might it be said that certain events cannot be represented?  Under what conditions 
can an unrepresentable phenomenon of this kind be given a specific conceptual 
shape?’  Rancière is here trying to connect world-historical problems – primarily the 
Shoah – with an aesthetics of the sublime as developed in other contexts.  But his 
questions also suggest a distinction, as well as a continuity, between 
representational objects and the durational activity of ‘giving shape’.  This lecture-
performance seeks to prolong this moment of giving shape, that in-between state in 
which an image is not yet a representation, though it will eventually be one.  
 
Schramm, Helmar / Houses, Towers, Islands: On Notable Spaces in Philosophy 
and Performance 
The British sculptor and installation artist Mike Nelson is known internationally for his 
dark and provocative installation works in which he creates strange and frequently 
uncanny worlds that often contain narrative elements. In 2011, in the British Pavilion 
of the 54th Venice Biennale, he presented a labyrinthine space that was as 
unsettling as it was thought provoking, and which should here form the starting point 
for a consideration of the important role of the “house” in the history of philosophy.  
 
On his utopian island New Atlantis, Francis Bacon includes an experimental house of 
deceits. In Leibniz, the idea of the “windowless monad” forms the philosophical key 
to his utopia of the best of all possible worlds in which the negative, evil, ugly, 
fortuitous, inexplicable are suspended in the teleological theatrum mundi of a pre-
established harmony. And Immanuel Kant remarked that human reason “so delights 
in building that it has several times built up a tower and then razed it to see how the 
foundation was laid”. Right up to the present, the spatial configurations of houses, 
towers and islands have repeatedly acquired key positions in philosophical 
discourse.  
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Precisely against the background of a history of knowledge, it becomes clear that we 
currently find ourselves in a situation in which a thorough rereading and 
reconsideration of Gaston Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space seem advisable. In this 
context the interplay of performance and philosophy also acquires an important role. 
 
Schroeder, Franziska / Network[ed] Listening – towards a de-centering of beings  
 
This presentation ties in with your conference’s theme of “how performance thinks”, 
specifically as this paper was born out of a ‘practice-as-research’ context. 
 
In this paper I question modes of listening; specifically I draw on my experience as a 
performer listening in network environments. The paper is an extension to a text 
developed in 2009 (Schroeder 2009), and constitutes one specific way of defining a 
mode of listening as seen by one performer with one specific instrument playing a 
certain type of music. It must be understood as a culturally variable listening that 
Paul Carter has described as a listening “subject to the prevailing ideologies and 
power relations of a given place at a given time” (in VeitErlmann, 2004, p.3). 
 
Listening is understood as an embodied mode, shaped by socio-political and cultural 
concerns, and I will touch upon writings that address listening in such a corporeal 
light (Born, 2010 and Voegelin, 2010). 
 
This phenomenologically-oriented standpoint allows me to abstains from an objective 
apprehension of the environment to which one listens, and thus acknowledges that 
everybody hears and listens differently, and that indeed being in a place (such as the 
network) already constitutes a subjective interference, a type of ‘editing’ of place. 
Listening in/to the network sheds light on how such environment can make us 
question our fundamental position in the world and our position to each other. 
Listening in/to the network as a performer has highlighted how the network makes 
one listen to oneself, which in turn has repercussions for re-thinking our relation to 
others. The network reveals various differences between the ‘here’ and ‘there’, 
between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, between ‘listening’ and ‘being listened to’. 
 
I draw on theoretical discourses by writers in the fields of music anthropology (Born, 
2010), media theory (McLuhan, 2006), music psychology (Clarke, 2005), 
composition (Schaeffer, 2006, Atkinson, 2007), and the writings by performers, such 
as Pauline Oliveros (2005, 2006). I look at how the composition and distribution of 
music inevitably question our modes of listening, an argument that will be extended 
by examining the writings of Theodor Adorno (1941, 1969) for example. 
Listening in the network, or what I also term network[ed] listening, can be seen as an 
activity and an interactivity that not only shapes our perception of a musical work but, 
ultimately, performers as listening subjects themselves. Network[ed] listening 
requires the performer to engage in what I elsewhere call a “sonic flânerie” 
(Schroeder, 2009), a permanent move between haptic and optic listening, enticing 
the ear to be constantly zooming in an out of different nodes, acoustic sites and 
sounds. 
 
Listening in the network exposes the body of the performer as particularly vulnerable 
and fragile. The fragility of the performative body will be examined by drawing 
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parallels to the Japanese art form Butoh (Kasai, 1999, 2000, 2003 and Kuniyoshi, 
1991, 2004). 
 
I will argue that network[ed] listening is an ideal corporeal state for rethinking linear 
conceptions of the other and a subject’s own relation with her world, and that 
network[ed] listening posits listening as a corporeal and multi-dimensional 
experience that is continuously being re-shaped by technological, socio-political and 
cultural concerns. 
 
Soloyeva, Julie / RSVP Editions – Paper and Virtual Performance Project  
 
My project aims to examine the significance of language in the discourse of live art 
practice, and to trace the history of the relationship between image, word, and 
movement in teleological and aesthetic realms. I plan to address the specific 
practices of Tino Sehgal, Xavier Le Roy, Eszter Salamon, and La Ribot as 
instrumental for experimentation with speech, communication, written word, 
performance, dance and situation. 
 
I would like to treat the notion of interruption, particularly in the context of laboratory 
simulating practices of Le Roy and Sehgal as an instrumental strategy in knowledge 
production. These artists use workshops, lectures, conferences and otherwise 
rehearsed as well as spontaneous encounters to bring together participants, initiate 
linguistic and movement games for set durational periods, recycle and augmenting 
game structures for the purposes of generating individual reactions and stimulate 
collective response. While La Ribot and Salamon implement visual, linguistic, and 
dramaturgical cues in their highly choreographed performances to interrupt the 
progression of choreography itself as well as to disturb the gestault of audience 
experience. 
 
Furthermore, I propose a part of the project to take place in virtual space, namely in 
a form of a performance game called RSVP Editions. A website that will serve as the 
arena and vessel where presence and interchange will mark the conceptual potential 
of blending exhibition making and performance. Editions will engage a variety of 
‘bodies’ such as artists, dancers, theater professionals, performance and art critics, 
philosophers, historians and theorists who concern themselves with production, 
exhibition and critique of live art in concrete and real time. The paper and online 
component will investigate live, virtual and historical participatory experiences that 
constitute research as practice. 
 
Given a task of collecting and selecting work that exists only in digital form, each 
body will perform a role of mediating his or her own presence though an abstract 
fragmentation of ideas. This agent will deposit gathered media into an online folder, 
which will in turn become accessible to the public and another body of a cultural 
producer who will attempt to devise a fictive account of an exhibition based on the 
material available in the folder. The game that is generated is a meditation on 
creative and fictional knowledge, collaborative, yet generated individually and 
virtually. Editions demands each body to assume its own position in carrying out an 
immaterial endeavor, conceptually vesting an effort to embody curatorial practice out 
of the public eye, thus resisting early performative trope of presence and 
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embodiment in a way. Instead, the active body will appear in linguistic and spectral 
media form, suggestive of the gestures beyond and linking visual world with the 
world of linguistic signs – textual or speech acts. I hope that How Performance 
Thinks Conference will serve as a starting point of this yearlong project, actively 
engaging conference speakers and audiences as participants. 
 
The process of gathering material and analyzing it should also be emphasized and 
analyzed with the system of virtual exchange that RSVP Editions would generate. 
The participants would be encouraged to draw particular attention to the semiotic 
economy of virtually generated, found, or existing content and the living economy, or 
the “living currency” to borrow Pierre Klossowski’s term, that one’s body must enter 
to take part in this project. The living currency here refers here to the physical, 
embodied presense of each participant in his/her own space, virtual unknown to the 
other but potentially mediated in the virtual as well as the immaterial labor 
contributed by each individual. Thus the web will act as a virtual laboratory for the 
critical imaginary to enact and reflect on the physical processes and conditions of 
performing a role of artist, curator, or story-teller conceiving exhibitions in private for 
a unique recipient, similar to mail art, but with potential for larger and infinite 
audience. 
 
I am currently working on developing the online platform for this and it should be 
ready by April with a presentation of the first “Edition” prepared by myself in 
collaboration with Malgorzata Misniakiewicz, a writer and research of Mail Art and 
unofficial artistic networks that emerged between South American and Eastern 
European in the post-war context. 
 
Wakefield, Nik / 'How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration' 
 
Presentation - 'Time-specificity' 
Abstract - Time-specificity describes the relationship between performance and time 
through adapting the model of site-specificity onto the temporal framework of 
Bergsonian duration. Arguing that theatre thinks in duration, time-specificity 
advocates the incorporation of a living, indeterministic temporality into a 
contemporary understanding of performance. To find how time-specificity emerges I 
identify temporal parallels between my own practice, Bergsonism and elements from 
the work of John Cage, Vito Acconci, Tehching Hsieh and Christian Marclay.  
 
Performance - 'How Long a Thing Takes: an invitation to think duration' 
Description - This performance aims to, after Deleuze, 'render time sensible'. But the 
kind of time it seeks to manifest is Bergsonian durée (duration). The performance 
becomes a kind of alternative 'clock', through performing durée from the body and 
with the body as a clock performs clock time. This showing of practice based 
research is part of a larger project on time-specificity and is therefore related to the 
paper presented at this conference on that subject. 
 
Walker, Jessica / Total Practice: putting the professional into practice-led 
performance research 
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Singer and writer Jessica Walker looks at a professional framework for practice-led 
performance research, with her circular model of total practice, which combines the 
practical elements of making work to earn a living, with critical reflection on the 
practice itself. Through analysis of the production process of her last solo show, The 
Girl I Left Behind Me – commissioned by Opera North in 2010 and still touring 
internationally– this presentation will describe and unpick the first revolution of the 
total practice cycle, from pitch to performance and beyond.  
 
Wikstrom, Josefine / Performance as Labour: Where thought and action meet   
 
Within the context of the visual arts, theatre and dance, performance has historically 
functioned as a privileged site for experimentation between artistic disciplines and for 
breaking down already existing categories within art. From the early-avant garde 
movements, through the 1960s and up until today, various forms of performance 
practices have therefore been characterised with open-ended, often action based 
activities conceived as ends in themselves. Within these practices little or no priority 
has been given to a final product, instead the focus has been on the process and 
continuous movement of the explorations.   
 
In this presentation I am suggesting, that in order to understand performance within 
the history of visual arts, theatre and dance, we must consider this specific form of 
activity, or labour, that performance proposes. What is specific to the practice and 
labour of performance that distinguishes it from other artistic disciplines and 
practices? How is it characterised and how does it correspond to the concept of 
'praxis' in Western thought? And what are its implications in relation to advanced 
capitalist forms of labour, which are also characterised as on-going activities without 
any finished products?  
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Biographies 
 
Bernadette Anzengruber, born in 1980, lives and works in Vienna;  
studied at the Academy of fine Arts Vienna, the University of Greenwich and 
Kingston University London; works in the fields of performance, video, installation 
and text shown at (selection): Philosophy on Stage, Wittgenstein House (Vienna); 
rules of play, Tin Sheds Gallery (Sydney); FEMINA International Women's Film 
Festival (Rio de Janeiro); identities - QUEER FILM FESTIVAL (Vienna); 
DotDotDashDot:Queer, Toynbee Studios (London); Nashville Film Festival 
(Nashville); zinegoak 2011 (Bilbao); Triennale Linz 1.0, Lentos Kunstmuseum (Linz); 
Marfa Film Festival (Marfa); Diagonale (Graz); 13 Lessons in Performance Art 
(Vienna); SWANHOTEL, brut Wien (Vienna); WUNDERKAMMER, Die Färberei 
(Munich); Sense and Sentiment. Mistakes are closely followed by Effects, Augarten 
Contemporary (Vienna). Awards: Birgit Jürgenssen Award, Organizers Award for just 
a meaning that you attribute to it at the International Video Festival Bochum. 
 
Peter M. Boenisch, originally from Munich/Germany, is Director of the European 
Theatre Research Network (ETRN) at the University of Kent. His research interests 
are in theatre directing and dramaturgy, dance, intermediality, and the aesthetic 
politics of theatre. Recent publications discussed the works of Thomas Ostermeier, 
Frank Castorf, Jan Fabre, Michael Thalheimer, Guy Cassiers, Rimini Protokoll, and 
William Forsythe. He co-edited, with Lourdes Orozco, the CTR special issue “Border 
Crossings: Contemporary Flemish Theatre”, and currently writes on his monograph 
Regie: Directing Scenes & Senses in European Theatre. 
 
Simon Bowes is senior lecturer at Glyndwr University. 
 
Gabriella Calchi-Novati, received a B.A. magna cum laude in Letters and 
Philosophy and an M.A. with honours in Public Relations and Corporate 
Communication from Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan. She also 
received an M.Phil. in Irish Drama and Film from the Drama Department, Trinity 
College Dublin, where she lectures in Performance Studies and Critical Theory. 
While her work on contemporary theatre has been published in international journals 
such as Theatre Research International and AboutPerformance; her more recent 
work on the interconnections between “biopolitics and performance” has appeared in 
academic publications such as Performance Research, Performance Paradigm, 
Cinema: Journal of Philosophy and the Moving Image and Cinemascope- 
Independent Film Journal; as well as in edited collections. Recipient of the 
prestigious Samuel Beckett Scholarship (2010-2011), awarded by Trinity College 
Dublin in conjunction with the Irish Government Department of Tourism, Culture and 
Sport, Calchi-Novati has recently completed her Ph.D. research entitled 
Performativities of Intimacy in the Age of Biopolitics. 
 
Ko-Le Chen is the associate researcher of this project.  She is also a video maker 
based in Culture Lab, Newcastle University.  
 
Broderick Chow is a lecturer in Theatre and Modern Drama Studies in the School of 
Arts at Brunel University, London. He is also a performer, stand-up comic, and 
trainee professional wrestler. He is one half of The Dangerologists with Tom Wells, a 
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physical and dance theatre duo who explore labour, masculinity and violence. 
Broderick's research centres around the popular performance as political 
intervention. He has written on stand-up and comedy based performance art, 
parkour (free-running), professional wrestling, musical theatre and theatrical protest 
movements. In 2010 Broderick became the first doctoral graduate of the Central 
School of Speech & Drama, University of London.  
 
Noyale Colin is a dancer/choreographer, exploring notion of time and memory in the 
form of solo or collaborative work. She trained in contemporary dance at national 
superior conservatoires in France and at the Martha Graham Dance School in New 
York. She then specialized in somatic and choreographic practices including a 
practical study of the work of Trisha Brown. She co-founded Imago Mundi, a 
collaborative cross art platform. In 2009 she received a research Studentship in 
Performing Arts at Middlesex University where she is currently leading a doctoral 
inquiry into collaborative practices in contemporary performing making.  
 
Elena Cologni’s work is mainly live, installation and performance grounded in 
conceptual art, and its tangible translations/manifestations. Cologni has a PhD from 
the University of the Arts London, Central Saint Martins College of Art and Design, 
with the thesis: The Artist’s Performative Practice within the Anti-Ocularcentric 
Discourse. Her post doc project Present Memory and Liveness in delivery and 
reception of video documentation during performance art events’, received an AHRC 
Grant (2004-2006). In the outcome Mnemonic Present, Un-Folding series of 2005-
2006, the use of ‘live-recording’ and ‘prerecording’ opened up questions on the 
involvement of the audience and their perception of what is present and represented, 
generating a form of ‘mnemonic present’ (also with the use of the time gap in live 
projections). She was Research Fellow at York Saint John University during which 
time she developed the project Experiential (Re-Moved 2008, CCA, Gi08 and 
Geomemos, Yorkshire Sculpture Park 2009), when site specificity and notions of 
memory as archival and removal in trying to enhance the audience’s and her own 
experience of the self in any given moment. She is particularly active in the 
discussion on Research as Practice, and she contributes with her expertise to the 
Cambridge University, Faculty of Education, Mphil Arts course since 2008. 
 
Augusto Corrieri is a performance artist and writer.  
His performance works investigate the theatrical apparatus through playful 
deconstructions and reversals. He has shown work in theatres and galleries in the 
UK and Europe. Augusto is currently in the last year of a PhD writing project at 
University of Roehampton, within the context of the Performance Matters research 
project. 
 
Tess Denman-Cleaver is the artistic director of Tender Buttons, a theatre company 
based in Newcastle Upon Tyne. 
 
Jennifer Duffy is a performance maker and writer, festival coordinator for the Higher 
Education strand of Gateshead International Festival of Theatre (GIFT) and a post 
graduate student, currently undertaking a practice-led Arts MRes at 
Northumbria University. Her research explores the development of 
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audience/performer relationships and utilisations of audience participation in 
contemporary performance practice. 
 
João Florencio is based at Goldsmiths University in London. 
 
Moritz Gansen is currently a postgraduate student in philosophy at the Centre for 
Research in Modern European Philosophy, Kingston University, and at the Free 
University of Berlin. He holds an MA in Critical and Creative Analysis from 
Goldsmiths, University of London, as well as a BA in English and American Studies 
and Philosophy from the University of Freiburg, where he has also worked and 
taught. Moritz's ongoing research projects revolve around the problematic knot of art, 
politics, and philosophy on the one hand, and metaphysical questions especially in 
German Idealism and contemporary French philosophies on the other. Besides his 
academic work, he has collaborated with different artists in both Germany and the 
UK and has occasionally worked for Freiburg Theatre. 
 
Kelina Gotman is a Lecturer in Theatre and Performance Studies in the Department 
of English Language and Literature at King’s College London, and Convenor of the 
MA in Theatre and Performance Studies. She received her PhD in Theatre from 
Columbia University, and her BA in History from Brown University, and has taught 
critical and cultural theory, writing, literature and performance at Columbia 
University, Bard College and The New School. She is translator of Félix Guattari’s 
The Anti-Oedipus Papers (Semiotext(e)/MIT Press, 2006), and author of “The Neural 
Metaphor,” forthcoming in The Neuroturn: Transdisciplinarity in the Age of the Brain 
(University of Michigan Press, 2012), and articles, reviews and translations in 
journals including Parachute Contemporary Art Magazine, TDR, Conversations 
across the Field of Dance Studies, Theatre Journal and PAJ. She is currently the 
recipient of a Jerwood Charitable Foundation Blue Touch Paper award to develop an 
experimental music-theatre work with composer Steve Potter and the London 
Sinfonietta, to be premiered at the Village Underground in May 2012. She has 
performed in and/or collaborated on over two dozen theatre and dance productions 
in the USA, the UK, Canada, France and Belgium, as an actor, dancer, director, 
choreographer, translator, dramaturg, designer and musician, and is an associated 
artist of New York City-based dance-theatre company Witness Relocation. She was 
born in Montréal, and lives in London. 
 
Matthew Goulish co-founded Goat Island in 1987, and Every house has a door in 
2008. His 39 Microlectures – in proximity of performance was published by 
Routledge in 2000, and Small Acts of Repair – Performance, Ecology, and Goat 
Island, which he co-edited with Stephen Bottoms, in 2007. He was awarded a 
Lannan Foundation Writers Residency in 2004, and in 2007 he received an honorary 
Ph.D. from Dartington College of Arts, University of Plymouth. Goulish is 
Provocations editor for The Drama Review, and he teaches in the MFA and BFA 
Writing Programs of the The School of the Art Institute of Chicago. 
 
Michelle Graves (b. 1980) considers herself a text-based interdisciplinary artist 
drawing inspiration from fields of neuroscience, anatomy, quantum physics, 
phenomenological and existential philosophy, empiricism and belief systems. The 
common thread throughout these fields of research is the mysterious. Graves sees 
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the mysteriousness in death and consciousness, for example, as an opportunity for 
interpretation and infinitely generative for art making material. Graves received her 
BFA in Photography from Indiana University Bloomington (2003) where she focused 
on digital manipulation and video work. She will receive her MFA in Interdisciplinary 
Arts and Media from Columbia College Chicago in May 2012. She has exhibited her 
work in Tokyo, New York City, Los Angeles, London (in April, 2012) and extensively 
in Indiana and the city of Chicago. 
 
Mark Greenwood is a performance artist/ writer originally from Newcastle but now 
based in Liverpool. He has presented work across the U.K, Europe and the United 
States as well as curating the RED APE; a performance platform dedicated to the 
preservation and legacy of provincial performance art practice in the U.K. Utilising 
indefinite durational practice and minimal actions as art forms, Greenwood’s 
interests lie in anthropomorphic puzzles and inter-textual folds. Mark is currently 
researching a PhD in Fine Art at Kingston University, London. 
 
Rebecca Groves is a PhD candidate at Stanford University. 
 
Katja Hilevaara is an artist, a teacher and a researcher. She is currently a recipient 
of a Queen Mary University of London scholarship for her PhD research on 
performance and memory. She is an Associate Tutor at Goldsmiths University of 
London and further information and images of her artwork can be found at 
www.katjahilevaara.com. 
 
Rebecca Hillman is an AHRC funded PhD student in her third year of study, in the 
University of Reading’s department of Film, Theatre and Television. Her PhD in 
Theatre uses practice as research to inquire into the efficacy of live performance for 
empowering a contemporary audience around social and political circumstances that 
are local or otherwise specific to their lives. Her recent practical project ‘The Pact’, 
and the performance collective In Good Company who formed for the project, 
explored the effects of engaging audiences in rehearsals as well as performances, in 
deploying diverse theatrical models (practiced by both politically-driven and non-
politically driven companies) in the same performance, and in the efficacies for 
community engagement of rehearsing and performing in places of cultural 
significance. Rebecca has enjoyed the opportunity to co-organise the University of 
Reading’s annual postgraduate conference Journeys Across Media, and to co-found 
and co-edit the Journeys Across Media Annual Special Issue Series in the Journal of 
Media Practice. She has teaches undergraduate students on the course 'Introduction 
to Theatre Studies', and has lectured on Naturalism, Ideology, and Practice-as-
Research. She has also taught practice as research to postgraduate students. She 
has presented her work at a number of international conferences, most recently on 
the themes 're-source' and 'failure' at TaPRA 2011.  
 
Lin Hixson co-founded Goat Island in 1987, and Every house has a door in 2008. 
She is full Professor of Performance at The School of the Art Institute of Chicago, 
and received an honorary doctorate from Dartington College in 2007. Goat Island 
created nine performance works and toured extensively in the US, England, 
Scotland, Wales, Belgium, Switzerland, Croatia, Germany, and Canada. Her writing 
on directing and performance has been published in the journals P-Form, TDR, 
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Frakcija, Performance Research, Women and Performance, and Whitewalls; and 
included in the anthologies Small Acts of Repair – Performance, Ecology, and Goat 
Island, Live Art and Performance, Theatre in Crisis?, and the textbook Place and 
Placelessness in Performance. Hixson has directed two films, Daynightly They re-
school you The Bears-Polka and It’s Aching Like Birds, in collaboration with the artist 
Lucy Cash and Goat Island. 
 
Joa Hug studied History, Political Science and Sociology at the Universities of 
Freiburg and Oregon/Eugene (US), and Choreography at the School for New Dance 
Development in Amsterdam. He worked as independent dancer with Body Weather 
Amsterdam a. o. and completed his M. A. on Artistic Research at the University of 
Amsterdam (2009). Based in Berlin, he currently follows the artistic doctoral research 
programme at the Theatre Academy Helsinki.  
 
Stefanie Husel is a PhD student, supervised by Prof Hans-Thies Lehmann (Theatre 
Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main) and Prof Stefan Hirschauer (Sociology, 
Gutenberg University, Mainz). In her doctoral thesis she is analysing the situations 
provided by post-dramatic performances; subject of her investigation are Forced 
Entertainments plays Bloody Mess and The World in Pictures. Stefanie worked in 
different theatre professions, including as sound-and-light technician, dramaturge 
and festival producer; she has been assisting Forced Entertainment and visited the 
group as a participant observer regularly since 2003. 
 
Rosanna Irvine is a choreographer working with performance, digital media and 
language practices often in collaboration with others. She is the recipient of an 
AHRC Collaborative Doctoral Award with Dance4 (producer of Nottdance Festival) 
and University of Northampton in a practice-as-research project through her own 
practice and in relations with the Nottdance archive. The title of her developing thesis 
is Thinking and Presence: towards a non-representational poetics of choreography. 
www.rosanna-irvine.co.uk 
 
Simon Jones, Professor of Performance, University of Bristol, is a writer and 
scholar, founder and co-director of Bodies in Flight, which has to date produced 17 
works and numerous documents of performance that have at their heart the 
encounter between flesh and text, where words move and flesh utters.  He has been 
visiting scholar at Amsterdam University (2001), a visiting artist at The School of the 
Art Institute of Chicago (2002) and Banff Arts Centre (2008).  He has published in 
Contemporary Theatre Review, Entropy Magazine, Liveartmagazine, Shattered 
Anatomies, The Cambridge History of British Theatre, Performance Research: on 
Beckett, co-edited Practice as Research in Performance and Screen (2009) and his 
work with Bodies in Flight features in Josephine Machon’s (Syn)aesthetics? Towards 
a Definition of Visceral Performance (2009). 
 
Joe Kelleher is professor of theatre and performance at Roehampton University. He 
is also Head of Department for Drama, Theatre and Performance. His research 
interests are largely in contemporary theatre and performance. A central concern of 
his work has been with structures of theatrical persuasion, both within and beyond 
the professional theatre. Much of his research over the past years has been on 
European performance, with a special attachment to work being produced in 
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northern Italy. Joe is currently working on a book, provisionally titled The Illuminated 
Theatre. Essays on the Suffering of Images. 
 
Esa Kirkkopelto (Born in 1965)  
2007-2012 Professor of Artistic Research, Vice-Rector, Theatre Academy Helsinki.  
2012-2015 Responsible leader of the “Doctoral Programme of Artistic Research” 
(Theatre Academy Helsinki, Academy of Fine Arts, Sibelius Academy, Aalto 
University) 
2011-2014 Responsible leader of the “Asian Art and Performance Consortium” 
(Theatre Academy Helsinki & Academy of Fine Arts) 
2009-2011 Responsible leader of the “Actor´s Art in Modern Times” research group 
(Theatre Academy Helsinki, University of Helsinki) 
2007-2011 Member of the Steering committee of the “Doctoral School of Music, 
Theatre and Dance” (Sibelius Academy, University of Helsinki, University of 
Tampere, Theatre Academy Helsinki) 
2009-2012 Member of the “Figures of Touch” research group (Aalto University, 
Helsinki University, Theatre Academy Helsinki) 
2004-2007 Post doctoral position at the department of aesthetics, University of 
Helsinki.  
2002 PhD at Université Marc Bloch (Strasbourg).  
Former theatre director and playwright.  
Convenor of “Other Spaces” – live art collective (2004–).  
Author of « Le théâtre de l´expérience. Contributions à la théorie de la scène » 
(Presses de l´Univerisité Paris-Sorbonne 2008). 
 
Alice Lagaay, Dr. phil., is a post-doctoral researcher and lecturer at Bremen 
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